A deeper objection asks how we know that valid reasoning can produce knowledge. If that principle is self-evident, why is it disputed? If it must itself be proved through inference, are we not attempting to establish inference by inference?
إِنْ كَانَ ضَرُورِيًّا لَمْ يَقَعْ فِيهِ خِلَافٌ
If it were necessary knowledge, disagreement would not occur.
وَإِنْ كَانَ نَظَرِيًّا يَلْزَمُ إِثْبَاتُ النَّظَرِ بِالنَّظَرِ
If inferential, proving reasoning by reasoning would be required.
The target is the epistemic authority of inference itself, not the truth of an individual example.