Divine Speech: Eternal Attribute, Inner Speech and Its Relations

1. Divine speech as an eternal attribute

وَالْكَلَامُ وَهِيَ صِفَةٌ أَزَلِيَّةٌ
Speech is an eternal attribute.

God's being one who speaks (mutakallim) is a real attribute of perfection. It does not mean that God once lacked speech and subsequently acquired a new property. Divine speech is affirmed without dependence on vocal organs, physical sound production, or temporal change.

A mutakallim is one to whom speech truly pertains. Distinguishing the eternity of this attribute from the temporality of our recitation is fundamental to the entire discussion.

2. Inner speech and articulated speech

Inner speech (kalām nafsī) denotes the real, meaningful divine speech subsisting in God and not belonging to the class of letters and sounds. Articulated speech (kalām lafẓī) refers to the words, vocal performances, and written signs through which that meaning is expressed.

عَبَّرَ عَنْهَا بِالنَّظْمِ الْمُسَمَّى بِالْقُرْآنِ الْمُرَكَّبِ مِنَ الْحُرُوفِ
It is expressed by the ordered composition called the Qur'an, composed of letters.

An expression and what it expresses must not automatically receive the same temporal description. Humanly uttered sounds begin in time; the eternal attribute is not confined to these produced sounds.

3. One meaning, multiple means of expression

A meaning may be conveyed through spoken expression, writing, or gesture. The medium changes, but it does not follow that the meaning conveyed comes into being anew with every medium.

A teacher might say “Close the door,” write it, or communicate it by a gesture. These are different modes of expression directed to an identifiable instruction.

The human example illustrates only the distinction between signified meaning and sign. It does not attribute human mental states, a tongue, or bodily organs to God.

4. Knowledge is not identical to speech

وَهُوَ غَيْرُ الْعِلْمِ
It is distinct from knowledge.

Knowledge concerns the disclosure of a reality; speech may involve reporting, commanding, or prohibiting. A person's making a statement does not establish that the person knows it to be true. A human can report falsely even while knowing the contrary.

This example demonstrates a conceptual distinction between knowledge and speech. It does not allow falsehood to be predicated of God; divine truthfulness and transcendence remain affirmed.

5. Speech is not identical to will

وَغَيْرُ الْإِرَادَةِ
It is also distinct from will.

A command requests or requires an act, whereas will concerns the determination of an event. A human may command as a test, knowing disobedience will occur, or intending to expose disobedience. Thus the meaning of a command is not identical with willing that the action occur.

In theological language one distinguishes the normative command from the divine will governing what occurs. The fact that an act is commanded does not mean that every addressee will in fact perform it.

6. Command and noncompliance

A master commands a servant to do something, and the servant refuses. The instruction remains a command even though compliance does not occur. A command is therefore not defined by the successful execution of its object.

The commanded act (maʾmūr bih) is what was ordered; compliance (imthithāl) is conformity; and disobedience (ʿiṣyān) is nonconformity. “A command was given” and “the command was obeyed” are distinct propositions.

The distinction matters when examining how an eternal command concerns future actions and persons.

7. How the expression inner speech is used

إِنَّ الْكَلَامَ لَفِي الْفُؤَادِ
Speech is in the heart.

This brief poetic expression illustrates that a person can possess an intelligible intended meaning before producing sounds. Language is then used to express it. Likewise, “I have something in mind” does not refer merely to audible sounds leaving the throat.

The analogy has limits: a human inner thought is itself temporal, whereas the eternality of divine speech is a distinct theological claim. The point here is only that the word “speech” need not be reduced in every usage to sound.

8. Transmission and the affirmation of speech

The affirmation that God is a speaker is linked to prophetic transmission and the community's doctrinal confession. Two questions must be distinguished: whether the attribute of speech is affirmed and how its nature and expression are precisely understood.

After affirming speech, one may still ask whether its reality is merely temporal letters and sounds or an eternal meaningful speech expressed through them. Affirmation of the attribute alone does not settle every philosophical elaboration.

Consequently the argument for inner speech also examines meaning and objections; it is not based only on grammatical derivation.

9. The objection of circular reasoning

An objection alleges a circle (dawr) if prophetic truthfulness is established by the prophet's report, while the report's truthfulness is in turn established by divine speech. A vicious circle arises when each proposition requires the other with no independent starting point.

The reply distinguishes the evidence establishing prophethood from reports accepted after that establishment. Evidence from a miracle may independently support the messenger's truthfulness, after which the messenger's report concerning divine speech is received.

The issue is the order and independence of proof, not merely repeating the conclusion in a premise.

10. The predicate mutakallim and its basis

وَهُوَ أَيِ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى مُتَكَلِّمٌ بِكَلَامٍ هُوَ صِفَةٌ لَهُ
God is a speaker by speech that is His attribute.

Mutakallim is a derived active designation. Predicating such a description normally affirms its relevant underlying meaning of the subject. Here divine speech is not reduced merely to the creation of sounds in another creature.

Objection: would creating speech in something else suffice to make God a speaker? The reply distinguishes an attribute subsisting in a subject from an effect produced elsewhere.

11. The eight attributes in this discussion

This theological enumeration contains eight attributes:
1. Knowledge — knowing all that is knowable.
2. Power — power over all possible objects.
3. Life — eternal life.
4. Hearing.
5. Sight.
6. Will — determination among possibilities.
7. Takwīn — the attribute concerning bringing into being.
8. Speech — the real attribute of speaking.

This is a particular systematic enumeration in kalām. Listing speech separately emphasizes that it is not simply another label for knowledge or will. Distinguishing attributes also does not posit multiple independent deities.

12. Where does the attribute of speech subsist?

One historical theological view holds that God creates speech in another subject and denies speech subsisting in the divine essence. The reply distinguishes creating an effect from being truly described by an attribute.

For example, if someone writes words on a wall, the wall does not thereby become a speaker; being the location of an inscription is not the same as speaking. The example illustrates only the distinction between a locus and the subject of attribution.

In the Sunni exposition under discussion, inner divine speech is affirmed as eternal and subsisting in God.

13. Distinct views about letters and the divine subject

Several historical accounts of divine speech must be distinguished. Some theologians, especially Muʿtazilites, regarded speech as originated and created. Some accepted the temporality of letters and sounds but denied an eternal inner meaning. Others proposed originated speech subsisting in the divine subject.

For each view, the key question is: what does “speech” mean? Sounds, letters, their expression, or an underlying attribute? Failure to distinguish these senses produces false equivalences.

A position should be evaluated against what it actually claims, not against a simplified claim ascribed to it.

14. Why articulated letters and sounds are temporal

Letters are pronounced in sequence, one following another, while sounds have audible beginnings, duration, and endings. Articulated letters and vocal performances are therefore events in time.

If all letters of a word were present at once with no sequence, they would not constitute ordinary pronunciation. This succession (taʿāqub) makes it problematic to identify spoken sound itself with an eternal attribute wholly free of temporal sequence.

This establishes the temporal character of human pronunciation and vocal expression. The existence of an eternal attribute of speech is a further question to be established by its own evidence.

15. Inner speech contrasted with silence

وَهُوَ أَيِ الْكَلَامُ صِفَةٌ أَيِ مَعْنًى قَائِمٌ بِالذَّاتِ
Speech is an attribute, that is, a meaning subsisting in the subject.

مُنَافِيَةٌ لِلسُّكُوتِ
It is contrary to silence.

Silence may mean simply refraining from audible speech. A person who is outwardly silent may still possess a meaning intended for expression. Accordingly theologians distinguish the outward and inward senses of silence.

The contrast in the account of divine speech clarifies what it means for speech to be present rather than absent; it is not an attempt to liken God to a silent human being.

16. Silence versus inability to speak

An āfah is an impediment that obstructs an activity. Silence may be the voluntary omission of speaking despite ability, whereas muteness or loss of speech ability concerns a restriction on outward articulation.

Two questions are distinct:
1. Has someone refrained from speaking despite being able to do so?
2. Is the physical capacity for producing words impaired?

Both examples concern articulated speech. In examining inner speech, they show that not expressing a meaning vocally and not possessing any such meaning are not the same condition.

17. Outward and inward silence

Outward silence means no words are audibly uttered, even though an intelligible meaning may be present. Inward silence considers the absence of meaningful inner speech. Without distinguishing the range of these senses, one cannot infer the absence of an inner meaning from an absence of sound.

A student may mentally prepare an answer without yet saying anything. Outward silence coexists with an intended content.

The human example distinguishes different senses of speech and silence; it does not impose the temporal beginning or ending of human thought on divine speech.

18. Impediment in articulation and in meaning

An impediment to articulation prevents or restricts the production of sounds and letters. An inward impediment would instead concern an absence of the capacity or reality of meaningful speech. Treating both as identical builds an invalid argument against inner speech.

Someone unable to speak because of illness may still communicate in writing; the failure of the vocal instrument does not remove intelligible content.

No impairment, inability, or bodily obstruction is attributed to God. The distinction is used only to analyze the theological terms carefully.

19. One attribute and multiple relations

إِنَّهُ صِفَةٌ وَاحِدَةٌ
It is one attribute.

While divine speech is one eternal attribute, its diverse relations to command, prohibition, and report do not create many originated parts within it. Likewise, knowledge concerns many known things without becoming a separate attribute for each individual object of knowledge.

Relations and attributions (taʿalluqāt and iḍāfāt) describe the different respects in which a single attribute is considered in relation to its objects. Multiplicity in objects or relations is not the creation of new attributes within the divine essence.

20. Command, prohibition, report, question and call

The familiar categories of speech include command, prohibition, report, question, and calling. Their communicative functions can be distinguished:
1. Command: requiring an act.
2. Prohibition: requiring restraint from an act.
3. Report: conveying information.
4. Question: an interrogative form.
5. Call: addressing someone.

The meaningful differences among these language functions do not force the conclusion that the one eternal attribute is composed of five separate temporal constituents. The differences concern addressees, objects, and expression.

21. Objection to treating forms as parts

Objection: if speech is one attribute, how can it be related to both commands and reports when these have distinct meanings? The objection can confuse different communicative meanings with separate material parts of an attribute.

The reply is that the kinds of speech should not be pictured as physical components composing a body. The difference between a command and a report remains genuine; it does not turn eternal speech into a chain of letters or material pieces.

The unity of the attribute and the diversity of articulated sentences belong to different levels of analysis.

One historical view attempted to reduce all forms of speech, in their original sense, to reporting. The objection is that reports are discussed in terms of truth and falsehood, whereas commands and prohibitions primarily require or forbid action. Their distinct communicative meanings should not simply be erased.

22. How a command concerns a future addressee

Objection: a command appears to require an addressee who can understand and perform it. How could an eternal command concern persons who do not yet exist?

The reply distinguishes eternity of the attribute from the addressee's becoming liable to it at the appropriate time. An eternal command may concern someone who later becomes capable of being addressed. The attribute need not begin when the addressee comes into existence.

A father may set out an instruction intended for a child when the child reaches maturity. This human analogy illustrates temporal applicability; it does not suggest that God acquires a new intention or plan.

23. Eternal command and time of application

The time of address, the time liability begins, and the time compliance occurs need not be identical. An instruction can be formulated, become binding under specified conditions, and be performed later.

This removes the objection that an eternal command must actually impose present responsibility on a nonexistent being who can neither hear nor act. The issue is the distinction between an attribute's relation and conditions governing its application.

Neither the addressee's action nor the created person is thereby made eternal. The command and its actual execution remain distinct.

24. Eternal report and temporal reference

The past, present, or future tenses of a report concern the content reported. If eternal divine speech concerns a future event, the event occurs in the future; that does not entail a transition in God from not knowing to knowing or from not speaking to speaking.

“The event will happen tomorrow” and, afterward, “it happened yesterday” can each be true relative to their respective times. Temporal wording relates to an event's time rather than the origination of the eternal divine attribute.

Thus a report's time-qualified content and the eternality of speech are distinct.

25. The resulting distinction and Qur’anic expression

Inner speech (kalām nafsī): God's eternal attribute, subsisting in the divine essence and not composed of letters or sounds.
Articulated speech (kalām lafẓī): the wording and oral or written expression signifying it; human recitation and writing occur in time.
Relations of speech: the diverse functions of command, prohibition, report, and others, which do not negate the unity of the attribute.

This distinction also matters when the term Qur'an is used for eternal divine speech and for its recited or written expression. Before affirming or denying “createdness,” one must identify whether the issue is the divine attribute, textual wording, a person's recitation, or writing.