Eternal Knowledge, Power, Life, Will and Their Relations

1. Divine knowledge as an eternal attribute

الْعِلْمُ صِفَةٌ أَزَلِيَّةٌ
Knowledge is an eternal attribute.

Divine knowledge is not acquired for the first time when an event occurs. God knows what exists and does not exist, what is possible and impossible, and past and future events in accordance with their actual states. Knowledge is related to its object, but the object's coming into being does not entail the coming into being of divine knowledge.

Knowledge (ʿilm) is an attribute of God; the known (maʿlūm) is what knowledge concerns. Confusing them wrongly suggests that every new creature produces new knowledge in God.

2. Disclosure of known things and the relation of knowledge

وَهِيَ صِفَةٌ أَزَلِيَّةٌ تَنْكَشِفُ الْمَعْلُومَاتُ عِنْدَ تَعَلُّقِهَا بِهَا
It is an eternal attribute through whose relation known things are disclosed.

Disclosure (inkishāf) means that a thing is known as it truly is; it does not imply that God first lacked awareness and then discovered it. Relation (taʿalluq) names the connection of the attribute of knowledge with what is known. The actual nature, time, and condition of the object are not hidden from God.

For example, God eternally knows a person's journey tomorrow as an event that will occur tomorrow. When the journey occurs, the event's status changes; there is no transition in divine knowledge from ignorance to discovery.

3. Distinguishing the attribute from its object

The existence of knowledge and the external existence of its object are distinct questions.

Knowing a possible thing does not require that it already exist. Something that will be created later is not yet actual, yet it is not beyond divine knowledge. An impossible proposition can also be known as impossible; its being known neither makes it possible nor brings it into existence.

1. Existent: something presently actual.
2. Nonexistent but possible: something that could exist but does not yet.
3. Impossible: something that cannot obtain because it entails contradiction.

Therefore, not everything known is existent, and the scope of knowledge must not be measured by the number of existing objects.

4. Eternal relation and temporal designation

To explain how an eternal attribute concerns temporal events, theologians distinguish an eternal relation from a temporal designation of the object. Divine knowledge eternally encompasses what it concerns. When a temporal event occurs, its occurrence is a new state outside God, not a newly acquired report in His knowledge.

Example: Zayd's entering a house. It is eternally known that he will enter at a particular time. His entering then is originated, but the eternality of God's knowledge remains unchanged.

This distinction permits genuine change in created events without attributing change, deficiency, or acquired knowledge to God.

5. Objection: does a changing object change knowledge?

Objection: if knowledge corresponds to an object’s state, why does it not change when the object passes from nonexistence to existence?

The answer distinguishes:
1. The object’s states: not existing earlier and existing later are two true descriptions at their respective times.
2. Eternal knowledge: comprehends both states under their correct temporal descriptions from eternity.

Thus “Zayd is not in the house now” and “Zayd will be in the house later” can both be correct with their time qualifications. Knowing them does not involve contradictory beliefs. The change occurs in Zayd's circumstances, not in the knowledge that comprehends those circumstances.

6. Power and what is within power

وَالْقُدْرَةُ وَهِيَ صِفَةٌ أَزَلِيَّةٌ
Power is an eternal attribute.

تُؤَثِّرُ فِي الْمَقْدُورَاتِ عِنْدَ تَعَلُّقِهَا بِهَا
It affects things within its scope when related to them.

A maqdūr is a possible object or event considered as subject to power. God's power is perfect and eternal, while each thing brought into existence need not be eternal. Creation at a specified time does not imply that divine power was deficient or delayed; the effect occurs at its appointed time.

Divine power cannot be understood as merely a created body's strength, which develops, is exerted, and can be lost.

7. Why knowledge and power have different domains

Knowledge concerns what can be known, whether existent, future, or impossible. Power concerns what is possible to bring about. Calling an intrinsic contradiction “not an object of power” does not indicate weakness: contradictory words do not describe a genuine possible outcome.

For example, “the same object is wholly moving and wholly at rest in the same respect at the same time” is inconsistent. Not realizing a contradiction is no failure of power.

By contrast, creating or not creating a possible body falls within divine power. Knowledge's disclosure and power's relation to bringing about an event are not interchangeable notions.

8. Effective power and temporal objects

Calling divine power effective power affirms its perfection and genuine relation to possible outcomes. But effectiveness does not mean that every possible object must already exist eternally. The power is eternal; a possible thing is created in its appointed state and time.

Objection: if power has always existed, why has its object not always existed?

Reply: the attribute of power and the occurrence of a particular effect are different considerations. The possibility of an act is not denied because it becomes actual only at a specified time. Thus power is not reduced to an ineffective potential, nor does its eternity make every creature eternal.

9. Life and the suitability for knowing and acting

وَالْحَيَاةُ وَهِيَ صِفَةٌ أَزَلِيَّةٌ تُوجِبُ صِحَّةَ الْعِلْمِ
Life is an eternal attribute that establishes the suitability for knowledge.

Life (ḥayāh) here does not mean animal breathing, blood circulation, or bodily motion. In human beings life is related to the capacity for knowledge and awareness; divine life, however, depends on no bodily instruments and does not increase or diminish.

The phrase “makes knowledge fitting or possible” marks a rational relation between life and knowledge. It does not imply that God's knowledge was acquired later. Eternal life is affirmed together with eternal knowledge and power.

10. Quwwah as a term for divine power

وَالْقُوَّةُ وَهِيَ بِمَعْنَى الْقُدْرَةِ
Strength here means power.

For creatures, quwwah may mean physical energy or a potential capacity awaiting exercise. Applied to God, it must not signify an embodied or merely potential ability that later becomes actual. It denotes complete divine power.

Different words in theological discourse do not always indicate distinct independently affirmed attributes. Consequently, “strength” here is understood through power and not through created bodily strength.

11. The attribute of hearing

وَالسَّمْعُ وَهِيَ صِفَةٌ تَتَعَلَّقُ بِالْمَسْمُوعَاتِ
Hearing is an attribute related to things heard.

Affirming divine hearing (samʿ) is to affirm a perfect attribute, not to assign ears, eardrums, or a physical transmission system to God. Created hearing ordinarily depends on organs and environmental conditions; divine hearing is not constrained by these limitations.

Things heard (masmūʿāt) are the objects to which hearing is related. Their created or temporal status does not make divine hearing a new attribute, just as a created object of power does not make power itself originated.

12. Sight and complete apprehension

وَالْبَصَرُ وَهِيَ صِفَةٌ تَتَعَلَّقُ بِالْمُبْصَرَاتِ
Sight is an attribute related to things seen.

فَتُدْرَكُ بِهِمَا إِدْرَاكًا تَامًّا
Through both there is complete apprehension.

This does not describe the formation of optical images or dependence on light as in human vision. Divine sight is affirmed as its own perfect attribute. Changes in visible creatures must not be projected onto God as changes in sensory organs.

Hearing and sight are distinguished by their stated objects: hearing relates to things heard and sight to things seen.

13. Imagination, estimation and direct apprehension

لَا عَلَى سَبِيلِ التَّخَيُّلِ وَالتَّوَهُّمِ
Not by imagination or estimation.

Imagination (takhayyul) can preserve an image after the sensed object is absent. Estimation (tawahhum) grasps particular nonsensible meanings, for example an anticipated danger or relation. These illustrate the modes of created human cognition.

Divine hearing and sight are not assimilated to imagination or estimation. Human mental images and estimates can be mistaken, while the perfection of divine apprehension is understood without ignorance or error. The comparison clarifies meanings of “apprehension,” not an equality of Creator and creature.

14. Are hearing and sight merely knowledge?

Some philosophical and Muʿtazilī accounts explain hearing and sight as knowledge of audible and visible objects instead of affirming two distinct attributes. The argument is that knowledge already encompasses every object, so additional attributes appear unnecessary.

The reply is that overlapping objects do not force two attributes to have identical meanings. Knowing an object and hearing or seeing it express different aspects. Affirming distinct hearing and sight attributes does not require created organs.

The dispute concerns the real distinction among the attributes, not whether anything is hidden from divine knowledge.

15. The objection from organs and sensory media

Objection: human hearing requires ears, and vision requires eyes and light. How then can hearing and sight be affirmed of God?

Reply: a particular created mechanism for possessing a perfection is not necessarily part of the perfection in every case. Human hearing depends on ears, sound transmission and other conditions; transferring these material requirements to eternal divine attributes would assimilate God to creatures.

Likewise, relating to sensory objects does not require the Creator to have a physical organ undergoing stimulation. Affirming an attribute and affirming the creaturely method of its operation are different claims; the former does not entail the latter.

16. Why an eternal sense does not entail eternal objects

Objection: if divine hearing and sight are eternal, must audible and visible objects be eternal too?

Reply: the eternality of an attribute and the eternality of its object do not entail each other. Eternal knowledge can concern a temporal known thing, and eternal power a temporal object brought about; likewise, the occurrence of things heard and seen does not make the attributes originated.

The distinction is secure when the attribute is not confused with the occurrence of its object or the way its relation is described. The arising of a sound does not mean that divine hearing acquired a new ability.

17. Will and mashīʾah

وَالْإِرَادَةُ وَالْمَشِيئَةُ وَهُمَا عِبَارَتَانِ
Will and mashīʾah are two expressions for the same meaning in this discussion.

Divine will (irādah) is an eternal attribute connected with the realization of a particular possible outcome. Mashīʾah here conveys the same underlying meaning. Human willing may arise after desire, hesitation, and newly formed deliberation; divine will is not treated as a temporal psychological state.

It is also essential not to equate willing an occurrence, commanding an action in revelation, and approving it. They address different questions, and keeping them distinct prevents errors in interpreting both texts and arguments.

18. Specification among possible outcomes

A possible thing can be conceived as existing at different times and under different conditions. Specification (takhṣīṣ) means that one particular time, form, quantity, or occurrence is realized. Divine will is understood in relation to such determinate realization.

For instance, a tree might be conceived as coming into being today, tomorrow, or not at all. The mere abstract notion of possibility does not determine which state actually occurs.

Power relates to an outcome as possible; will relates to its specified realization. The eternality of both attributes is therefore not contradicted by the temporal existence of the tree.

19. Knowing an outcome versus willing it

Objection: if divine knowledge eternally determines what will occur, why affirm a separate attribute of will?

The reply assigns disclosure to knowledge and specification to will. Knowledge concerns what is the case, while will is related to the particular occurrence of a possible state. This distinction does not make the attributes independent gods.

One may distinguish a craftsperson's knowing how a task will be done from choosing a particular task. That human example only illustrates two meanings; it does not imply that divine knowing and willing involve human indecision, tools, or the acquisition of capacities.

20. Why one of two possibilities is actualized

For a possible thing, existence and nonexistence, or realization at different times, are conceivable alternatives. Simply saying “it is possible” does not explain why one determinate outcome occurs; this is the issue of preference and specification.

If a possible state is said to assign its own definite time merely by being possible, one has added a determining power that possibility alone does not supply. Will articulates the specification of one possibility.

Key distinction: “having power over an outcome” concerns its possibility; “its occurrence at this particular moment” concerns its specification.

21. Command, will and approval

Three separate questions arise about an action:
1. Command: what does revelation require?
2. Will: what occurs in the created world?
3. Approval: which acts are pleasing and religiously sanctioned?

The command that all accountable persons believe does not imply that all in fact believe. Likewise, the occurrence of disobedience does not mean it is commanded or approved.

Some theological arguments equate will with command or liking and thereby blur the difference between the occurrence of actions and their normative status. Keeping the three concepts apart is essential to understanding the dispute.

22. The objection of a newly arising will

Some Muʿtazilī and other theological accounts speak of a newly occurring will. An objection is raised: if eternal will concerns an originated act, why does the act not exist eternally?

The central response distinguishes the eternality of the will from the effect's occurrence at a specified time. The later realization of an object does not entail that the will specifying its time first arose then.

A statement such as “this event will occur at a given time” can have a determined temporal content without itself being uttered at that later time. This analogy clarifies the logic of temporal reference; it does not equate divine knowledge and will with ordinary human reports.

23. Origination and the thing originated

التكوين
Takwīn: the term for bringing a possible thing from nonexistence into existence, or for the attribute related to that origination.

المكوَّن
Mukawwan: the thing brought into existence.

In the Māturīdī formulation, takwīn is an eternal attribute of God while the originated thing is temporal. Consequently, takwīn cannot be simply equated with the mukawwan, just as knowledge is not the known and power is not its object.

A particular tree comes into being in time; it is not an eternal tree merely because it is related to an eternal attribute. The aim is to distinguish the Creator's attribute from its temporal effect.

24. Māturīdī and Ashʿarī formulations of takwīn

Māturīdī formulation: Takwīn is affirmed as a real eternal attribute, while creating, forming, giving life, and providing sustenance express its various relations. Their effects occur among temporal creatures.

Ashʿarī formulation: Rather than affirming takwīn as an additional independent eternal attribute, it is explained through the relation of power or the relation arising from the act of creation. This does not entail that created things themselves are eternal.

The actual disagreement concerns how attributes of acts are affirmed and whether takwīn is a distinct real attribute or a relational description. It is misleading to portray one side as affirming a Creator and the other as denying creation.

25. Integrating eternal attributes with temporal events

Knowledge: things are known as they truly are; temporal objects do not entail newly acquired divine knowledge.
Power: an eternal attribute concerning possible things; their coming into existence does not originate the attribute.
Life: an eternal perfection, not a bodily biological process.
Hearing and sight: genuine attributes related to what is heard and seen, without physical organs or imagination and estimation.
Will and mashīʾah: concern the specified occurrence of possible outcomes, distinct from commands and approval.
Takwīn: Māturīdī and Ashʿarī formulations differ about the status of the attribute related to origination.

The unifying distinction is between the Creator's attribute, its relation, and the existence or state of the creature.