Divine Transcendence: Form, Essence, Place and Time
Read-only question overview. Answers and scoring remain inside authenticated learner attempts.
- How are tanzīh and affirmation of perfections related?
- What is the central problem with ascribing physical shape to God?
- How do a logical definition and a spatial boundary differ?
- Which correctly distinguishes continuous and discrete quantity?
- Why is divine unity distinguished from being one numbered unit?
- What is chiefly denied by the negation of tabʿuḍ?
- How does imagined division differ from actual division?
- Why does naming several attributes not establish bodily parts in the essence?
- What is the key difficulty in treating a composite as necessarily existent?
- What does denying a necessary being an external cause mean?
- What may the technical question mā huwa seek in a discussion of quiddity?
- Why is a genus-and-differentia definition problematic when applied to God?
- What does sharing the word “existent” not imply about God and creatures?
- Why should denial of a creaturely quiddity not be read as denial of existence?
- How are color, smell and taste treated here?
- How can divine perfections be affirmed while bodily qualities are denied?
- What did classical discussions of mizāj and its consequences concern?
- What is primarily meant by being situated in a place?
- How did classical accounts of place vary?
- What does the historical debate about void not establish?
- What terminological caution applies to taḥayyuz and tamakkun?
- If an atom is spatially located but not “in a place” under some definitions, what follows?
- How is denial of extension connected to magnitude and division?
- How is denial of bodily direction related to the denial of place?
- How does transcendence of time relate to knowledge of temporal events?
- Why present several overlapping negations of corporeality separately?
- Denying corporeal shape entails denying that God exists.
- Conceptually distinguishing knowledge and power does not imply two bodily parts in God.
- All classical definitions of place and spatial region were identical, so taḥayyuz and tamakkun were always synonymous.
- Some denials of corporeality support others: extension raises questions of measure, and bodily direction involves spatial relation.