Causes of Knowledge: Definition, Certainty and Sources

1. From affirming reality to knowing it

أَسْبَابُ الْعِلْمِ
The causes or means of knowledge.

Once the reality of things has been affirmed, a further question arises: how can human beings know those realities? A thing's being real and a person's knowing it are distinct. A mountain can exist beyond anyone's present view; the question of how its existence becomes known is a separate inquiry.

The nature of knowledge concerns the attribute by which something becomes clear to the knower. Its causes or means concern the routes through which created beings acquire that knowledge. The nature of knowledge and its modes of acquisition are distinct questions and must not be conflated.

2. The central definition of knowledge

وَهُوَ صِفَةٌ يَتَجَلَّى بِهَا الْمَذْكُورُ لِمَنْ قَامَتْ هِيَ بِهِ
Knowledge is an attribute through which what is mentioned becomes manifest to the one in whom that attribute subsists.

The definition contains three parts. Attribute (ṣifah) describes knowledge as a quality of the knower; the mentioned matter (al-madhkūr) is what can be the object of awareness; and manifestation (tajallī) means that the matter becomes clear to the knower.

Someone who knows that a door is open does more than recite those words. The person apprehends a subject and the condition asserted of it. Verbal expression may convey that knowledge, but is not itself identical with the attribute of knowing.

3. The meaning of attribute and inherence

صِفَةٌ ... لِمَنْ قَامَتْ هِيَ بِهِ
An attribute subsisting in the knower.

The expression qāmat bihi is technical theological language. It does not picture knowledge as a physical object stored somewhere inside a person. It attributes the quality of knowing to the subject who possesses knowledge, while what is known remains the object of that awareness.

If Zayd knows that two is less than four, Zayd is the knower; knowledge is the relevant attribute; and the numerical relation is the object known. Maintaining these distinctions prevents us from identifying the external or conceptual object with the knower's quality of awareness.

4. Manifestation and intelligibility

يَتَجَلَّى بِهَا الْمَذْكُورُ
The matter becomes clear through that attribute.

Tajallī cannot be restricted to visual appearance. Hearing a sound, understanding a mathematical relation, and apprehending the impossibility of a contradiction are different kinds of cognition. In each case, something becomes intelligible in a determinate respect.

Thus an object of knowledge need not be a colored or shaped body. Sensible particulars can be known through perception, while conceptual relationships and judgments can be known intellectually. The manifestation of an object to understanding is broader than its appearance before the eye.

5. Why the definition uses al-madhkūr

الْمَذْكُورُ
What can be mentioned or made an object of thought.

This wording is deliberately broad. Restricting the object of knowledge to something externally existent would make it hard to include true judgments about absence and impossibility. One may know that an object exists, but one may also know that a specified object is not present.

Example 1: “This book is on the table” concerns an existent object. Example 2: “There is no elephant in this room” concerns the absence of a particular kind of object. In neither case does the mere ability to speak about the subject prove that it exists externally. Mentionability and actuality must remain distinct.

6. Knowing the possible, absent and impossible

مَمْكِن، مَعْدُوم، مُسْتَحِيل
Possible, nonexistent, and impossible.

The possible can exist without involving an inherent contradiction, even if it does not actually exist. The nonexistent is absent in the relevant respect. The impossible involves a contradiction that blocks its realization.

A particular house planned for next year may be possible yet not constructed today. In contrast, the same thing being entirely existent and entirely nonexistent at the same instant and in the same respect is contradictory. Both kinds of subject can be discussed truly. That does not turn absence or impossibility into independent external objects.

7. A second classical definition

صِفَةٌ تُوجِبُ تَمْيِيزًا لَا يَحْتَمِلُ النَّقِيضَ
An attribute producing discrimination that does not admit the contradictory.

This alternate definition stresses distinguishing knowledge and certainty. Discrimination here need not mean merely seeing two differently colored things. It can mean distinguishing a particular meaning or judgment from incompatible alternatives.

The judgment that a fixed integer cannot be both even and odd in the same respect has a different status from “perhaps it will rain today.” The first is put forward as certain; the second expresses possibility. The two definitions bring different emphases—manifestation and certain discrimination—into focus.

8. Discrimination is not merely sensory contrast

تَمْيِيز
The recognition that distinguishes one content from another.

Discrimination may be sensory, as when one distinguishes white from black, or intellectual, as when one understands that a proposition and its contradiction cannot both be true in the same respect. Restricting discrimination to the senses would exclude important kinds of intellectual cognition.

With conception, a square can be distinguished from a triangle by its meaning. With judgment, the truth of “a square has four sides” can be understood as a predication. Thus knowledge may concern a concept or an affirmed claim, and the relevant discrimination is not identical in these two settings.

9. The contradictory and the status of certainty

لَا يَحْتَمِلُ النَّقِيضَ
Does not allow the contradictory in the relevant established cognition.

A contradictory is not merely an alternative opinion. It directly denies the same proposition about the same subject, time, and respect. “This door is closed” is contradicted by “This door is not closed,” provided the reference and circumstances are the same.

Strong subjective confidence must not automatically be treated as genuine knowledge; people can be intensely convinced and still mistaken. The technical question is whether a definition that stresses exclusion of contradiction adequately covers all forms of knowing, including conceptions as well as certain judgments.

10. A definition must cover conception and judgment

The first definition's broad term al-madhkūr permits discussion of concepts and judgments alike. The second raises a question: does every mere conception have a contradictory in quite the same sense as a complete proposition?

Conceiving “tree” does not itself assert its existence. Judging “this tree exists” yields a definite claim whose contradictory is “this tree does not exist.” A definition centered on excluding the opposite of an affirmed judgment therefore needs explanation when applied to conceptual awareness. This illustrates why even apparently small changes in a technical definition affect its range of application.

11. Sensory cognition and the range of the definition

If discrimination is taken in a narrowly intellectual or propositional sense, some sensory apprehensions may be excluded. If taken broadly as determinate awareness, sensory cognition can be included. The scope of the definition thus depends upon the technical meanings of its key terms.

Someone feels the heat of fire: that is sensory apprehension. The person then judges “this fire is hot”: that is a proposition. The two are related but not structurally identical. A sound assessment of the proposed definition requires establishing which kinds of sensation, conception, and judgment its language is meant to capture.

12. Knowledge, conjecture and doubt

لِأَنَّ الْعِلْمَ عِنْدَهُمْ مُقَابِلٌ لِلظَّنِّ
For, in their terminology, knowledge stands in contrast to conjecture.

In one technical usage, ʿilm signifies certainty, whereas ẓann involves a preferred but still nondecisive possibility. Shakk commonly denotes hesitation without preference between opposed possibilities. Exact usage may vary across disciplines.

Saying “it will probably rain” on the basis of clouds can represent conjecture. Grasping a valid mathematical demonstration may exemplify certainty. The fact that some evidence appears credible does not by itself determine whether its conclusion is demonstratively certain; the status depends upon the proof and its conditions.

13. Knowledge and changing conditions

An objection arises: if someone is present today but absent tomorrow, does knowledge admit its contradiction? The response specifies the time and subject of the judgment.

“Zayd is present at this gathering today” and “Zayd is absent from it tomorrow” are not contradictory claims about the same time. Both can be true. The original report still needs valid grounds for its assertion about today.

Thus a change in the world must not be confused with a contradiction in knowledge. Contradiction requires fixing the subject, predicate, time, and relevant respect before comparing affirmation with denial.

14. Created knowledge and divine knowledge

لِلْخَلْقِ ... بِخِلَافِ عِلْمِ الْخَالِقِ تَعَالَى فَإِنَّهُ لِذَاتِهِ
Created beings have means of knowing, unlike the Creator, whose knowledge belongs to His essence.

The passage establishes a theological distinction. Human and other created beings come to know through particular routes; divine knowledge is not acquired from outside through hearing, experiment, or a process of learning. Applying the conditions of created cognition to divine knowledge would therefore be a category error within this theological framework.

The coming classification of senses, report, and reason concerns the means of knowledge available to creatures. It must not be read as a description of how God acquires knowledge.

15. The three principal means of knowledge

ثَلَاثَةٌ: الْحَوَاسُّ السَّلِيمَةُ، وَالْخَبَرُ الصَّادِقُ، وَالْعَقْلُ بِحُكْمِ الِاسْتِقْرَاءِ
By an inductive classification, the three principal means are sound senses, truthful report, and reason.

Sound senses apprehend sensible matters when the faculty and conditions are suitable. Truthful report conveys information whose truth has appropriate grounds. Reason handles concepts, judgments, and valid inference.

Seeing an object oneself, learning through trustworthy testimony, and drawing a conclusion from established premises are distinct routes. The purpose of naming them is not merely to memorize a triad but to understand what each contributes and where each needs qualification.

16. Sound senses and the conditions of perception

الْحَوَاسُّ السَّلِيمَةُ
The sound senses.

The qualifier “sound” signals that not every sensation is equally trustworthy regardless of circumstances. The functioning of a sense organ, distance, illumination, and the type of object can affect what appears to the observer. A correctly observed property must be distinguished from a mistaken judgment about the observation.

A distant person appears small, but it does not follow that the person's actual height is only a few inches. Perception presents an appearance under specific conditions, while the inference may neglect distance. Affirming sensory knowledge is therefore different from claiming that every interpretation of sensory experience is immune from error.

17. Truthful report and what lies beyond direct observation

الْخَبَرُ الصَّادِقُ
A true report, adequately grounded as corresponding to reality.

No person directly observes every city, past event, or another person's experience. Reporting can provide knowledge beyond one's immediate observation. Yet the occurrence of a report and its being truthful are different matters. Hearing a claim many times does not by itself establish its correctness.

If someone says it rained in another city today, a listener who did not observe it must consider the report's grounds and reliability. A truthful report can communicate knowledge; an unsupported report may produce only a possibility. Its reliability must therefore be evaluated rather than assumed merely because someone has spoken.

18. Reason as a route to understanding and judgment

الْعَقْلُ
The faculty through which meanings, judgments, and conclusions are grasped.

Reason should not be restricted to constructing long formal proofs. Some meanings and elementary judgments are immediately intelligible, whereas other results arise through connecting premises. Reason may also draw conclusions from material supplied by the senses, so the intellectual step can be distinguished from the earlier observation.

If every square has four sides and the drawn figure is a square, its having four sides follows by reasoning from the premises. The result is not merely a visual sensation nor merely someone's report; the operative step is apprehending the relevant connection.

19. What induction means in this classification

بِحُكْمِ الِاسْتِقْرَاءِ
According to a classification reached by surveying instances.

Istiqrāʾ means examining cases and drawing a general classification or conclusion. Surveying common routes of cognition produces the broad headings of sense, report, and reason. The number three is therefore defended as an analytical division, not by simply repeating an arbitrary list.

What about inner awareness, intuition, or experience? One must first identify how such cognition arises, then determine whether it falls under a broader heading or requires more careful qualification. The classification is meaningful only when its criteria can account for the cases it sorts.

20. External and internal routes of cognition

One explanation of the division asks whether the proximate route to cognition comes from outside the knower or involves a capacity of the knower. Report conveys information from another source; sense uses a perceptual faculty; and reason apprehends conceptual and inferential relations.

One may see a building's height directly, hear a reliable report about it, or compare two known heights through reasoning. The subject can be the same while the route and evidential status vary. The external/internal contrast helps organize the three, but the decisive distinctions concern transmitted information, sensory apprehension, and rational judgment.

21. Cause, instrument and route are not identical

الْمُدْرَكُ ... وَالْآلَةُ ... وَالطَّرِيقُ
The object or proximate factor, the instrument, and the route.

“Cause” is not always used for the same kind of influence. The eye is an instrument of seeing, a report is a channel of information, and intellect is a faculty of understanding and inference. Describing all three without qualification as things that “produce knowledge” conceals their different roles.

A student hears a mathematical explanation: a teacher's words convey information, the ears register sounds, and reason grasps the proof. These aspects can cooperate in one acquisition of knowledge. Classifying means of knowledge requires specifying the respect in which each is called a cause.

22. Ultimate agency and ordinary causes

بِأَنْ يَخْلُقَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى فِينَا الْعِلْمَ مَعَهُ بِطَرِيقِ جَرْيِ الْعَادَةِ
God creates knowledge in us in conjunction with that means, in accordance with the customary course of events.

This theological explanation distinguishes observed or proximate means from ultimate agency. People see, hear reports, and reason; knowledge ordinarily follows through these routes. The passage nevertheless avoids treating such routes as independent of divine creative power.

Jary al-ʿādah denotes a regular customary pattern in which events accompany their familiar antecedents. The distinction is not a rejection of observation or argument. It specifies the theological relationship between created means and the Creator's action.

23. An alternative emphasis on reason and instruments

Some accounts assign reason a more fundamental role in cognition while treating the senses and reports as instruments or routes. The question is what is accomplished by sensation alone and what further understanding or judgment is required for it to become knowledge.

Hearing a sound is a sensory event. Understanding it as a meaningful announcement, evaluating its reliability, and assenting to its claim involve additional cognition. Hearing a spoken claim does not itself guarantee belief in it.

This disagreement should not be confused with denying that knowledge is possible. It often concerns which layer of the process deserves the title “cause,” and which is better called an instrument or channel.

24. Inner awareness, intuition and experience

الْوِجْدَانُ وَالْحَدْسُ وَالتَّجْرِبَةُ وَنَظَرُ الْعَقْلِ
Inner awareness, intuition, experience, and rational reflection.

These are significant ways in which cognition occurs and can therefore seem to challenge a threefold list. Inner awareness concerns the subject's present experience; intuition can involve swiftly grasping a relation; experience joins observation with learned judgments; and reflection arranges premises to draw conclusions.

A broad taxonomy must explain the sensible, intellectual, and inward aspects of these cases. Subsuming a specific route under a broad heading does not deny its distinctive features. It shows why the division requires defensible criteria rather than a rigid count without explanation.

25. Integrated review of the unit

Knowledge is the attribute by which its object becomes clear to the knower in the relevant respect. The breadth of al-madhkūr allows intelligible judgments about existence, absence, and impossibility. Conception must be distinguished from judgment, and certainty from conjecture or merely intense conviction.

The three principal recognized routes for created knowers are sound senses, truthful report, and reason. Two questions must be kept separate: through which route is information acquired, and what is the ultimate theological account of its coming about? The distinctions between cause, instrument, and channel answer different aspects of these questions.

Observation supplies sensible data, reliable testimony supplies information beyond one's observation, and reason connects premises and consequences. An uncorroborated rumor about that same city, however, is not equivalent to established knowledge merely because it has been transmitted.