Simple and Compound Expressions: Terms and Their Semantic Divisions

1. After signification: simple and compound

The previous lesson examined verbal signification through complete meaning, a component and an implication. We now ask whether the meaningful expression itself is simple (mufrad) or compound (murakkab).

اللفظ الدال إما مفرد، وإما مركب
A signifying expression is either simple or compound.

The division is not based merely on counting letters or written words. Its criterion is whether the constituent parts are intended to signify constituent parts of the whole meaning. Consequently, even an expression with several written words may count as simple when functioning as one indivisible name.

2. The defining criterion of mufrad

فالمفرد ما لا يقصد بجزئه الدلالة على جزء معناه
A simple expression is one whose part is not intended to signify a part of its intended whole meaning.

The restriction “is not intended” is crucial. A simple term need not lack physical parts: its parts may exist, and may even have independent meanings in other uses, but those meanings are not intended as components of the present signification.

“Zayd,” as a personal name, designates an individual. Its letters are not intended to indicate portions of that person, so the name is logically simple.

3. Two elementary cases of simple terms

A simple term may have no constituent part available for the proposed division, or it may have parts that do not separately signify portions of the intended meaning.

1. A term with no further linguistic part: the interrogative hamzah “أَ” is a single particle.
2. A term with letters that do not contribute component meanings: the letters of “Zayd” do not denote parts of Zayd himself.

Therefore, a simple term is not necessarily one letter long; and having several letters is not enough to make an expression logically compound.

4. ʿAbd Allāh as a proper name

Used descriptively, “ʿabd Allāh” comprises “servant” and “God”: its constituent words contribute to the combined relational meaning.

Used instead as someone's proper name, “ʿAbd Allāh” is meant to identify that individual. The constituent words are not meant to signify parts of that individual's identity. In this use, the name is logically simple.

The same visible words can therefore be treated differently depending on their intended signification. What matters is the meaning conveyed in the actual use.

5. Definition of a compound expression

والمركب ما يقصد بجزئه الدلالة على جزء معناه
A compound expression is one whose constituent part is intended to signify a part of its total intended meaning.

In “ghulāmu Zaydin” (Zayd's servant), each element contributes to the relational meaning, so the expression is compound.

In “Zaydun qāʾimun” (Zayd is standing), the subject and predicate also contribute separately; it is compound as well. Yet only the latter makes a complete assertion, showing that compounding and completeness of judgment are different issues.

6. Why word-count is not decisive

The number of written words cannot by itself settle the question of logical simplicity or composition.

“Zayd” as a name: simple.
“ʿAbd Allāh” as a personal name: simple despite two written words.
“ʿabd Allāh” as a descriptive possessive phrase: compound.
“Zayd is learned”: compound because subject and predicate contribute separately.

This classification concerns intended signification. It should not be confused with the grammatical classification of a word or the distinction between complete and incomplete sentences.

7. Three classes: ism, kalimah and adāh

ثم المفرد على أنحاء ثلاثة
A simple expression is further divided into three classes.

Ism: has an independently intelligible meaning not conventionally coupled with a particular tense, such as “Zayd” or “knowledge.”
Kalimah: has an independently intelligible meaning coupled with a tense, as in “qāma,” “he stood.”
Adāh: does not convey its intended relational meaning independently, as in “min,” “from.”

“Kalimah” is used here in a technical logical sense, and must not automatically be equated with every grammatical use of “word.”

8. Tense distinguishes logical kalimah

“Qāma” expresses standing and is conventionally tied to past time, so it is a logical kalimah. The noun “qiyām” expresses the act of standing but does not, by its lexical signification, include a specified tense; it is an ism.

“Qāma”: action with past tense.
“Yaqūmu”: action with a present/future temporal form.
“Qiyām”: the action as a noun without an inherent tense.

A noun can be used in a sentence about yesterday without becoming a tense-bearing kalimah. The distinction concerns the expression's conventional meaning, not every time reference in context.

9. Adāh and relational meaning

وإن لم يكن معناه مستقلا فهو أداة
If its meaning is not independently intelligible, it is an adāh (a relational particle).

The signification of “min” (“from”) becomes definite through its relation to other terms, as in “min al-bayt” (“from the house”). Uttered in isolation, it does not express the complete relation intended in that construction.

Grammar commonly calls this a ḥarf, while the logical division uses ism, kalimah and adāh. The sciences employ different classificatory purposes; their technical labels should be distinguished.

10. Grammatical kalimah versus logical mufrad

The text cautions against identifying the logician's mufrad with the grammarian's kalimah without qualification. Logic examines the intended signification of a term; grammar also considers sentence structure and grammatical relations such as subject and verb.

For example, grammar analyzes “iḍrib” (“strike!”) with reference to its understood subject, the addressee. Logic separately asks whether an actual constituent of the expression is intended to signify a component of the total meaning.

Consequently, definitions from different disciplines must be applied according to their own criteria, not merely because the terms appear similar.

11. A second division: one meaning or several

قد ينقسم المفرد بتقسيم آخر
The simple term admits a further division.

We now classify it by the number of meanings it carries: one conventionally specified meaning, or several meanings. This is a different criterion from the earlier threefold distinction between ism, kalimah and adāh.

For one meaning, the next question is whether that meaning can be predicated of more than one individual. For several meanings, we investigate whether separate meanings were assigned from the outset or whether a term was later transferred from one sense to another.

12. A proper name and logical particular

ذلك المعنى متعينا مشخصا أو لم يكن، والأول يسمى علما
The single meaning may designate a determinate individual or may not; the first case is called a proper name.

When “Zayd” designates one specified person, it functions as an ʿalam (proper name) and relates to the category of genuine particulars.

Many distinct people can happen to share the name Zayd. That does not make the meaning intended in a particular use universally predicable of all of them. Repetition of a name across people is different from the predicability of one common concept.

13. Mutawāṭiʾ: even predication

أن يكون صدق ذلك المعنى على سائر أفراده على سبيل الاستواء
Its meaning applies to all of its instances on an equal footing.

Such a general term is called mutawāṭiʾ (univocal in predication). “Human,” for instance, applies to Zayd, ʿAmr and Bakr as humans without degrees of humanity. One may be more knowledgeable or stronger, but that does not make the term “human” apply to him in a greater degree.

Equality concerns the predication of this particular universal meaning, not equality in every property, achievement or condition.

14. Shared essence versus varying attributes

For mutawāṭiʾ, distinguish how a universal applies from the other attributes of its bearers.

“Zayd is human”: humanity is predicated of Zayd.
“ʿAmr is human”: the same common meaning applies to ʿAmr.
“ʿAmr is taller than Zayd”: a difference in height, not an additional degree of humanity.

A common concept may have many instances without becoming graded. Graded predication requires a relevant difference within the way the shared meaning itself is attributed.

15. Mushakkik: graded predication

أن لا يكون صدق ذلك المعنى العام في جميع أفراده على وجه الاستواء
The common meaning does not apply to all of its instances in precisely the same manner.

This is called mushakkik, a graded universal. The book discusses difference through priority, precedence, intensity or increase. The meaning remains common, but the manner or degree of its application differs.

Its traditional examples include “existence” predicated of the Necessary and the contingent, and the varying whiteness of snow and ivory. These examples belong to classical philosophical discussions and should be interpreted within those technical distinctions.

16. Four respects of graded predication

The book identifies four respects of gradation.

1. Awlawiyyah: one instance has a stronger claim or priority to the shared predicate.
2. Awwaliyyah: the meaning applies with logical or explanatory precedence in one case.
3. Shiddah: a difference in intensity, such as the strength of whiteness.
4. Ziyādah: a difference described in terms of increase or greater measure.

Their interpretations can be debated in classical philosophy. Merely finding any greater-or-lesser property is not sufficient: the difference must bear on the shared meaning actually under discussion.

17. Why univocal and graded terms are confused

ويسمى هذا القسم مشككا؛ لأنه يوقع الناظر في الشك
It is called mushakkik because it may cause uncertainty in the observer.

The puzzle is this: if the meaning is one, why does it apply with a relevant difference? And if there is a difference, are we dealing with distinct meanings after all?

Mutawāṭiʾ: the same meaning applies equally in the respect at issue.
Mushakkik: the common meaning applies with a relevant gradation.

The commentary notes that historical schools differ over cases involving existence and essence. Those philosophical disputes should not obscure the basic logical classification.

18. Mushtarak: one word, several primary senses

أن اللفظ الذي كثر معناه إن وضع ذلك اللفظ لكل معنى ابتداء بأوضاع متعددة على حدة، يسمى مشتركا
If a term has several meanings and was independently assigned to each from the outset, it is termed mushtarak (homonymous).

For “ʿayn,” the original text gives gold, the eye and the knee as separate senses. A spring is another established Arabic sense of the same word. This does not mean every use intends all the meanings at once: context selects the intended sense.

Contrast it with mutawāṭiʾ: there one universal meaning applies to many instances. In mushtarak the same word-form carries several distinct lexical meanings.

19. Homonymy is in the expression, not the referents

In mushtarak, the shared element is the word-form; the different meanings need not themselves form one common universal.

“ʿAyn al-insān”: a human eye.
“ʿAyn al-māʾ”: a water spring.

The sound or written form ʿayn is shared, but the intended meaning is distinct. By contrast, “human” as applied to Zayd and Bakr does not become two unrelated meanings; one general concept applies to both.

The distinction matters later when an argument uses the same term in different senses and mistakenly treats them as identical.

20. Manqūl: a meaning transferred through usage

إن اشتهر في الثاني وترك موضوعه الأول، سمي منقولا
A term initially assigned to one meaning may, through a relevant association, come into established use for a second meaning, with the first use abandoned in the relevant convention. This is manqūl, or transferred usage.

Unlike independent primary assignments in homonymy, transfer has a historical or conventional transition from an earlier sense. A casual metaphor is insufficient; the second meaning must become established in the specified usage.

The source divides transfer by its agents or community into customary, religious-legal and technical types.

21. Customary transfer: dābbah

المنقول العرفي باعتبار كون الناقل عرفا عاما
Customary transfer occurs when general usage brings about the change in meaning.

The book uses “dābbah” as an example: its earlier broad sense related to moving creatures on earth, while later customary usage came to favor a narrower class of animals.

The point is not that the senses are unrelated. Rather, a social convention changes which meaning is normally intended. Transfer by common usage must be distinguished from transfer grounded in religious law or specialist terminology.

22. Religious-legal and technical transfer

المنقول الشرعي باعتبار كونه أرباب الشرع
Religious-legal transfer is established through the terminology of religious law.

“Ṣalāh” is linked with supplication in its earlier lexical sense, but in legal-religious usage it names a specified act of worship with defined elements. The term acquires an established technical referent.

The book also gives the grammatical term “ism.” Its treatment as a word with an independently intelligible meaning not inherently attached to a tense is a specialist usage; the original lexical history of the word is distinct.

The first illustrates legal-religious transfer, the second transfer through a technical discipline.

23. Literal and figurative meaning

وإن لم يشتهر في الثاني ولم يترك الأول، بل يستعمل في الموضوع الأول مرة وفي الثاني أخرى، يسمى بالنسبة إلى الأول حقيقة وبالنسبة إلى الثاني مجازا
Where the later sense has not replaced the original and the expression continues to be used sometimes in the original and sometimes in the associated sense, the original use is literal (ḥaqīqah) and the second figurative (majāz).

“Asad” literally means a lion. Applied to a courageous man, it is figurative through the association of courage.

The animal and the brave man are not one referent. The secondary use relies on a recognizable relation while the original sense remains in use.

24. How to distinguish transferred, homonymous and figurative uses

Mushtarak: separate senses conventionally assigned to the same form, exemplified by the uses of “ʿayn.”
Manqūl: a word transferred from its earlier sense into an established customary, legal or technical sense, as “ṣalāh” in religious usage.
Majāz: an associated second sense used while the literal sense remains available, as calling a brave man “a lion.”

A word's having two meanings is therefore insufficient to classify it. We must examine the nature of the assignments and the patterns of usage that connect, or do not connect, the senses.

25. Mutarādif: different expressions for one meaning

إن كان اللفظ متعددا والمعنى واحدا يسمى مرادفا
If the expressions are multiple but the meaning is one, they are called synonymous (mutarādif).

“Al-asad” and “al-layth” both denote a lion, and so illustrate synonymy in this respect.

Synonymy: different expressions with the same intended meaning.
Homonymy: one expression with distinct independent meanings.

These are converse patterns. Sharing a general topic is not enough for synonymy; the intended sense must coincide. Possible nuances of usage are a further question.

26. Complete compound expressions

المركب قسمان: أحدهما المركب التام، وهو ما يصح السكوت عليه
Compound expressions are of two kinds. The first is complete compound speech: an utterance after which one may properly stop because the intended communicative meaning is complete.

“Zayd qāʾim”: Zayd is standing.
“Al-ʿālam ḥādith”: the world is originated.

Both make complete assertions. “One may stop” does not mean no further question could be asked; it means that the expression is not grammatically or semantically awaiting an essential completing member.

27. Complete compounds: assertion and non-assertion

المركب التام ضربان، يقال لأحدهما: الخبر والقضية
Complete compound speech is of two kinds; one is called khabar or qaḍiyyah, an assertion or proposition.

Khabar/proposition: reports something whose content can be true or false, such as “the sky is above us.”
Inshāʾ: complete discourse not intended as a report, including command, prohibition, question, wish, hope and vocative address.

“Iqraʾ”: Read! (command).
“Lā takdhib”: Do not lie! (prohibition).
“Hal ḥaḍara Zayd?”: Did Zayd arrive? (question).

These are complete utterances but are not themselves true or false in the same way that propositions are.

28. Incomplete compounds and their forms

وثانيهما المركب الناقص، هو ما ليس كذلك
The second kind is an incomplete compound: an expression that does not amount to a complete utterance.

Iḍāfī (genitive/possessive): “ghulāmu Zaydin,” “Zayd's servant.” It identifies someone but does not state a complete claim.
Tawṣīfī (descriptive): “al-rajul al-ʿālim,” “the learned man.” It modifies or identifies rather than asserts.
Taqyīdī (qualifying): “fī al-dār,” “in the house.” This gives a location relation but, alone, is no complete proposition about a specified subject.

This completes the introductory study of expressions. The next section discusses mafhūm (concepts) and the particular/universal division.