Six Kinds of Signification and the Three Modes of Verbal Convention

1. Why logic studies signification

The previous lesson explained that logic concerns sound conception and correct reasoning. Yet teachers normally use words to convey concepts. We therefore need to understand how a word or other sign leads the mind toward a meaning.

Dalālah (signification) is the relation through which knowing one thing leads to knowing another. The sign may be verbal or nonverbal. Understanding the distinction helps us interpret definitions and arguments accurately.

2. Lexical and technical meanings of dalālah

الدلالة لغة هو الإرشاد
In ordinary language, dalālah means guidance.

كون الشيء بحيث يلزم من العلم به العلم بشيء آخر
A thing being such that knowing it entails knowing another thing.

The lexical definition highlights guidance; the technical definition describes the transition from one known thing to another. This need not involve speech. Seeing smoke and inferring fire is also a form of signification.

3. Sign and signified

The dāll is the sign that directs the mind, while the madlūl is what it signifies. Confusing the two makes classification unreliable.

Example 1: The word “Zayd” is the sign; the person named is the signified.
Example 2: Smoke is the sign; the inferred fire is the signified.
Example 3: A standardized road sign is the sign; its agreed instruction is the signified.

Ask two questions: What is being perceived as a sign, and what does it lead us to know?

4. Verbal and nonverbal signification

والدلالة قسمان: لفظية وغير لفظية
Signification is divided into verbal and nonverbal forms.

In verbal signification, the sign is a word or vocal expression. Hearing the word “book,” for example, conveys the concept of a book.

In nonverbal signification, the sign is not a word: a gesture, condition, conventional marker, or observed event may convey information.

The distinction concerns the nature of the sign, not merely whether its meaning can later be described in words.

5. Convention, nature, and reason

Both verbal and nonverbal signs can work through three different kinds of connection: convention (waḍʿ), nature (ṭabʿ), and reason (ʿaql).

Conventional: a meaning is assigned or agreed upon, as with a person's name.
Natural: a condition naturally produces an expression, as when pain evokes a cry.
Rational: the mind infers something from an effect or a necessary connection, such as a sound indicating a sound-producing source.

What matters is the basis of the connection, not merely its outward form.

6. The six kinds in one comparison

Combining two kinds of signs with three kinds of connection yields six forms of signification.

1. Verbal conventional: “Zayd” indicates the person so named.
2. Verbal natural: an involuntary “akh, akh” expresses pain.
3. Verbal rational: a word heard behind a wall indicates a speaker.
4. Nonverbal conventional: an agreed flag or signal indicates a message.
5. Nonverbal natural: a horse's neigh indicates a natural need.
6. Nonverbal rational: smoke indicates fire.

This follows the main text's sixfold scheme. The commentary calls the enumeration inductive and reports a disagreement attributed to Sayyid al-Sanad about counting nonverbal natural signification separately.

7. Verbal conventional: a name signifies

اللفظية الوضعية، كدلالة لفظ زيد على مسماه
Verbal conventional signification, such as the word “Zayd” signifying the person named Zayd.

The sound points to that person because it was assigned as a name. No natural resemblance between the sound and the person is required.

If the same child were named Bilal instead, the child's reality would remain unchanged. What changes is the conventionally assigned linguistic sign.

8. Verbal natural: an involuntary cry

The text uses a cry like “akh, akh” as an example of verbal natural signification. Pain can naturally give rise to this vocal expression.

The relevant connection is the natural production of the cry, not a dictionary convention assigning a definition to a word. An actor can imitate the same sound without being in pain.

Thus the type of signification is one issue; whether the sign is reliable in a particular case is another.

9. Verbal rational: speech implies a speaker

Suppose a word is heard from behind a wall, while the speaker remains unseen. Even without understanding the word's dictionary meaning, the mind may infer that a source produced the utterance.

This is verbal rational signification. The sign is a spoken word, but what it indicates here is the speaker's existence rather than the word's conventional meaning.

Two relations must be separated: “book” signifying a book is conventional; hearing someone say “book” and inferring a speaker is rational.

10. Nonverbal conventional: agreed signals

The commentary describes four kinds of nonverbal conventional markers: distance markers on roads, conventional drawn lines, gestures or signals, and finger configurations used to indicate numbers. Their meanings are learned through accepted usage rather than spoken words.

For example, a red flag may be assigned to indicate danger in a particular system. A different system could assign it another meaning.

The signification depends on an established convention, not on danger being naturally contained in the color itself.

11. Nonverbal natural: a horse’s neigh

كدلالة صهيل الفرس على طلب الماء والكلأ
As a horse's neighing indicates a desire for water and fodder.

A neigh is not an articulated word. The textbook treats it as a natural expression that may reveal an animal's need; hence it is placed under nonverbal natural signification.

A horse can neigh in other situations too, so one should not infer hunger or thirst from every neigh. The example explains the kind of natural connection, not a guaranteed diagnosis.

12. Nonverbal rational: smoke and fire

كدلالة الدخان على النار
As smoke signifies fire.

Here smoke is the sign and fire is what it indicates. Smoke is not a word or an arbitrary agreed symbol. Reason relates it to fire through an observed connection between cause and effect.

Actual investigation may still require attention to circumstances and alternative sources. The point is that an observable effect can lead the mind to a related cause.

13. One utterance, two relations

Someone in another room says “water.” One audible event supports two different signifying relations.

Verbal conventional: the word “water” conveys its established meaning.
Verbal rational: the utterance indicates the presence of a speaker.

If the person involuntarily cries “akh” in pain, verbal natural signification may also be involved.

To classify a sign, specify not only the sign itself but which meaning it leads to and through what relationship.

14. Why logic prioritizes verbal convention

فهذه ست دلالات، والمنطقي إنما يبحث عن الدلالة اللفظية الوضعية
These are six kinds of signification, and the logician principally studies verbal conventional signification.

Definitions and arguments are communicated most easily through terms with established, understandable meanings. The text therefore emphasizes the usefulness of conventional words for imparting and acquiring knowledge.

The other five types remain genuine forms of signification. This one is simply the principal focus for logical instruction.

15. Three forms within conventional verbal signification

Verbal conventional signification is further divided into three forms. They differ according to whether the word points to its entire assigned meaning, part of it, or something necessarily connected with it.

1. Muṭābaqah: signification of the whole meaning.
2. Taḍammun: signification of a component of that meaning.
3. Iltizām: signification of a necessary concomitant outside that meaning.

These are not three separate species of words. One word may signify in different ways relative to different intended objects.

16. Muṭābaqah: the complete assigned meaning

المطابقة، وهي أن يدل اللفظ على تمام ما وضع ذلك اللفظ له
Muṭābaqah is a word indicating the whole meaning for which it was assigned.

The textbook uses “al-insān” (human). In traditional logic, the human is defined as “a rational animal”. Taking “human” to signify that whole compound meaning is complete signification.

Here nāṭiq refers to rational capacity, not simply vocal speech. Muṭābaqah concerns the whole assigned concept, not one component alone.

17. Taḍammun: a component of the meaning

التضمنية، وهي أن يدل اللفظ على جزء المعنى الموضوع له
Taḍammun is a word indicating a part of the meaning for which it was assigned.

“Human” conventionally signifies “rational animal.” If the intended signified is only animality or only rationality, the signification is inclusion, since either is a component of the full concept.

A component of a meaning is not necessarily a physical piece of an object. The components of a definition must be distinguished from bodily parts.

18. The exact distinction: whole versus part

The word may remain unchanged; what differs is the scope of the signified meaning.

“Human” → rational animal: the complete meaning, hence muṭābaqah.
“Human” → animal: one conceptual part, hence taḍammun.
“Human” → rational: another conceptual part, also taḍammun.

A hand is physically part of a human body, but it is not therefore a component of the classical definition “rational animal.” To assess taḍammun, first identify the assigned concept.

19. Iltizām: an implication beyond the assigned meaning

الدلالة الالتزامية، وهي أن لا يدل اللفظ على الموضوع له ولا على جزئه، بل على معنى خارج لازم للموضوع له
Iltizām occurs when a word signifies neither its whole assigned meaning nor a component, but an external necessary concomitant.

The word lāzim is crucial. The intended feature is not included within the definition, yet grasping the assigned meaning leads the mind to something necessarily associated with it.

For example, understanding “four” brings evenness to mind. Evenness is not the word's complete assigned meaning or merely a definitional component, but a necessary property of the number.

20. What counts as a necessary concomitant?

واللازم هو ما ينتقل الذهن من الموضوع له إليه
A necessary concomitant is that to which the mind passes from the meaning originally assigned to the word.

An accidental personal association does not suffice. If “book” reminds someone of their desk, that memory is not thereby a logical concomitant; books do not necessarily belong on desks.

By contrast, the evenness of four is a necessary property understood in connection with the number rather than as the entire assigned meaning of its name. The precise relation of necessity matters in identifying iltizām.

21. Capacity versus actual possession of knowledge

The commentary relates “human” to the capacity for knowledge and writing. It is essential to distinguish having a capacity from actually exercising or possessing it.

Capable of knowledge: possessing the potential to learn.
Actually learned: already possessing knowledge.
Capable of writing: having the potential to learn writing.

The example concerns a necessary capacity, not the claim that every human is already learned or literate. Confusing potential with actuality distorts the implication.

22. Not every association is a logical implication

The text also discusses the relation between “ʿamā” (blindness) and “baṣar” (sight). Understanding blindness invokes the capacity for sight and its absence; it does not assert that every blind person actually has sight.

Compare:
“Four” → even: a necessary numerical property.
“Book” → my cupboard: a personal association, not a necessary implication.

Iltizām requires a relation of necessity, not any idea that happens to come to mind.

23. The commentary on intention and understanding

The commentary reports a technical disagreement concerning taḍammun: must the speaker specifically intend a component for a word assigned to a compound meaning to signify that component?

One aspect is the hearer's comprehension of a component; another is the speaker's specific intention. Classical discussions do not always give these the same status.

For this level, the essential distinction remains whole meaning, component meaning, and external necessary concomitant. The role of intention is a further refinement, not a replacement for that distinction.

24. Why inclusion and implication presuppose the whole

الدلالة التضمنية والالتزامية لا توجدان بدون المطابقة
Taḍammun and iltizām do not exist without muṭābaqah.

A word must first have an identifiable complete assigned meaning before we can speak of a component or an external necessary concomitant. Without knowing the whole meaning, we cannot determine what counts as its part or implication.

والمطابقة قد توجد بدونهما
Muṭābaqah may exist without the other two.

The text explains this possibility through a simple meaning that has no relevant conceptual part or separately recognized necessary concomitant. This states a logical relation between the three forms.

25. An objection and the lesson’s conclusion

An objection follows: if every meaning has some necessary concomitant, how can complete signification exist without implication? The commentary restricts the relevant relation to an evident concomitant: in the narrower sense, grasping the subject leads to the concomitant; in the broader sense, grasping both terms yields certain awareness of the necessary connection.

Summary: Identify the sign and signified. Determine whether the sign is verbal or nonverbal, whether its connection is conventional, natural, or rational, and—if verbal and conventional—whether it signifies the whole meaning, a part, or an external necessary concomitant.

Practice: “Human” → rational animal is muṭābaqah; → animality is taḍammun; → necessary capacity for knowledge exemplifies iltizām. The next section turns to simple and compound expressions.