LessonsProof of Mutual Hindrance: Divine Unity, Conflicting Wills and Eternity of AttributesQuiz

A subtler objection asks: if one alleged deity freely allows the other to act, does that show limited power? An agent’s choice not to exercise power is not automatically an inability to exercise it.

Two conditions must be distinguished: an agent does not exercise a power, and an agent tries but cannot carry out what he wills. Only the latter directly raises a question of incapacity.

This example clarifies that the proof cannot rely exclusively on an outcome’s failure to occur; it must address the hypothesis of two independently effective ultimate wills. Free coordination by itself is not equivalent to actual defeat.

Opening interactive controls...

Could one freely defer to the other?

Proof of Mutual Hindrance: Divine Unity, Conflicting Wills and Eternity of Attributes

A subtler objection asks: if one alleged deity freely allows the other to act, does that show limited power? An agent’s choice not to exercise power is not automatically an inability to exercise it.

Two conditions must be distinguished: an agent does not exercise a power, and an agent tries but cannot carry out what he wills. Only the latter directly raises a question of incapacity.

This example clarifies that the proof cannot rely exclusively on an outcome’s failure to occur; it must address the hypothesis of two independently effective ultimate wills. Free coordination by itself is not equivalent to actual defeat.