The Universality of Divine Knowledge and Power: Classical Objections
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- What principle is expressed by “Nothing lies outside His knowledge and power”?
- Which distinction between knowledge and power is correct?
- Why is a thing both existent and nonexistent in the same respect not an object of power?
- What are “particulars” in the claim “He does not know particulars”?
- If Zayd is indoors in the morning and outdoors later, what follows about divine knowledge?
- Which assumption underlies the objection from changing particulars?
- What distinguishes a change of taʿalluq from a change in knowledge itself?
- Why does knowing a universal rule not automatically supply every particular fact?
- For what claim is “From one only one proceeds” invoked?
- What does not follow merely from unity of the divine essence?
- Why is a voluntary agent important to the critique of “one effect only”?
- Which premise underlies the reported Dahriyya objection to divine self-knowledge?
- What is the main reply to the objection against self-knowledge?
- Which two things are excluded from power in the position attributed to al-Naẓẓām?
- Why does creating a creature’s ignorance not entail ignorance in the creator?
- What does not follow from the occurrence or creation of a wrongful act?
- Which distinction correctly states khalq versus kasb?
- How do “like the servant’s act” and “the very servant’s act” differ?
- What is limited in the position attributed to al-Balkhī?
- In the reported general Muʿtazilī view, what is “the very act under the servant’s power”?
- What is the first step in analyzing two “relations of power” to one act?
- Which comparison of eternal and originated power is correct?
- Which inference is invalid?
- For an act of oppression, which question concerns moral evaluation?
- What reasoning principle unites the debates over particulars and human acts?
- What is the unifying conclusion of the section?
- Changes in external objects do not necessarily imply new divine knowledge.
- “An act like the servant’s” and “the very act of the servant” must mean exactly the same thing here.
- Creating ignorance in a creature does not prove that the creator is ignorant.
- Having power over an act automatically implies its moral permission and approval.