Indications of Rational Metaphor and the Metaphor-by-Implication Debate

1. Why rational metaphor requires an indication

Rational figurative predication (المجاز العقلي) attributes an action or action-meaning to an associated subject rather than its proper bearer. The listener needs an indication (قرينة) that prevents treating this attribution as literally intended.

ولا بد له أي للمجاز العقلي من قرينة صارفة عن إرادة ظاهره
Rational metaphor requires an indication that diverts interpretation from its apparent attribution.

Without such evidence, an apparently possible assertion should not be labelled figurative merely because another reading sounds elegant. The indication is what licenses the departure from the apparent predication.

2. Verbal and nonverbal indications

An indication may appear in the wording itself, or arise from reason, ordinary experience, context, or known facts. It is therefore helpful to distinguish verbal (لفظية) from nonverbal or conceptual (معنوية) indications.

TypeHow it worksGeneral example
VerbalA word or construction in the utterance blocks a literal predicationAn explicit expression incompatible with literal agency
ConceptualReason, customary knowledge or situation excludes the apparent agentAn action ascribed to a season or causal associate that is not the proper performer

The indication should not be confused with the relation (علاقة). Causality or time explains the association between agent and subject; the indication explains why the apparent attribution is not intended literally.

3. An indication based on rational impossibility

Some utterances cannot be sustained on their apparent attribution because the purported agent cannot literally perform the stated action. Rational impossibility (استحالة عقلية) can therefore signal figurative attribution. The exact locus of impossibility must be identified: the act itself, the subject, or their proposed relation.

مَحَبَّتُكَ جَاءَتْ بِكَ إِلَيَّ
Your affection brought you to me.

Affection does not physically walk or transport a person. It is presented as the motive or cause of coming. Causality supplies the relation, while the impossibility of bodily agency by affection supplies the indication.

4. Customary impossibility is not always logical impossibility

A relation contrary to ordinary experience need not be impossible by pure logic. Reason may allow a conceivable scenario while familiar facts or the context exclude that reading in the actual utterance.

In “أَنْبَتَ الرَّبِيعُ الْبَقْلَ” (spring made the herbage grow), spring is naturally associated with growth, but not thereby an independent, deliberate creator of it. The speaker's assumptions, context and the known chain of causes matter when identifying the intended attribution.

Logical impossibility, unusualness in ordinary practice, and a contextual indication are not interchangeable names. They provide different kinds of evidence.

5. Recognizing a verbal indication

A verbal indication arises when the wording of the utterance itself excludes the literal agency. A striking word is not automatically an indication; it must genuinely constrain the interpretation.

For example, if an utterance attributes an action to someone but also explicitly states that the action occurred through that person's direction, supervision, or cause rather than personal performance, the added wording can make the intended attribution clear.

The figurative subject and the word serving as indication play different roles. The indication is evidence for recognizing a nonliteral relation; it is not identical to the relational transfer itself.

6. Unusual wording alone does not prove metaphor

Rare vocabulary and figurative predication are different matters. The earlier discussion of individual-word eloquence concerned unusual pronunciation, obscurity and morphology. The present issue concerns who is presented as performing the action.

بَنَى الْأَمِيرُ الْمَدِينَةَ
The ruler built the city.

In some settings, this means the work happened at the ruler's command or under his administration, without his physically building it. Yet broad customary usage and context matter: the utterance cannot automatically be declared rationally figurative in every use.

First establish the intended action, its attributed agent, and the evidence—linguistic convention or contextual indication—that the relation is not literal.

7. Customary agency in “The commander defeated the army”

هَزَمَ الْأَمِيرُ الْجُنْدَ
The commander defeated the army.

The defeat is grammatically attributed to the commander. He might have directly participated, or his army might have achieved victory under his leadership. Both linguistic convention and particular context matter.

Before declaring the statement figurative, we should ask whether Arabic customary usage properly attributes collective action to a commander, and what indication is available in the specific utterance. Neither assuming complete personal performance nor assuming figurative attribution in every instance is justified.

8. Examining “Seeing you delighted me”

سَرَّتْنِي رُؤْيَتُكَ
Seeing you delighted me.

Delighting is ascribed to “seeing.” Seeing may function as a cause of joy, but that fact alone does not conclusively settle whether the whole predication is figurative: ordinary Arabic also uses verbs with their effects or causes.

The example raises an advanced question: must a real agent actually exist externally for every action before rational figurative predication becomes possible? Another issue is what ordinary usage already permits the verb “sarra” to express. Different treatments of such cases should not be compressed into a single mechanical rule.

9. The issue of intransitive and transitive verbs

A transitive verb takes an object; an intransitive verb does not require one. This grammatical distinction becomes relevant in advanced objections concerning the proper bearer of an action.

The claim that every action must always possess a separately existing external agent can create difficulties for intransitive verbs, abstract actions and hypothetical utterances. The rhetorical question is about the proper attribution, not merely verb classification.

Grammar identifies the subject of the verb as constructed. Rhetoric asks whether that grammatical subject is also the proper bearer of the action under the intended usage.

10. Apparent predication, belief and linguistic custom

The speaker's belief matters in analyzing figurative predication. Earlier lessons explained why the expressions “عند المتكلم” (according to the speaker) and “في الظاهر” (on the face of it) affect classifications of genuine attribution.

Some judgments about agency are not derived from pure logic alone, but also from conventional linguistic usage. If speakers normally use a verb in a certain way, an analyst cannot label it metaphorical solely because of a personal impression.

Order of analysis:
1. Identify the verb's established meaning.
2. Identify the grammatical subject.
3. Examine intent, belief and contextual indications.
4. Only then decide how literal or figurative the predication is.

11. Comparing overt and subtle indications

AspectManifest indicationSubtle indication
ComprehensionMeaning is evident without extended inferenceMeaning emerges through reflection and analysis
BasisExplicit wording, obvious reasoning or familiar circumstancesA delicate implication, context or rhetorical association
RiskPremature classificationInventing an unsupported figurative reading

These are degrees of clarity of indication, not necessarily two distinct kinds of figurative predication. What is clear in a well-known context may be obscure when detached from it.

The complete utterance, its surrounding discourse, the speaker's intent and recognized usage may all matter.

12. A poetic example of beauty revealed by continued looking

يَزِيدُكَ وَجْهُهُ حُسْنًا إِذَا مَا زِدْتَهُ نَظَرًا
The face appears increasingly beautiful to you the more attentively you look at it.

The line connects an increase of perceived beauty with an increase in the observer's attention. Its discussion distinguishes fresh awareness of subtle features from an actual alteration in the face's external beauty.

Reflective awareness of successive fine points is not identical to a claim that the external object has physically acquired new beauty. The rhetorical attribution must be assessed through intention and indication.

13. Al-Sakkākī’s alternative account

In explaining some familiar cases of rational figurative predication, al-Sakkākī advances an approach associated with metaphor by implication (استعارة بالكناية). A nonliteral agent is likened to the proper bearer of the action, and an appropriate attribute or action is then presented as a consequence of that comparison.

For “أَنْبَتَ الرَّبِيعُ الْبَقْلَ,” spring is understood through an implied comparison with what truly causes growth; the attribution of “causing growth” serves the figurative conception.

The dispute concerns where the figurativeness is located. One account identifies transfer in the predication itself, while the other invokes implicit comparison and its attached implications. They should not be presented as identical theories.

14. Subject and implied comparison in metaphor by implication

In the analysis of استعارة بالكناية, the thing compared (مشبّه) is presented as resembling another, while the implied comparand (مشبّه به) supplies a characteristic or consequence associated with it. The comparand may remain unspoken and be inferred from its attributes.

In “spring made the grass grow,” the word “spring” remains, while “causing growth” creates the imaginative picture of spring as a true agent of growth.

Understanding an implicit simile is one thing; treating that simile as a complete theory of the predication is another. The latter requires explaining how the attributed action, the comparison and the indication fit together.

15. Indication versus an attribute of the implied comparand

In metaphor by implication, an attribute or action may serve as an attribute of the implied comparand (لازم المشبّه به). But not every such attribute is automatically the rational-metaphor indication, whose specific function is to exclude literal predication.

An attribute may primarily establish an imaginative comparison, or it may also serve as evidence against the plain reading. These functions can coincide, yet are not identical definitions.

Two analytic questions:
1. Which unspoken comparison does this feature evoke?
2. Which apparent attribution does it prevent us from accepting literally?

Keeping both questions in view clarifies the relation between استعارة بالكناية and rational figurative predication.

16. The Qur’anic phrase “a pleasing life”

فَهُوَ فِي عِيشَةٍ رَاضِيَةٍ
He will be in a life of satisfaction. (Al-Ḥāqqah 69:21)

“Rāḍiyah” ordinarily relates to being pleased, an attribute associated with a sentient subject. Here the phrase conveys a life that is satisfying or pleasant. The quality of satisfaction is expressed through the condition of the life enjoyed.

The technical issue is whether to explain this as figurative attribution of satisfaction to life, or through figurative lexical usage and its implications. Competing analyses illuminate different dimensions of the same Arabic expression.

17. Attribution of an adjective and the genitive construction

The discussion of “عِيشَةٍ رَاضِيَةٍ” raises a fine point: if the satisfaction ultimately belongs to the person enjoying the life, must one always reconstruct an unspoken genitive expression referring to that person?

An adjective may conventionally be attached to something that produces or occasions a quality rather than literally experiences it. On the other hand, the analyst should not invent an omitted noun without justification.

“A pleasant life” is a meaningful customary description; “life literally feels pleased like a person” is a different claim. The conventional sense of the adjective, the actual bearer of the quality and any proposed ellipsis must be separately examined.

18. Agency in “their trade did not profit”

فَمَا رَبِحَتْ تِجَارَتُهُمْ
Their trade did not profit. (Al-Baqarah 2:16)

Here “rabiḥat” is the verb and “tijāratuhum” is its grammatical subject. Profit and loss are associated with trade through the actions of the traders and their outcome.

Grammatical question: what word receives the verb? — Their trade.
Rhetorical question: what properly receives profit, and what relation links it to trade? — The traders, their transactions and their outcomes.

Assuming that every grammatical subject is automatically the proper literal agent would erase the very distinction studied in rational figurative predication.

19. Construction attributed to the person commanded

يَا هَامَانُ ابْنِ لِي صَرْحًا
O Hāmān, build for me a lofty structure. (Ghāfir 40:36)

Pharaoh commands Hāmān to build. The imperative addresses him, but does not necessarily require that he personally lift the bricks: the project may be executed through workers under his direction.

This illustrates the need to distinguish broad ordinary usage from specifically figurative attribution. If “build” conventionally extends to someone who commissions or manages building, then physical nonparticipation alone does not prove metaphor. Custom, authority and contextual evidence must be assessed.

20. Three objections based on unintended consequences

An objection to the implied-metaphor account is that, if a figurative agent is treated as resembling the real agent in every respect, undesirable consequences may follow that the utterance never intended.

Examples:
1. “Spring caused the grass to grow”: treating spring as an independently powerful agent.
2. “Seeing you delighted me”: treating the act of seeing as autonomous in all senses.
3. “O Hāmān, build for me”: treating an overseer as necessarily performing all manual labor.

The key concern is not to import every external implication into a rhetorical comparison. A likeness may be intended in one aspect and not in all possible attributes.

21. Response: an implicit resemblance may be restricted

One response is that a comparison need not extend to every characteristic of its implied model. Presenting spring as agent-like with respect to growth does not automatically grant it autonomous power in every respect.

This principle helps keep both analyses disciplined: do not force implications beyond what the indication and context sustain.

Yet that response does not by itself settle the underlying dispute over whether the figurativeness primarily belongs to the predication or to an implicit metaphor and its accompanying features. The theoretical distinction remains.

22. Comparing kināyah, metaphor and rational figurative attribution

ConceptCentral concernQuestion answered
Rational metaphorNonliteral attribution of an action or judgmentWho properly bears this predicate?
Metaphor by implicationUnspoken comparison and its associated attributesWhat is imaginatively likened to what?
Contextual indicationEvidence excluding the apparent readingWhy is the apparent predication not intended?

All three may be relevant to the same Arabic utterance, but they perform distinct analytical tasks.

In particular, an indication (قرينة) is not automatically a causal or temporal relation (علاقة). The former supports interpretation; the latter links the proper bearer to the expressed subject.

23. Worked exercise: three indications

For each example, identify the predication, the relation, then the indication.

1. أَنْبَتَ الرَّبِيعُ الْبَقْلَ — growth is attributed to spring; the link is time and cause; the analysis depends on customary usage, belief and the role of the cause.
2. مَحَبَّتُكَ جَاءَتْ بِكَ إِلَيَّ — coming is attributed to affection; the link is motivation; affection's inability to act physically is an overt indication.
3. فَمَا رَبِحَتْ تِجَارَتُهُمْ — profit is attributed to trade; the link is commercial activity and its results; the contrast between trade and traders reveals the attribution.

Apply the same questions elsewhere: what was attributed, through which association, and on what evidence is the plain reading excluded?

24. How to evaluate competing explanations

Different analyses of one rhetorical expression do not imply that the underlying Arabic is unintelligible. The disagreement often concerns where the formal basis of its eloquence should be located.

For “عِيشَةٍ رَاضِيَةٍ,” the communicated sense is a satisfying life. One reading emphasizes the attributed quality; others examine conventional adjectival use, metaphor or whether a suppressed genitive is warranted.

For each view, identify three things: the claim, the evidence or indication, and the difficulty or objection. Otherwise, an intellectual dispute degenerates into a list of names.

25. Synthesis: indications, attribution and metaphor

A sound analysis of rational figurative predication distinguishes the grammatical attribution from what properly bears the action or quality. When these differ, a justified indication is needed to establish the nonliteral reading.

Main principles:
1. An indication may be verbal or conceptual.
2. It may be obvious or subtle.
3. Causal and temporal relations are not synonymous with indications.
4. Metaphor by implication emphasizes the imagined comparison within the expression.
5. Interpretation must respect convention and context.

The next lesson begins **أحوال المسند إليه** (states of the subject), including the rhetorical purposes of mentioning or omitting the subject.