Wiping Over Khuffs and the Continuing Rulings of Hajj and Jihad

1. Wiping over khuffs during travel and residence

وَنَرَى الْمَسْحَ عَلَى الْخُفَّيْنِ فِي السَّفَرِ وَالْحَضَرِ كَمَا جَاءَ فِي الْأَثَرِ
We regard wiping over the khuffs as permissible both while travelling and while residing at home, as transmitted in the reports.

Al-mash 'ala al-khuffayn is the transmitted allowance concerning wiping over foot-coverings in ablution. Its permissibility is not restricted to travel: the statement explicitly includes both travel and residence and grounds the practice in transmitted reports.

2. Travel, residence and transmitted precedent

فِي السَّفَرِ وَالْحَضَرِ
During a journey and in settled residence.

Safar denotes travelling, whereas hadar denotes remaining in one's place of residence. Their combination removes the mistaken restriction of wiping over the khuffs to travellers alone.

كَمَا جَاءَ فِي الْأَثَرِ
As reported in the transmitted precedents.

The permissibility is thus tied to reported religious precedent, not merely to an individual's personal preference.

3. Three recognized features of the Sunni way

أَنْ تُفَضِّلَ الشَّيْخَيْنِ، وَتُحِبَّ الْخَتَنَيْنِ، وَتَرَى الْمَسْحَ عَلَى الْخُفَّيْنِ
To accord precedence to the two shaykhs, love the two sons-in-law, and regard wiping over the khuffs as permissible.

These three characteristics, attributed to Imam Abu Hanifah, connect respect for the Companions with acceptance of a transmitted practical ruling. Attachment in belief and recognition of a juristic practice appear together in one concise statement.

4. The two shaykhs, the two sons-in-law and wiping

Al-shaykhan
Abu Bakr al-Siddiq and 'Umar al-Faruq, may Allah be pleased with them both.

Al-khatanan
The two sons-in-law of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ.

Acknowledging the merit of the two shaykhs and loving the Prophet's two sons-in-law expresses a sound stance towards the Companions. The accompanying mention of wiping over the khuffs shows that an established transmitted legal practice is also among these recognized features.

5. The continuing status of Hajj and jihad

وَالْحَجُّ وَالْجِهَادُ فَرْضَانِ مَاضِيَانِ مَعَ أُولِي الْأَمْرِ مِنَ الْمُسْلِمِينَ بَرِّهِمْ وَفَاجِرِهِمْ إِلَى قِيَامِ السَّاعَةِ، لَا يُبْطِلُهُمَا شَيْءٌ وَلَا يَنْقُضُهُمَا
Hajj and jihad remain two prescribed duties associated with the Muslim authorities, righteous or sinful, until the Hour; nothing annuls their prescribed status.

Fardan madiyan concerns the continuing validity of these religious rulings. The personal righteousness or wrongdoing of an authority does not, in itself, nullify the status of the duties.

6. Fardan madiyan: continuing religious rulings

فَرْضَانِ مَاضِيَانِ
Two prescribed duties whose rulings continue to remain in force.

Madiyan does not mean that Hajj or jihad must in fact be taking place at every moment. It refers to the continuation of their religious status and ruling. A duty not being carried out at a particular time is not the same as its legal ruling being abolished.

The distinction applies to both subjects and explains why continued legal force must be separated from uninterrupted performance.

7. Those in authority: righteous and sinful

مَعَ أُولِي الْأَمْرِ مِنَ الْمُسْلِمِينَ بَرِّهِمْ وَفَاجِرِهِمْ
With those holding authority among Muslims, whether righteous or sinful.

Barr refers to a righteous person; fajir refers to a sinful person. These terms describe the personal moral condition of the authority. That condition does not by itself extinguish the underlying prescribed status of Hajj or jihad.

Condoning someone's sin and recognizing that a separate religious ruling remains valid are different matters.

8. Neither duty is annulled or revoked

لَا يُبْطِلُهُمَا شَيْءٌ وَلَا يَنْقُضُهُمَا
Nothing invalidates or revokes their underlying prescribed status.

Yubtilu concerns making something void; yanqudu concerns undoing or overturning what stands established. The two negations emphasize that the basic rulings concerning Hajj and jihad remain in place.

The point concerns the continuing ruling, not a claim that every person is performing these duties at every moment under all conditions.

9. The technical religious meaning of jihad

The word jihad has a lexical range as well as a specific technical religious usage. In this discussion, its defined legal sense is qital fi sabil Allah, fighting in the way of Allah.

The lexical sense of effort or hardship does not mean that every laborious act automatically receives the same technical rulings and merits. A defined religious term must be understood through its recognized religious usage, not only its broad dictionary meaning.

10. The distinction between hardship and a legal term

Effort, difficulty and hardship may be lexical descriptions of an activity. A term's defined usage in religious law is a different matter: it is a technical religious category.

The mere fact that an activity is difficult does not make it jihad in the specific sense under discussion. Treating every demanding activity as equivalent to that category erases the distinction between an ordinary word and a particular religious ruling.

The defined legal sense must therefore not be derived solely from the broad dictionary range.

11. Why preserving technical terms matters

If established religious terms are redefined solely through a broad lexical association, the interpretation of connected rulings may also shift. Once a technical meaning is lost, provisions and merits belonging to that category can be transferred to unrelated activities.

That is the concern behind tahrif fi al-din, distortion of religious meaning. In discussing jihad, the ordinary senses of effort and difficulty are not used to replace its defined legal usage; the two levels of meaning remain distinct.

12. Common usage of the term mujahidin

In common usage ('urf 'amm), those engaged in fighting are also referred to as mujahidin. Familiar usage can matter when interpreting the meaning of a religious term. Ignoring that usage may create further confusion concerning what a word denotes.

An unnecessary reinterpretation of jihad that displaces its recognized sense can also alter popular understanding. Keeping lexical, legal and customary meanings distinct allows each expression to remain in its proper setting.

13. Each religious practice has its own merits

Distinct merits associated with fighting in the way of Allah need not be transferred to every other good deed. Prayer, zakat, fasting and Hajj have their own stated merits and standing.

A particular virtue relates to the practice to which it is assigned. Establishing the worth of another act does not require giving it a different name or importing the first act's distinctive merits. Each prescribed practice retains its own place without diminishing the others.

14. Distinct obligations and the standing of other acts

A person who offers prayer, gives zakat, fasts and performs Hajj may be accountable for failing to undertake a separate duty, but the merit and acceptance of those other acts are not thereby cancelled.

Likewise, a person who undertakes jihad but omits prayer, zakat, fasting or Hajj remains answerable for neglecting those duties; the omission does not of itself cancel the standing of the other act.

Each act has its own standing. Performing one prescribed act does not count as performing another, and omission of one is not a blanket rule nullifying every other act.

15. A continuing ruling is not uninterrupted performance

The statement that Hajj and jihad continue until the Hour means that their religious rulings remain in force. It does not require their practical occurrence continuously, at every moment or in every year.

An unforeseen calamity could prevent Hajj from taking place in a particular year. Likewise, there may be a period with no actual fighting. In each case, temporary non-performance is different from the cancellation of the underlying ruling.

This is the essential distinction for understanding both madiyan and the declaration that neither duty is revoked.

16. The status of a duty versus its occurrence

First case: The ruling concerning Hajj remains established, but an unforeseen calamity prevents its performance in a given year. That circumstance does not abolish the Hajj ruling.
Second case: The ruling concerning jihad remains established, but no fighting occurs during a particular period. Non-occurrence does not repeal the underlying ruling.

Conclusion: A religious duty's continuing legal status and its actual performance at a particular time are separate matters. This distinction explains the persistence described in the passage.