Creation versus acquisition, Muʿtazilī objections, detailed knowledge, scriptural proofs, freedom, and moral accountability Read the bilingual lesson for Creation of Human Acts: Divine Causation, Acquisition and Choice and test your understanding with a focused quiz.
Lesson
1. The central question of human acts
والله تعالى خالق لأفعال العباد
God Most High is the creator of the acts of His servants.
Human acts include belief and disbelief, obedience and disobedience, along with other voluntary conduct. Two questions must be distinguished: Who brings an act into existence? and To whom is the act attributed? In this Sunni theological account, the act exists through divine creation, while the servant remains its willing, acquiring, and accountable agent.
Affirming God as creator does not by itself deny human responsibility. Nor does attributing a voluntary act to its human agent make that agent an independent creator alongside God. The discussion rests on keeping these two relations distinct.
2. Creation, performance and acquisition
Khalq (creation) means bringing a thing or act from nonexistence into existence. Fiʿl (act) names the action as performed and attributed to an agent. Kasb (acquisition) concerns the servant's voluntary relation to that act, grounding obligation and accountability.
Consider someone giving charity. The act and its occurrence fall under divine creation, but the person undertakes it with intention and choice; this is why the act can count as worship or wrongdoing according to its circumstances. Confusing these relations produces a false dilemma: either the servant is a mere automaton or an independent creator.
Sunni theologians differ over the detailed explanation of acquisition, but share the concern to preserve both divine creation and meaningful human responsibility.
3. The principal Muʿtazilī disagreement
لا كما زعمت المعتزلة أن العبد خالق لأفعاله
This differs from the Muʿtazilī contention that the servant creates his own acts.
Muʿtazilī arguments seek to safeguard divine justice and human responsibility by attributing the origination of voluntary actions to human agents. They raise a difficulty: if disbelief and sin are created by God, how can punishment and blame be just? Sunni theologians reject the supposed consequence because creation and voluntary performance need not be the same relation.
The dispute is not merely whether a human being may be called an agent. It concerns whether the servant's power independently originates an act or whether God creates the act as the servant voluntarily acquires and performs it.
4. The meaning of creator and originator
The word khāliq can sometimes be used for measuring, shaping, or fashioning. The theological dispute, however, concerns creation in the strict sense of truly originating existence. One should not transfer a conclusion from an ordinary usage of the word to an unrestricted theological meaning.
Terms such as mūjid (one who brings into existence) and mukhtariʿ (originator) also arise in this argument. Calling a servant a creator in the absolute sense reserved for God would undermine divine uniqueness. Yet saying that a person writes, makes, or builds something need not assert independent creation from nothing.
The central question is what sort of agency a particular expression attributes, rather than the bare presence of the word 'make' or 'create'.
5. The argument from detailed knowledge
One rational argument maintains that a genuine originator knows the relevant details of what it originates. Since human agents do not know every minute detail of their actions, this is offered as evidence against describing them as independent creators.
Walking looks simple, yet it involves varied limb movements, different speeds, pauses, and intricate coordination. A person intends to walk but does not consciously represent every component of the process in detail.
The argument does not equate lacking detailed awareness with lacking all choice. Someone can intentionally perform an action without possessing exhaustive knowledge of the physical processes accompanying it. The claim under examination concerns independent origination, not whether the person can be said to act.
6. General and detailed awareness
General awareness is knowledge of the intended action and its overall character. Detailed awareness covers its numerous particular aspects and conditions. Confusing the two misstates the argument.
A person knows that they are writing a letter with a pen, even though they may not know the fine vibrations of the pen tip, the neural signals involved, or every muscular adjustment. Writing is still their intentional act.
Thus an argument against independent human creation does not entail that humans have no awareness, agency, or responsibility. The distinction concerns levels of knowledge; it is not an attempt to derive a theological doctrine directly from present-day physiology.
7. Ignorance versus momentary inattention
An objection notes that someone may possess knowledge but fail to attend to it at a given moment. Classical argument therefore distinguishes ignorance (jahl) from inattention (dhuhūl). In the first case, the relevant knowledge is absent; in the second, something known is not presently attended to.
Someone who walks may understand many principles of movement without identifying every particular motion or pause. Human volition need not coincide with exhaustive awareness of all components.
The distinction neither removes human choice nor denies divine creation. It clarifies that an agent's voluntary relation to an act is not the same as the claim to originate it independently and comprehensively.
8. The verse “God created you and what you do”
وَاللَّهُ خَلَقَكُمْ وَمَا تَعْمَلُونَ
“God created you and [the act of] your doing.” (Qurʾān 37:96, on the verbal-noun reading of mā)
The grammatical force of mā is disputed. If it is maṣdariyyah (introducing a verbal noun), the verse refers to human doing and is used directly as evidence for the creation of acts. If it is mawṣūlah (relative), it may refer to what people fashion, such as idols in the immediate context.
The alternatives should be stated openly: the syntactic analysis affects the form of this particular proof, while other scriptural formulations and rational arguments also feature in the broader debate.
9. How two readings of mā affect the proof
مَا تَعْمَلُونَ
“What you fashion” or “your doing”: the meaning differs with the grammatical analysis.
On the verbal-noun construction, taʿmalūn is understood in the sense of the act of doing, approximately “your action.” On the relative-pronoun construction, the expression points to the object acted upon or fashioned. These readings therefore do not produce exactly the same argument.
This is an example of why syntax, immediate context, and the logical claim need to be considered together. The text's theological conclusion should not be made to depend on concealing a real grammatical alternative.
10. The generality of “Creator of everything”
اللَّهُ خَالِقُ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ
“God is the Creator of everything.” (Qurʾān 13:16)
The expression kulli shayʾ is general. Sunni theologians include human beings and their originated acts within its scope, because an act occurring in time is also a contingent thing. The response considers whether a valid rational or textual specification can restrict this generality.
It is not enough to claim that general expressions can never admit exceptions; rather, excluding human actions requires a sound specifying reason. Simply assuming that humans are independent creators would beg the very question being argued.
11. Calling someone a creator and divine uniqueness
أَفَمَنْ يَخْلُقُ كَمَنْ لَا يَخْلُقُ
“Is one who creates like one who does not create?” (Qurʾān 16:17)
The verse distinguishes the Creator from those who cannot create, in an argument about rightful worship. The theological debate concerns whether treating humans as independent originators of their acts is compatible with the exclusive sense of creation attributed to God.
Using “maker” or “creator” in an ordinary sense of arranging or fashioning does not by itself grant a person divinity. The argument concerns unrestricted, independent origination, not every everyday use of a term for production or craftsmanship.
12. Divine uniqueness and careful attribution of shirk
God has no independent partner in creation. But refuting a theological proposition and pronouncing a judgment of shirk or disbelief upon every individual holding a related view are not the same act. Classical arguments may state severe implications of “multiple creators”; understanding an actual person's doctrine requires attention to definitions and stated intent.
Divine power encompasses contingent things, while human choice operates as a real relation within creation. Someone calling a craftsman a “maker” means something different from assigning him independent power to originate existence.
Making this distinction preserves conceptual precision without turning a technical disagreement into an automatic judgment on individuals.
13. Creating an attribute versus possessing it
Creating an act or property does not imply possessing that property. God creates colors and bodily states, but this does not make the divine essence a colored body. The same distinction applies to human actions.
A servant stands, sits, and eats. God creates the existence of these acts, yet this does not make God one who stands, sits, or eats. Producing an act and being described by that act are different relations.
Without this distinction, one might argue that if God creates a human act, all predicates belonging to that act must be attributed to God. The answer differentiates origination from characterization and preserves divine transcendence.
14. Voluntary and involuntary movement
A person may choose to walk, whereas a tremor or involuntary movement can occur without such a choice. Both movements are created, but their relation to voluntary agency differs. Walking is directed by an aim; an involuntary tremor is not acquired in the same manner.
This distinction underlies moral responsibility. A movement occurring without meaningful choice cannot automatically be treated like an act performed with intention, capacity, and choice.
Preserving the difference between voluntary and compelled movement is essential if belief in divine creation is not to be confused with a theory that erases human action altogether.
15. Choice does not require knowing every detail
For an act to be voluntary, the agent need not know every muscular movement, pause, and downstream consequence. Selecting a purpose and acting toward it are central indicators of choice and acquisition.
A person intentionally goes for a walk, although many bodily processes remain beyond conscious inspection. The absence of such detail does not turn an ordinary walk into a reflex. An involuntary tremor, by contrast, lacks the same intentional relation.
Thus the argument about exhaustive knowledge should not be turned into a denial of choice. Its intended conclusion concerns the rejection of independent origination by the servant.
16. Duty, praise and blame
Religious obligation (taklīf) means holding people responsible through commands and prohibitions. If an agent had no meaningful choice at all, praise for obedience and blame for disobedience would become deeply problematic. Sunni accounts therefore affirm the servant's acquisition and voluntary agency.
Telling the truth intentionally differs morally from deliberately lying, even when both acts fall under divine creation. Reward and punishment concern how an action is voluntarily attributed to its agent, not whether that agent independently created it.
The doctrine of acquisition preserves a crucial distinction between absolute compulsion and independent creative power.
17. The objection of absolute determinism
In certain formulations of Jabrite determinism, the servant's acquisition or meaningful choice is denied so thoroughly that the person is little more than the locus in which an act occurs. Such a picture makes moral responsibility difficult to explain.
The doctrine of divine creation is not automatically identical to that determinism. It addresses who gives existence to the act; the servant's voluntary relation is established through another distinction.
Consequently, “God created it” does not establish that “the servant willed nothing.” Conversely, “the servant chose it” does not establish that the servant independently brought the act into being.
18. The Muʿtazilī challenge from accountability
One Muʿtazilī challenge asks: If God creates disbelief and wrongdoing, on what basis can the wrongdoer be punished or the obedient rewarded? The objection treats creating the act as equivalent to choosing and committing it.
The response distinguishes the two: humans receive commands and voluntarily obey or disobey; their acquisition is what is subject to moral and legal evaluation. God's origination of an act neither implies approval of the sin nor removes the servant's accountability.
It is also important not to collapse creative will into command and approval. These distinctions prevent the origination of an action from being confused with its moral evaluation.
19. Means, instruments and the real Creator
People act by means of instruments and causes: they write with a hand, walk with feet, and speak with a tongue. The presence of these means does not make them independent originators of existence.
A means or cause is a condition or pathway associated with the occurrence of an act; an instrument is the immediate medium used; creation in the strict sense concerns bringing that act into existence. These roles are distinct.
The disagreement with the Muʿtazilah does not deny that human action visibly proceeds through human capacities. It denies that such capacities are independent creators outside divine origination.
20. Wisdom, justice and responsibility
Two extremes threaten the discussion: eliminating any meaningful human choice, or making the servant an independent creator in an effort to defend divine justice. Each overlooks a different part of the issue.
Divine creation concerns the existence of an act; human acquisition concerns its voluntary attribution; and religious judgment concerns whether the act is obedience or disobedience. Confusion arises when one relation is mistaken for another.
The intended account preserves human responsibility without placing an independent creator alongside God.
21. The broader lexical sense of khalaqa
فَتَبَارَكَ اللَّهُ أَحْسَنُ الْخَالِقِينَ
“So blessed is God, the best of creators.” (Qurʾān 23:14)
The expression “creators” does not entail several beings who independently create from nothing in the divine sense. The verb khalaqa can also denote estimating, shaping, or fashioning. God's creation is unrestricted in the theological sense, while some applications to creatures are narrower and lexical.
Sharing a word does not prove sharing the same ontological power. The verse must be understood through its usage and context rather than forcing one technical definition onto every occurrence.
22. Jesus and the shaping of clay
وَإِذْ تَخْلُقُ مِنَ الطِّينِ كَهَيْئَةِ الطَّيْرِ
“When you shaped from clay something in the form of a bird.” (Qurʾān 5:110)
The verb “create” is used in addressing Jesus, peace be upon him. It does not establish an independent creative power equal to God's. In context the act involves shaping, while the resulting living sign occurs by My permission (bi-idhni).
The verse therefore distinguishes the limited action attributed to a prophet, divine permission, and absolute origination. A theological conclusion must attend to the whole expression and its conditions rather than isolating one verb.
23. Applying the distinctions to making and writing
Saying “she built a house” is ordinary and correct, even though she did not create the earth, materials, abilities, or laws of nature from nothing. Likewise “Zayd wrote a letter” attributes the acquired action of writing to Zayd, while the origination of the act's existence is attributed to God.
These comparisons clarify meanings; they do not establish a complete physical mechanism for divine creation and human acquisition. Their value is to separate everyday agency from independent absolute creativity.
Thus human action need not be emptied of meaning, and every craftsperson need not be treated as an independently creating deity.
24. Rational argument and scriptural evidence
The analysis of human acts employs revealed evidence and rational argument without treating them as interchangeable. Scriptural formulations such as “God is the Creator of everything” address the universality of creation, while rational argument examines whether a contingent human act could be independently originated by a creature.
If an objection concerns the grammar of a verse, the reply needs syntactic and contextual analysis. If it concerns the claim that an originator must know all particulars, the reply must examine general versus detailed knowledge.
A sound inquiry identifies exactly which premise is contested and answers at that level. Repeating a different proof is not, by itself, an answer to every objection.
25. The cumulative argument and two recurring errors
The cumulative case combines scriptural arguments about God's universal creativity and human acts with rational arguments about the contingency of actions, the limits of exhaustive human knowledge, and the meaning of independent origination. One should neither ignore a verse's genuine grammatical alternative nor rest the entire doctrine on a single analogy.
Mistake 1: inferring “humans have no choice” from “God creates the act.”
Mistake 2: inferring “humans independently create existence” from “humans choose.”
The careful conclusion is that the existence of an act belongs to divine creation, while its voluntary moral attribution belongs to human acquisition. The distinctions between decree, approval, and divine will remain essential to the doctrine.
Practice questions
Question 1
What is the central Sunni distinction concerning human actions?
- Humans independently originate acts; God only commands
- God creates the act; the servant voluntarily acquires it
- Only involuntary actions can be attributed to humans
- God creates only morally good actions
Question 2
If a person deliberately lies, which analysis is appropriate?
- Divine creation cancels the liar’s responsibility
- Committing the act makes the human an independent creator
- Intention cannot matter for the act
- God creates the act, while the human’s deliberate acquisition remains accountable
Question 3
What chiefly distinguishes khalq from kasb?
- Creation brings into existence; acquisition is voluntary human attribution
- Creation is intention; acquisition annihilates an object
- Creation concerns only worship; acquisition only sins
- Acquisition means independent divine creation; creation means human compulsion
Question 4
What concern primarily motivates the Muʿtazilī assertion of human origination?
- Denying God’s knowledge of particulars
- Establishing bodily divine attributes
- Explaining moral accountability and divine justice
- Treating miracles as unnecessary to prophecy
Question 5
Why does calling someone a builder differ from calling them an independent creator?
- The first denotes only involuntary action
- The first is ordinary making; the second asserts unrestricted origination
- They necessarily assert the same doctrine
- The second merely means acquisition
Question 6
What is the target of the argument from detailed knowledge?
- Proving that no person ever intends an act
- Proving all acts are involuntary
- Proving humans recognize none of their acts
- Challenging the claim of independent human origination
Question 7
How do intention and exhaustive knowledge of bodily motion relate in walking?
- One may intend to walk without knowing every component movement
- Choice requires exhaustive knowledge of all bodily movements
- Any unknown detail makes walking involuntary
- General and detailed knowledge are identical
Question 8
Which statement correctly distinguishes jahl from dhuhūl?
- Jahl is distraction; dhuhūl is absence of knowledge
- Both necessarily deny choice
- Jahl is not knowing; dhuhūl is momentary inattention to something known
- Dhuhūl is pure imagination, unrelated to knowledge
Question 9
How does reading mā as a verbal-noun particle affect Qurʾān 37:96?
- It restricts the phrase to the material idols
- It allows the sense of “your doing” or “your acts”
- It excludes actions from the discussion
- It makes mā necessarily a negation
Question 10
What sense arises if mā in the same verse is relative?
- What you fashion or make
- Only a question about where you work
- Actions cannot occur
- Negation of a past-tense verb
Question 11
What methodological principle follows from acknowledging two grammatical analyses?
- Context may be ignored in favor of a technical claim
- Every syntactic analysis must yield the same conclusion
- Lexicon alone settles all theology
- Syntax, context, and the resulting argument should be evaluated distinctly
Question 12
What premise is central when applying “Creator of everything” to human acts?
- Human acts are not contingent and originated
- A general term can never admit specification
- Human acts are contingent existents unless a valid exception excludes them
- The verse speaks only of material bodies
Question 13
What is the purpose of the contrast “Does one who creates equal one who cannot?”
- Distinguishing the Creator as worthy of worship
- Making every artisan a partner in divinity
- Proving human actions do not exist
- Defining legal command and creation as identical
Question 14
Which example correctly illustrates the distinction between creation and predication?
- Whoever creates a color must be a colored body
- God creates motion and therefore bodily moves
- The creator must possess every feature of the creature
- God creates bodily acts without possessing their bodily properties
Question 15
What distinguishes intentional movement from a tremor?
- An involuntary movement is uncreated
- The first involves intention and choice; the second lacks that relation
- Both entail identical religious responsibility
- The first is outside divine creation
Question 16
What feature of the servant matters for praise and blame?
- The voluntary acquisition and attribution of the act
- Being the independent originator of existence
- Exhaustive awareness of every bodily movement
- Only external occurrence regardless of intention
Question 17
Why is identifying divine creation with absolute compulsion mistaken?
- Compulsion can apply only to good actions
- God creates only intentions and not acts
- Because acquisition necessarily originates existence independently
- Creation concerns origination, while compulsion denies human choice
Question 18
What assumption underlies the objection “How can reward and punishment be just?”
- God has power over contingent things
- Equating origination with voluntary commission
- People can receive religious commands
- Intention may affect moral evaluation
Question 19
What does not follow from God creating an act?
- The act belongs among contingent existents
- Its origination is attributed to the Creator
- God morally approves the act
- The servant’s acquisition can ground moral attribution
Question 20
Which distinction correctly describes means, instrument and creator?
- Means and instruments mediate an act; the Creator brings it into existence
- An instrument must be an independent originator
- The presence of means rules out human agency
- Means, instrument, and creator are interchangeable
Question 21
Which inference from “best of creators” is unwarranted?
- Khalaqa can refer to fashioning in some contexts
- A lexical use may differ from a theological claim
- Creatures may be described as fashioning in a limited sense
- Multiple independent creators equal to God are established
Question 22
How should “you shape/create” in Qurʾān 5:110 be understood regarding Jesus?
- It proves independent creative power equal to God
- The shaping is attributed to him; the miraculous result occurs by God’s leave
- No action is attributed to him
- The phrase “by My permission” is irrelevant
Question 23
What is the first step when a theologian calls a human agent “creator”?
- Determine whether it means independent origination or limited making/acquisition
- Assume immediate belief in independent divinity
- Treat all context as irrelevant
- Apply the same personal legal judgment to every usage
Question 24
Which statement correctly relates creation and moral evaluation?
- Everything God creates is necessarily commanded
- A sinful act cannot be created
- Human choice renders all commands meaningless
- The act’s origination and its legal-moral status are different aspects
Question 25
Which distinction is most important before studying decree and destiny?
- Classifying every action as involuntary
- Not equating creative will, approval, and command without analysis
- Treating the issue as solved by words alone
- Always dismissing human intention as irrelevant
Question 26
Which conclusion most faithfully captures the unit?
- Since humans choose, God does not create their acts
- Since God creates, human intention and acquisition are unreal
- Creation belongs to God; voluntary acquisition and moral attribution to humans
- Each person independently originates their body and instruments
Question 27
The relative and verbal-noun readings of mā can change the immediate meaning of “wa-mā taʿmalūn.”
Question 28
God’s creation of human acts entails that God eats, walks, or commits sin.
Question 29
Acquisition and voluntary choice help explain praise, blame, and obligation against absolute compulsion.
Question 30
Calling a craftsperson a “maker” necessarily attributes divine creation from nothing to that person.
Open the interactive quiz