Human Capacity: Power, Action, and Conditions

Read-only question overview. Answers and scoring remain inside authenticated learner attempts.

• What primarily distinguishes the two uses of istiṭāʿah?
• What is the specific theological sense of “capacity accompanies the act”?
• How is the timing of capacity usually presented in the Muʿtazilī view discussed here?
• What follows directly from possessing a healthy hand before acting?
• Which statement correctly distinguishes a cause from a condition in this debate?
• How does affirming acquisition differ from making human power independently creative?
• What role does intention play in good and evil actions?
• In this argument, what is meant by denying the disbelievers an ability to hear?
• What answers the claim that a concurrent power leaves the deed without power?
• Which claim becomes disputed if accidents do not persist?
• What does tajaddud al-amthāl mean here?
• What is tested by the objection that prior power may weaken over time?
• What question lies behind the objection that capacity is unchanged while action occurs at one time but not another?
• What is meant by power with all operative conditions fulfilled?
• If a healthy person is not presently acting, which conclusion is warranted?
• In the persistence argument, what kind of premise is “an accident does not inhere in another accident”?
• How does the concurrence view answer the objection that prayer is commanded before its performance?
• Which statement is most precise concerning obligating the incapable?
• In the verse requiring pilgrimage from those able to make the journey, what is emphasized?
• How does the response address the objection that sound means are not themselves an attribute of the obligated person?
• After distinguishing the two capacities, which statement is correct?
• What distinction is essential to the capacity-for-opposites debate?
• What conclusion about human capacity for faith and disbelief is drawn here?
• What error results from failing to distinguish the nature of capacity from its relation to an act?
• What should be checked first when two arguments about capacity appear to conflict?
• If the necessary means for an act are entirely unavailable to a person, which issue is immediately relevant?
• Capacity understood as sound means and faculties may exist before the act.
• Affirming concurrent operative power necessarily means that a person is wholly compelled and incapable in every respect.
• The renewal of similar accidents requires them to be numerically the very same accident.
• There is no necessary contradiction between power being related to one actual deed and being generally suitable for an alternative.