Accidents: Definition, Categories and the Beginning of the Origination Argument

1. From substances to accidents: the central distinction

Aʿyān include the bodies and substances whose composition and divisibility have been examined. Aʿrāḍ are the attributes or states subsisting in something else. A body may be white, moving, or at rest; the subject and its state are conceptually distinct.

This distinction underlies the classical argument for the temporal origination of the world. Before arguing from changing states to the origination of bodies, one must identify what an accident is and what kinds of accidents the analysis assumes.

Treating every attribute as an independent substance—or erasing the distinction between subject and attribute—would obscure the subsequent reasoning.

2. The definition of an accident

والعرض ما لا يقوم بذاته، بل بغيره
An accident does not subsist in itself; it subsists in another.

Subsisting in itself does not mean independence from God for existence. It describes the ontological difference between a subject that does not require a bearer of its own kind and an attribute that requires a substratum.

The whiteness of a body is not, on this definition, another self-subsisting material body. The body is the bearer; its whiteness is an accident subsisting in that bearer.

3. Being dependent upon a bearer in spatial occupancy

بل بغيره بأن يكون تابعاً له في التحيز
Rather, it subsists in another by depending on it with respect to spatial occupancy.

Taḥayyuz concerns being related to a spatial locus. For some accidents, their spatial attribution follows that of the substance or body bearing them: the color of a surface is attributed to that surface rather than assigned an independent material location.

This does not make color another tiny body. Spatial dependence describes the way the accident belongs to its bearer; it is not a definition of a separate material constituent.

4. The qualifying relation between attribute and subject

أو مختصاً به اختصاص الناعت بالمنعوت
Or it is specially related to another, as a qualifying attribute is related to what it qualifies.

The formulation allows for dependence not always described in strictly spatial terms. Its central idea is specification to a bearer: the attribute belongs to a particular subject.

For example, the warmth of a body and the warm body are not interchangeable concepts. Sharing one concrete situation does not make the property and its bearer two equally self-subsisting entities.

5. Why the divine attributes are not classified as accidents

An accident is a category used for created dependent attributes within the discussion of bodies and substances. It is therefore not applied to God's eternal attributes.

If the mere fact that an attribute belongs to a subject were treated as the complete definition, the category would become too broad. The relevant sort of dependence and the discussion of created attributes must remain in view. Divine knowledge and the color of a body are not two instances of one identical ontological type in this theology.

The distinction is between an attribute associated with a subject in general and a temporally originated accident dependent upon a created substratum.

6. Black and white as basic color categories

السواد والبياض
Blackness and whiteness.

Color is a leading example of an accident. A cloth may remain the same body while its color changes; the body and its qualitative state are not identical.

The classical account begins with black and white and records differing accounts of the remaining colors. The purpose here is not to establish a modern theory of color formation. It is to show how a quality of a body is analyzed as an accident distinct from its bearer.

7. Disagreement about red, green, and yellow

وقيل: الحمرة والخضرة والصفرة أيضاً، والبواقي بالتركيب
It was also held that redness, greenness, and yellowness are basic, while the remaining colors arise by composition.

One classical view reduces basic colors to two; another adds red, green, and yellow. The distinction is between an allegedly basic color and a derivative color.

These are historical explanations, not modern optics or pigment science. The dispute over basic colors does not undo the immediate point of the argument: color is treated as an accident borne by a colored thing.

8. The four states called akwān

والأكوان وهي الاجتماع والافتراق والحركة والسكون
The akwān are conjunction, separation, motion, and rest.

In this technical usage, kawn refers to the spatial state of a substance or body, not simply to the universe at large. It concerns being in a place or spatial locus.

The four states must not be confused. Conjunction and separation concern the spatial relation of two substances, while motion and rest compare the spatial condition of a subject across successive instants.

9. Kawn and the philosophical category of place

الكون وهو الحصول في المكان
Kawn is being in a place.

Philosophical discussions use ayn for the category of where a thing is. The exact differences between place and spatial locus require care: terminology from different schools should not be conflated as though every technical definition were identical.

Saying someone is “in the room” states a spatial condition; saying the person is “resting in the room” adds another description. Kawn, in this discussion, isolates the relevant spatial relation.

10. What conjunction means

الاجتماع: وهو كون جوهرين بحيث لا يمكن أن يتوسطهما ثالث
Conjunction is two substances being so situated that no third substance can intervene between them.

The decisive condition is the impossibility of an intervening third. Two things being in one room merely shows general proximity; it does not establish technical conjunction.

In the classical atomistic scheme, neighboring indivisible parts are used to illustrate this relation. Technical contiguity must be distinguished from ordinary closeness in order to preserve the logic of the definition.

11. What separation means

والافتراق: وهو كونهما بحيث يمكن أن يتوسطهما ثالث
Separation is the relation of two substances such that a third could be situated between them.

Unlike conjunction, the condition is the possibility of an intervening third, not its actual presence. Possibility and actuality must be kept distinct.

Imagine a gap between two substances: technical separation does not require a third item already occupying it. It requires only that the relation permits such an intervening occupant.

12. Motion as a succession of spatial states

والحركة: وهي الحصول في المكان مسبوقاً بحصوله في مكان آخر
Motion is occupation of a place preceded by occupation of another place.

The key condition is a difference between successive spatial states. If a body occupies position A at one instant and position B at the next, it is described as moving.

This is a metaphysical definition in terms of position and time, not a modern mathematical account of all kinds of motion, velocity, or physical dynamics.

13. Rest as remaining in the same place

والسكون: وهو حصوله في المكان مسبوقاً بحصوله فيه
Rest is occupation of a place preceded by occupation of that same place.

If a body occupies position A at both an earlier and a later instant, this is characterized as rest. Comparison of successive instants is essential to the definition.

Saying only “the object is now at A” does not tell us whether it has moved there or remained there; its previous spatial condition must be considered.

14. The philosophers’ privative account of rest

Some philosophers defined rest as the absence of motion in something naturally capable of moving, making it a case of privation (ʿadam al-malakah).

The kalām formulation instead identifies rest by comparing successive spatial conditions. These are different explanatory angles:
First: a subject capable of motion is not moving.
Second: the subject is in the same place at successive instants.

The formulations should not simply be treated as interchangeable, since their background theories differ.

15. Comparing the four akwān

The four akwān are distinguished by two questions.

Relation of two substances: If a third cannot intervene, it is conjunction; if a third could intervene, it is separation.
Successive states of one substance: If the earlier place differs, it is motion; if it is the same, it is rest.

The first pair is about a relation between two subjects; the second about successive states of one subject. An assertion of motion is therefore not analyzed in the same way as an assertion of separation.

16. One spatial fact and multiple descriptions

A further question asks whether each of the four names denotes an independently distinct external accident or whether one spatial reality is described under different aspects or relations.

Being in a place may be considered relative to another substance as conjunction or separation, and relative to a previous instant as motion or rest.

Several technical labels do not by themselves prove several separately existing entities. One must distinguish the underlying state from the description grounded in a relation.

17. The nine categories of taste

والطعوم، وأنواعها تسعة
Tastes are enumerated as nine kinds.

The historical taxonomy names:
al-marārah — bitterness.
al-ḥirqah — a burning or sharp taste.
al-mulūḥah — saltiness.
al-ʿufūṣah — astringent tartness.
al-ḥumūḍah — sourness.
al-qabḍ — constricting or strongly astringent taste.
al-ḥalāwah — sweetness.
al-dusūmah — fattiness.
al-tafāhah — insipidity.

Composite flavors can display several qualities. This is a classical classification of sensations, not contemporary gustatory science.

18. Basic taste names and composite experiences

ثم يحصل بحسب التركيب أنواع لا تحصى
Through combination, innumerable varieties then arise.

The nine names do not imply that every food yields just one isolated sensation. A food may combine sweetness and sourness, or saltiness and burning sharpness.

The classification separates basic labels from composite experiences. The ontological application is also instructive: a single bearer can exhibit changing qualities, while the bearer and the qualities remain analytically distinct.

19. Odors and further sensible accidents

والروائح وأنواعها كثيرة، وليست لها أسماء مخصوصة
Odors are numerous in kind, without separate established names for all of them.

Odor illustrates that a sensible quality may be distinguishable even when language lacks a unique name for every nuance. Some smells are pleasant, others unpleasant, and others are perceived as mixtures.

Having a conventional word for a quality and perceiving that quality are different matters. The limits of vocabulary do not by themselves set the limits of possible sensible distinctions.

20. Which subjects can bear which accidents?

والأظهر أن ما عدا الأكوان لا يعرض إلا للأجسام
The preferable view here is that, apart from the akwān, other accidents occur only in bodies.

Under this position, kawn may be ascribed to a substance, while color, taste, and similar sensed qualities are attributed to composite bodies. Other kalām positions differ about which substrates can bear which accidents.

Two questions must remain separate: “Which sort of bearer can receive a color?” and “Can color subsist independently?” The latter concerns the definition of accident; the former concerns the range of possible substrata.

21. The world classified into substances and accidents

وإذا تقرر أن العالم أعيان وأعراض، والأعيان أجسام وجواهر
Once it is established that the world comprises substances and accidents, with bodies and atoms counted among substances…

The argument for the world's temporal origination can now be organized. In this classification:
Aʿyān comprise bodies and substances.
Aʿrāḍ comprise colors, spatial states, tastes, and other dependent properties.

The conclusion that the world is originated does not follow merely from naming these categories. The division states the objects to be examined; their origination still requires argument.

22. Origination of some accidents through observation

أما الأعراض فبعضها بالمشاهدة
For some accidents, their temporal occurrence is known by observation.

A thing may be first at rest and then in motion; a surface may be white and subsequently black. Such cases show a change of state and motivate the distinction between the occurrence and cessation of accidents.

Observation establishes a change; a full metaphysical analysis of what undergoes change requires further argument. One should not treat every observable transition as though it immediately settles every ontological premise.

23. Why other accidents require inference

وبعضها بالدليل وهو طريان العدم
For other accidents, origination is argued from the occurrence of nonexistence or cessation.

When the first occurrence of a quality is not directly seen, its disappearance or possible loss becomes a basis for inference. The argument rests on a contrast between what is eternal and what is subject to nonexistence.

Yet “this particular property has ceased” and “every possible property necessarily ceases” are distinct claims. The former may be grounded in a case; the latter requires a general argument.

24. Why eternity and nonexistence are contrasted

فإن القدم ينافي العدم
For eternity is incompatible with nonexistence.

Qidam means beginninglessness. If a given accident is shown to have been absent, or to be subject to nonexistence in the relevant sense, it cannot be beginningless in that same sense.

Two cautions matter:
1. Specify which property's nonexistence is being discussed.
2. The loss of one property by a body does not by itself establish that the whole body originated; an additional premise is needed.

Thus the origination of accidents and the origination of substances occupy distinct stages of the argument.

25. Two premises of the classical origination argument

أما الأعيان فإنها لا تخلو عن الحوادث، وكل ما لا يخلو عن الحوادث فهو حادث
Substances are not free from originated states; and whatever cannot be free of originated states is itself originated.

The classical inference takes this form:
Premise 1: A body or substance is always associated with some originated spatial or qualitative state.
Premise 2: Whatever cannot exist apart from such originated states is itself originated.
Conclusion: Substances are originated; since accidents are also argued to be originated, the world in this classification is originated.

This is the structure of the argument, not yet a full defense of each premise. The universality of “cannot be free” and the entailment “therefore originated” demand independent examination.