Divine Will: Eternity, Specification of Possibilities and Free Agency

Read-only question overview. Answers and scoring remain inside authenticated learner attempts.

• What is implied by describing will as eternal and subsisting in God?
• When does the issue of specifying possibilities arise?
• What does “in one manner rather than another” primarily indicate?
• What distinction matters in “at one time rather than another”?
• What is the relevant distinction between knowledge and will?
• In Māturīdī terminology, how do will and takwīn differ?
• Why need not every object of an eternal will be eternal?
• What is wrong with treating will’s relation as bodily motion?
• What mode of causation is meant by “necessitating by essence”?
• Which human feature is not implied by divine voluntary agency?
• What distinguishes certainty of an act from necessitation by essence?
• What is central to the classical inference from the order of the world?
• Which claim does not directly follow from “al-awfaq wa-l-aṣlaḥ” here?
• Which premise in the philosophical dilemma is disputed?
• What is the principal objection to an originated attribute of will subsisting in God?
• What is the issue expressed by “willing by essence, not by an attribute”?
• Which two assertions occur in the attributed Muʿtazilī view?
• What is NOT meant by “subsisting in the divine essence”?
• Which pairing correctly describes revelation and reasoning here?
• Which matching of historical positions is accurate?
• Which statement is not contradictory when a thing is specified to exist at a particular time?
• Which statement correctly expresses divine voluntary agency?
• Which argument correctly uses the distinction among knowledge, power and will?
• Why is specification of possibilities distinct from merely proving a maker?
• In the critique of necessary emanation, when does delay of an effect from its necessitating cause become problematic?
• Why is it important not to confuse attribute with object?
• Affirming eternal will necessarily means that every willed object has always existed.
• The attributed Najjāriyyah view affirms divine willing while disputing a distinct real attribute of will.
• Inferring divine choice from wise order automatically establishes the doctrine that God is obligated to do the best.
• In the Māturīdī account, knowledge, power, will and takwīn are conceptually distinct even though all may relate to one creature.