Origination of Accidents and Substances: Premises, Objections and Replies

Read-only question overview. Answers and scoring remain inside authenticated learner attempts.

• Which pair correctly states the two major premises of the argument from accidents?
• In the cited classical definition, what is occupancy of the same place at two instants?
• Which term is used for occupation of two locations at two instants?
• Why does the first occupation of a body challenge the given classification?
• What does the origination of one movement not by itself establish?
• What is the proper distinction between possible cessation and actual cessation of rest?
• What role does “cannot be free of originated states” play in the second premise?
• Which account correctly distinguishes eternity from a particular originated event?
• What objection follows from the proposed existence of immaterial entities?
• What is needed to pass from conceiving an immaterial intellect to asserting its actuality?
• Which item is not one of the three historically described classes of immaterial entities?
• What is criticized in the maxim that only one proceeds from one?
• What is the central issue in inferring the soul’s immateriality from grasping universals?
• Which classification of motion occurs in the argument about celestial souls?
• Which examples illustrate the objection that not every accident has been proven originated?
• When does circularity arise between proving accidents and proving substances originated?
• Which strategy best avoids circular proof?
• What is meant by denying that eternity is a special condition?
• Which distinction matters in the proposed eternity of motion-in-general?
• Which account of place helps generate the critic’s regress?
• What is the stated kalām understanding of ḥayyiz?
• What qualification may be needed in the first premise?
• Which inference illegitimately jumps from originated members to a first member of the series?
• On what distinction does the answer to the fourth objection about place depend?
• Which is the sound order of the reasoning concerning motion and rest?
• How should the material on separate intellects and celestial souls be approached?
• The origination of each particular motion, by itself, establishes a first member of the whole series.
• The discussion distinguishes conceivability of immaterial entities from proof of their actual existence.
• If the origination of substances depends entirely on that of accidents and vice versa, a circular proof results.
• In the stated kalām account, a locus is necessarily the actual inner surface of another surrounding body.