لَا كَمَا يَزْعُمُ الْمُعْتَزِلَةُ أَنَّهُ عَالِمٌ لَا عِلْمَ لَهُ، وَقَادِرٌ لَا قُدْرَةَ لَهُ
This contrasts with the reported Muʿtazilī formula: He is knowing without an attribute of knowledge, and powerful without an attribute of power.
The objection turns on the relation of a genuine predicate to what makes it true. If the name 'knowing' is affirmed while every real sense of knowledge as an attribute is denied, the predicate needs further explanation.
The opposing school was not denying divine knowledge in the ordinary sense; it sought to avoid independently eternal realities alongside God. The disagreement concerns how meaningful perfections should be understood without compromising divine unity.