Knowledge, Conception, Assent and Their Divisions

1. Why logic begins with knowledge

Logic aims to order reasoning so that we can avoid errors in thought. Before studying reasoning, however, we must understand what knowledge means and how it is divided.

Grasping a meaning is one act; affirming a claim about it is another. Understanding the concept “human” is different from accepting that “a human is a living being.”

This difference prepares the later study of definition and proof. The lesson explains the uses of the word knowledge, conception, assent, and their initial subdivisions.

2. Several technical senses of knowledge

The opening text notes that the term knowledge has more than one technical use:

اعلم أن العلم يطلق على معان
Know that the word knowledge is used in several senses.

These are not five interchangeable definitions. Some scholars describe the acquisition of a thing in the mind, others the resulting mental form, and others the relation between knower and known.

The disagreement concerns how the nature of knowledge should be analyzed. The first two formulations provide the most useful starting point.

3. First sense: acquiring a mental form

حصول صورة الشيء في العقل
The coming-to-be of a thing's form in the intellect.

Suppose you had not understood what a tree is, but then came to recognize it. Considered as an acquisition, a meaning has become present to your mind.

A form here is not necessarily a visual picture. It can be an intelligible meaning or recognition. For example, justice can be understood without a single pictorial representation.

This formulation emphasizes the acquisition of a mental form, not a physical object entering the mind.

4. Second sense: the resulting mental form

الصورة الحاصلة من الشيء عند العقل
The form of a thing that has become present to the intellect.

The first formulation highlights the coming-to-be of the form; the second highlights the form now present.

After learning what a circle means, you possess a concept of a circle. Its acquisition is considered under the first sense, while the concept acquired is considered under the second.

The formulations are closely connected, but the process of acquisition and its result are different aspects of analysis.

5. Three further senses: object, reception, relation

The text gives three more formulations:

الحاضر عند المدرك
That which is present to the perceiver.

قبول النفس لتلك الصورة
The soul's reception of that form.

الإضافة الحاصلة بين العالم والمعلوم
The relation obtaining between knower and known.

These respectively focus on the object as present, mental reception, and a relation between knower and known. They must be understood as different proposed analyses, not collapsed into a single sentence.

6. Knower, known, and cognition

The knower is the one who possesses knowledge; the known is the object or content known; cognition concerns the mind's apprehension of it.

Suppose a student understands a triangle:
Knower: the student.
Known: the concept of a triangle.
Cognition: the mental apprehension or acquisition of that meaning.

The external triangle, its concept, and the student have different roles. That helps explain why different definitions of knowledge foreground different aspects.

7. The division into conception and assent

وينقسم على قسمين، أحدهما: يقال له التصور، وثانيهما: يعبر عنه بالتصديق
Knowledge is divided into two kinds: conception and assent.

Conception (tasawwur) is apprehending a meaning without affirming a separate judgment about it.

Assent (tasdiq) concerns judging whether a predicative relation holds or does not hold.

Examples:
“Human” — a concept.
“A human is a living being” — a proposition; accepting its claim concerns assent.

Word count is not decisive. The distinction is the presence of a judgment. The commentary specifies that this treatment concerns acquired, originated knowledge, not knowledge by presence or eternal knowledge.

8. The source definition of conception

أما التصور فهو الإدراك الخالي عن الحكم
Conception is apprehension free of judgment.

Apprehension is grasping meaning; being free of judgment means that no separate affirmation or denial is yet made about a subject.

“Zayd,” “standing,” and “white cloth” can all be understood as concepts. “White cloth” includes a qualification, but it does not independently assert that some particular cloth is white.

An expression of several words can therefore remain conceptual if it is not used as an independent assertion.

9. What judgment means

والمراد بالحكم نسبة أمر إلى أمر آخر إيجابا أو سلبا
Judgment means relating one thing to another by affirmation or denial.

Affirmation (ijab) asserts a predicate: “Zayd is standing” affirms standing of Zayd.

Denial (salb) rejects that predication: “Zayd is not standing” denies standing of Zayd.

Merely understanding Zayd and standing does not constitute a judgment. A judgment arises when the relation between them is affirmed or denied. This is decisive for distinguishing conception and assent.

10. Affirmative and negative predication

Compare two propositions:

“This door is open.” — the predicate open is affirmed of the door: affirmative judgment.
“This door is not open.” — the same predicate is denied: negative judgment.

Both require understanding the door and openness before assessing the predication.

A common mistake is to exclude negative propositions from assent. Tasdiq is not limited to positive predication; correctly affirming that a relation does not hold can also constitute assent.

11. Establishing and withdrawing a relation

The text also says:

وإن شئت قلت إيقاعا أو انتزاعا
If you wish, you may call it the positing or withdrawal of a relation.

It adds:

وقد يفسر الحكم بوقوع النسبة أو لا وقوعها
Judgment may also be explained in terms of whether the relation obtains or does not obtain.

The idea is not merely to entertain two meanings, but to determine whether their predicative connection holds. “Zayd is learned” affirms a property; “Zayd is not learned” denies it.

12. Grasping subject and predicate is not enough

In the source example, understanding Zayd and standing separately remains conception.

“Zayd” — a person's identity.
“Standing” — the concept of being upright.
“Zayd is standing” — an assertion of standing.
“Zayd is not standing” — denial of standing.

The first two present concepts; the latter two express an affirmation or denial of a relation.

Important: hearing a proposition as an example does not mean personally assenting to its truth. Having the form of an assertion does not establish its truth.

13. Complex conception versus a proposition

Compare two expressions about one subject:

“A learned student” — a complex conception, not an independent assertion.
“The student is learned” — a proposition asserting learning of the student.

Likewise:
“Zayd's house” — a relational phrase, hence conception.
“Zayd's house is spacious” — an assertion of spaciousness.

Including a property or relation within a description is not the same as predicating it in a proposition. This prepares the distinction between definition and proposition.

14. Assent: judgment accompanied by conceptions

أما التصديق فهو على قول الحكماء عبارة عن الحكم المقارن للتصورات
According to the philosophers, assent is a judgment occurring together with the relevant conceptions.

To evaluate “Zayd is standing,” one must grasp Zayd, standing, and the relation between them. The mind then affirms or denies that relation.

In the philosophers' formulation, judgment is what specifically constitutes assent; the conceptions are necessary for it but do not by themselves amount to assent.

Conception does not disappear in assent. Judgment occurs with the needed conceptual content.

15. Three cognitive elements required for assent

The source analyzes “Zayd is standing” through three required apprehensions:
1. Conception of Zayd: the subject under discussion.
2. Conception of standing: the predicate attributed to him.
3. Conception of the link: the meaning connecting subject and predicate.

The mind then judges whether this connection obtains.

The idea of a relation differs from affirming that it really holds. A listener may understand what “Zayd is standing” claims without assenting to it.

16. Four senses of the term judgment

The commentary distinguishes four uses of hukm (judgment):
1. Al-mahkum bihi: the predicate being judged, such as standing.
2. Wuqūʿ al-nisba or its absence: whether the relation obtains.
3. The relation as connecting the terms: the link itself.
4. Apprehending whether it obtains: cognition of the relation's obtaining or not obtaining.

Context matters when interpreting the term. A predicate, a relation, and cognition of its occurrence are distinct aspects.

17. Philosophers and Imam al-Razi compared

The commentary describes two accounts of the nature of assent.

Philosophers: assent is the judgment, while the relevant conceptions are its necessary conditions.
Imam al-Razi: assent is analyzed as the composite of judgment and the conceptions of the terms.

In “Zayd is standing,” the subject, predicate, and connection must be understood. The disagreement concerns whether the total complex is called assent or the judgment alone is decisive.

The disagreement should be preserved, not erased; both accounts require grasping the concepts before making a meaningful judgment.

18. A worked analysis of assent

Consider “This water is cold.”
Subject: this particular water.
Predicate: coldness.
Link: the attribution of coldness to the water.
Judgment: affirming coldness of this water.

If the water is indeed cold and the attribution is accepted on appropriate grounds, this is correct assent. If the water's condition is unknown, understanding the wording does not amount to accepting the judgment.

The distinction matters whenever we comprehend a claim but still need evidence for it.

19. Self-evident and inferential knowledge

Both conception and assent are subdivided into badihi (immediate or self-evident) and nazari (requiring reflection or inference).

Badihi knowledge is obtained without organizing a further process of reasoning at that point.

Nazari knowledge requires thought, analysis, or reasoning from what is already known.

This division concerns how knowledge is obtained, whereas the conception/assent division concerns the presence of judgment.

Thus a conception can be immediate or inferential, and so can an assent.

20. Immediate conception: heat and cold

فصل: التصور قسمان: أحدهما: بديهي، أي حاصل بلا نظر وكسب
Conception has two kinds; the first is immediate, obtained without deliberative reasoning or acquisition.

The text gives heat and cold as examples. Someone familiar with these experiences can grasp their basic meanings without constructing a long logical argument.

Immediate does not mean that every person automatically knows the relevant vocabulary in every language. The point concerns direct grasp of a meaning, not mastery of a particular word.

21. Inferential conception: a meaning needing reflection

وثانيهما: نظري، أي يحتاج في حصوله إلى الفكر والنظر
The second is inferential conception, which requires thought and reflection to acquire.

The text offers jinn and angels as concepts whose proper understanding cannot simply be assumed from ordinary sensory familiarity; information and reflection may be needed.

As another teaching example, a student may build the concept of a quadrilateral with four right angles by understanding its defining features.

Distinction: inferential conception aims to obtain the meaning; inferential assent aims to establish the truth of a proposition by reasoning.

22. Immediate assent: a plainly grasped relation

Assent can also be immediate: once the terms are properly understood, the truth of the relation is recognized without an extended chain of inference.

The text's examples are:

الكل أعظم من الجزء
The whole is greater than the part.

والاثنان نصف الأربعة
And two is half of four.

Once the concepts and suitable quantitative relation are grasped, the judgment becomes clear. The whole–part example concerns a quantitative whole and a proper part.

This is assent because a relation is affirmed, not merely because words have been repeated.

23. Inferential assent: a proposition requiring evidence

The text illustrates inferential assent with:

العالم حادث، والصانع موجود
The world is originated, and the Maker exists.

These are theological propositions for which arguments are developed in traditional kalam. The point here is not to present all those arguments, but to show that reaching a judgment through reasoning is inferential assent.

Merely understanding the meanings of “world,” “originated,” and “Maker” does not by itself supply a proof of these propositions. Supporting premises and reasoning must be considered.

24. Two divisions yield four combinations

Combining the two classifications yields four possibilities:

1. Immediate conception: directly grasping coldness.
2. Inferential conception: learning a complex concept through definition and thought.
3. Immediate assent: recognizing that two is half of four once the quantities and relation are clear.
4. Inferential assent: accepting a conclusion on the basis of premises and argument.

The first division asks, Is judgment involved? The second asks, How is this cognition obtained?

Thus it is false that all conception must be immediate and all assent inferential.

25. Practice: concepts, propositions, assent

First identify the structure of each expression, then consider assent separately:

“Book” — a conception.
“Old book” — a qualified conception, not a full assertion.
“This book is old” — an affirmative predication.
“This book is not old” — a negative predication.

Merely hearing the last two does not automatically mean believing them. Assent requires accepting the relevant judgment.

Also, affirmative versus negative and immediate versus inferential answer separate questions.

26. Consolidated lesson review

Descriptions of knowledge focus on acquisition of a form, the form acquired, the object apprehended, reception by the mind, or the relation between knower and known.

Conception grasps a meaning without independently judging it.

Assent involves an affirmative or negative judgment. Philosophers and Imam al-Razi analyze the role of its constituent apprehensions differently.

Immediate knowledge needs no further reasoning at that point; inferential knowledge requires reflection. Either can occur in conception or assent.

The next discussion examines inferential knowledge, thought, and the ordering of what is already known.