حَتَّى يَرِدَ بِهِ الِاعْتِرَاضُ عَلَى حَصْرِ الْأَسْبَابِ فِي الثَّلَاثَةِ
Thus inspiration should not generate an objection to restricting the means to three.
The objection asks: if someone receives correct knowledge inwardly without the senses, a report, or a syllogism, why insist that there are only three means? It can conflate knowledge occurring in a particular person with a publicly defensible standard for obtaining knowledge.
The latter is the main point of the exclusion. An exceptional, inward occurrence does not automatically add a universally testable fourth method. But if the restriction were interpreted as “knowledge can never arise otherwise,” it would require further qualification, which the discussion itself supplies.