Realities Are Established: Truth, Correspondence and Essence

1. Why reality matters in kalām

Theological reasoning presupposes that the created world is not a mere illusion. Before one argues from contingent or originated things to the Creator, one must recognize that there are things and states of affairs about which knowledge is possible.

حقائقُ الأشياء ثابتة
The realities of things are established.

This principle affirms that objects and their properties have realities that can be investigated. It does not claim that every human perception or belief is accurate; that is a separate question.

2. Reasoning from originated things

ثُمَّ لَمَّا كَانَ مَبْنَى عِلْمِ الْكَلَامِ عَلَى الِاسْتِدْلَالِ بِوُجُودِ الْمُحْدَثَاتِ
Because kalām is founded upon reasoning from the existence of originated things.

The term muḥdathāt concerns things considered as having originated. Their existence, changes and conditions provide material for reasoning about dependence and the Creator.

Two steps must be kept separate: acknowledging that things exist and then establishing further premises about their origination and dependence. An observation alone does not automatically establish every step in the argument.

3. Substances and attributes in observation

الْأَعْيَانِ وَالْأَعْرَاضِ
Individuated things and their attributes or accidents.

Aʿyān are identifiable things, such as a tree or stone. Aʿrāḍ are properties or states that belong to a bearer—for example, color, movement, or rest.

Recognizing a tree is not precisely the same as recognizing the green color of its leaves. The former concerns a thing; the latter concerns one of its properties. Both can be investigated without conflating the categories.

4. What observation supplies to an argument

Seeing a stone, flowing water, or a growing tree supplies observations. A theological argument then analyzes origination, change, cause, and dependence to reach a conclusion beyond the observation itself.

Observation is one avenue to knowing a particular thing or state; inference moves from premises to a further conclusion.

The distinction prevents two mistakes: claiming that all theological conclusions are directly visible, or rejecting the reality of observable premises because the conclusion is not itself a sensory object.

5. What the thesis affirms—and does not affirm

حقائقُ الأشياء ثابتة
The realities of things are established.

This does not mean that everything someone believes is true. Two people can make incompatible claims about the same event; the event itself is not created by either person's assertion.

Whether a stone actually fell into water is distinct from someone's conception of that event and from the truth of a witness's statement. Reality, conception and judgment must not be identified.

6. External existence versus a mental idea

One can imagine a garden without having a garden in front of oneself. Having that idea and there being a corresponding garden outside the mind are different propositions.

A mental conception concerns what is represented in thought. External existence concerns whether a thing is actually there independently of that thought.

Thus, “I imagined a castle” does not establish “that castle exists.” The distinction is essential when evaluating claims about the realities of things.

7. Fallible knowledge does not erase reality

A distant shimmer may be mistaken for water, but closer inspection can show it is a mirage. This perceptual error does not imply that sand, light, and distance are unreal.

A mistaken perception is an incorrect judgment about a particular state of affairs. Denial of reality altogether is a far stronger claim.

Affirming real things is compatible with recognizing that individual sensory or rational judgments can be mistaken and require checking.

8. Judgment and correspondence

“The door is open” states a judgment. It corresponds to reality if the door is in fact open; it fails to correspond if the door is closed.

Correspondence concerns whether the asserted state of affairs obtains, not merely how certain the speaker feels.

Confidence and truth must be distinguished. A confident speaker can be mistaken, while a hesitant speaker can state something accurate.

9. The definition of al-ḥaqq

الْحَقُّ: وَهُوَ الْحُكْمُ الْمُطَابِقُ لِلْوَاقِعِ
Al-ḥaqq is a judgment corresponding to reality.

A ḥukm affirms or denies something; wāqiʿ is the actual state of affairs; and muṭābiq means that the judgment accords with it.

“It is raining today” is true only with respect to the specified place and time if rain is actually falling there. Properly identifying what is claimed is part of testing correspondence.

10. Al-bāṭil as the opposite of al-ḥaqq

وَيُقَابِلُهُ الْبَاطِلُ
Its opposite is al-bāṭil, falsity or invalidity in this context.

A judgment is not true if it fails to accord with reality. However, whether a claim is false and whether its speaker deliberately deceives are separate issues; an uninformed person may be sincerely wrong.

For example, calling a particular iron object “wood” is an inaccurate claim about that object. The referent and meaning must be settled before assessing the claim.

11. The wider use of ḥaqq

يُطْلَقُ عَلَى الْأَقْوَالِ وَالْعَقَائِدِ وَالْأَدْيَانِ وَالْمَذَاهِبِ
The term is applied to statements, beliefs, religions, and doctrinal schools.

Calling a proposition ḥaqq assesses its content. Calling a doctrine ḥaqq has a wider scope involving its central claims and their correspondence with reality.

These uses share an orientation toward truth, but they are not identical in scope. One accurate statement by a person does not validate all of that person's beliefs.

12. Different scopes of doctrinal claims

Testing a single proposition concerns one definite assertion, such as “this water is sweet.” A doctrine can consist of interconnected propositions, arguments, and implications.

A qawl is a statement, an iʿtiqād is an accepted belief, and madhhab here can denote a systematic intellectual or creedal position. The word ḥaqq may apply to each, but the evidential scope differs.

Accordingly, labels alone do not determine truth; a disputed claim and its supporting reasons must be examined.

13. The meaning of al-ṣidq

وَأَمَّا الصِّدْقُ فَقَدْ شَاعَ فِي الْأَقْوَالِ خَاصَّةً
The use of ṣidq is especially common with statements.

Ṣidq concerns the truthfulness of an assertion: does the reported proposition correspond to the facts?

“The caravan has arrived” is a true report if it has actually arrived. If it is still traveling, the proposition is false, even if the reporter believed it without checking.

14. What ḥaqq and ṣidq share

Both ḥaqq and ṣidq are linked to correspondence with reality. A true report can be called ṣādiq and its content can be described as ḥaqq.

Nevertheless, the terms do not have identical usage in every setting. Ḥaqq readily extends to creeds and broader doctrinal positions, while ṣidq is particularly prominent with reports and statements.

Accurate analysis therefore considers the respect in which each term is being used.

15. Two perspectives on correspondence

الْمُطَابَقَةَ تُعْتَبَرُ فِي الْحَقِّ مِنْ جَانِبِ الْوَاقِعِ، وَفِي الصِّدْقِ مِنْ جَانِبِ الْحُكْمِ
In ḥaqq correspondence is considered from the side of reality; in ṣidq, from the side of the judgment.

This distinguishes two perspectives on the same relation, not two independent worlds of truth. The focus in ḥaqq is reality's conformity; in ṣidq, the asserted judgment's agreement with the facts.

“The sun has risen” can be assessed under either consideration, but the underlying state of affairs is one.

16. Falsehood as the contrary of ṣidq

وَيُقَابِلُهُ الْكَذِبُ
Its opposite is kadhib, falsehood.

Here kadhib describes a report that does not correspond to reality. In ordinary speech, “lying” can also imply intentionally giving a false report; intention and factual inaccuracy should not be conflated.

If “the treasury door is open” is said while it is closed, the proposition is false. The reporter's sincerity is a further, separate question.

17. Three cases of claims and reality

Example 1: “This vessel is empty” asserts a condition of a particular vessel; it must be checked.
Example 2: “Every white thing is snow” is an invalid universal generalization; white paper provides a counterexample.
Example 3: “I saw snow” reports a person's experience. Whether the person had that experience and whether snow actually existed are related but distinguishable questions.

These examples separate faulty generalization from mistaken observation and show why the precise asserted content matters for evaluating truth.

18. The reality and quiddity of a thing

حَقِيقَةُ الشَّيْءِ وَمَاهِيَّتُهُ
The reality of a thing and its quiddity, or what-it-is.

The question “What is it?” seeks a thing's kind or defining nature. Māhiyyah is linked to the question mā huwa? (“What is it?”).

Understanding what a kind of thing would be does not by itself establish that an instance exists outside the mind. Defining a nature and affirming its external instantiation are distinct operations.

19. What makes a thing what it is

مَا بِهِ الشَّيْءُ هُوَ هُوَ
That by which a thing is what it is.

This expression seeks a defining nature rather than a mere label. The point is to identify what is essential to the kind under discussion.

A human can stand, sit, or walk at different moments without ceasing to be human. These changing conditions should not be mistaken for the constitutive nature of the kind.

20. The classical definition of the human

كَالْحَيَوَانِ النَّاطِقِ لِلْإِنْسَانِ
As “rational animal” is used in the classical definition of the human.

Within classical logical terminology, ḥayawān is the wider genus and nāṭiq points to the differentiating rational capacity, not merely audible speech.

The purpose is to distinguish a definition aimed at essential kind from everyday descriptions such as a person's occupation or clothing color.

21. Essential and accidental descriptions

بِخِلَافِ مِثْلِ الضَّاحِكِ وَالْكَاتِبِ
Unlike descriptions such as laughing or writing.

Being a laugher or writer can help describe someone, but the activity is not continually manifested and is not itself the essential nature of being human.

An essential definition aims at constitutive kind; an accidental description identifies a property that can belong to a member of that kind without constituting its essence.

22. Māhiyyah, ḥaqīqah and huwiyyah

In classical discussions, māhiyyah often answers “what is it?”; ḥaqīqah concerns a thing's real nature; huwiyyah can stress particular identity or that-which-it-is. Exact usage varies by context.

Different analytical considerations do not require three separately existing objects. They may be ways of examining one and the same thing.

“What is a human?”, “Who is this person?”, and “Does this person exist outside thought?” pose different questions that must not be collapsed.

23. Conceivability is not external possibility

A phrase may be linguistically intelligible while combining requirements that cannot be jointly realized, such as “a figure that is a perfect square and a perfect circle in precisely the same respect.”

Understanding the words, forming a coherent concept, and establishing external possibility are different matters.

A verbally formulated impossibility is not evidence for an externally existing object. Claims about reality require attention to what can coherently obtain.

24. The thing and the existent in this framework

وَالشَّيْءُ عِنْدَنَا هُوَ الْمَوْجُودُ
In our theological usage, a thing is that which exists.

This is a technical position in a particular debate. Some schools discussed nonexistent but possible entities under the term “thing,” whereas this formulation links shayʾ with existence.

Technical usage must not be confused with all ordinary uses of the English or Urdu word “thing,” which may refer to imagined or absent objects.

25. Existence terms and the apparent tautology

وَالثُّبُوتُ وَالتَّحَقُّقُ وَالْوُجُودُ وَالْكَوْنُ أَلْفَاظٌ مُتَرَادِفَةٌ
In this discussion, establishment, realization, existence, and being are treated as closely related terms.

An objection follows: if a reality already means something established, is “realities are established” merely saying “established things are established”?

The substantive claim concerns whether the natures we take things to possess have objective purchase in reality. It relates our beliefs about things to what actually obtains, rather than merely repeating a word. This makes the proposition substantive: it concerns the truth of what we believe about things, not a verbal repetition.