Literal and Figurative Meaning: Rules, Categories and Interpretive Indicators

1. Why literal and figurative meaning matter

The previous lesson considered unrestricted and qualified wording. We now ask whether an expression is used in its originally assigned meaning or in a related secondary meaning. That choice can change the legal conclusion.

«ما يتعلق بالحقيقة والمجاز»
Principles governing literal and figurative usage.

Haqiqah is an expression used for the meaning to which it was assigned. Majaz uses it for a different but related sense with an appropriate indication. This lesson examines precedence, difficult cases, juristic differences, and the indicators that justify departing from the literal sense.

2. Rule one: precedence of literal meaning

Where both literal and figurative uses exist, the starting point is to give priority to the literal sense. Merely knowing that a figurative reading is established does not, by itself, justify selecting it here.

«ما دام أمكن العمل بالمعنى الحقيقي سقط المعنى المجازي»
As long as the literal meaning can be applied, the figurative meaning is set aside.

For example, the Arabic word “asad” normally denotes a lion, even though it can describe a courageous person. Context or another indicator is needed to select the latter. A meaning being possible is not the same as that meaning being intended in this occurrence.

«لأن المجاز لا يزاحم الحقيقة»
Because a figurative reading does not compete with the literal reading.

The literal sense retains priority when it is operative; a merely possible secondary sense does not displace it.

3. “Aqqadtum al-ayman”: an applied example

The Qur’anic expression aqqadtum al-ayman helps determine the class of oath relevant to this particular legal consequence. The literal sense of “binding” refers to establishing an oath, not simply forming a passing intention.

«ولكن يؤاخذكم بما عقدتم الأيمان»
But He takes you to account for the oaths you have bound firmly.

The textbook therefore treats this wording in connection with an effective, binding oath (yamin mun‘aqidah) rather than automatically assimilating the deliberately false oath (yamin ghamus). This is a specific juristic reading that preserves the operative sense of “binding.”

4. Bound and deliberately false oaths

A yamin mun‘aqidah is an oath formed, under the relevant conditions, concerning a future action or abstention; expiation is discussed if it is breached. A yamin ghamus is a deliberately false oath, a grave wrong but not identical in legal character to the former.

This example is not an exhaustive treatment of all oath rulings. Its methodological point is that a specific literal meaning can define the scope of a ruling; one cannot simply broaden that scope by invoking an available secondary meaning.

5. Three kinds of literal usage

The practical status of a literal sense varies. It may be impossible to carry out, physically possible but abandoned by ordinary usage, or still regularly used.

«الحقيقة على ثلاثة أنواع»
Literal usage falls into three categories.

1. Haqiqah muta‘adhdhirah: literal fulfilment is impossible.
2. Haqiqah mahjurah: literal fulfilment is possible, but its use is abandoned in the relevant convention.
3. Haqiqah musta‘malah: the literal sense remains in current use.
These categories determine when a figurative interpretation comes into play.

6. Impossible literal usage: tree and fruit

Suppose someone swears, “I will not eat this tree.” In the ordinary sense of eating food, one cannot literally eat the tree as such. Its produce, such as fruit, becomes a sensible intended object.

«حقيقة متعذرة»
A literal meaning whose fulfilment is impossible.

A figurative reading is possible because the tree is related to its fruit as producer to product. Whether consuming the relevant fruit breaches the oath follows from this interpretive choice. The figurative reading rests on an impossible literal performance and a real semantic link, not on preference alone.

7. Impossible literal usage: a cooking vessel and its contents

Similarly, “I will not eat this cooking pot” ordinarily refers to the food prepared or held in the pot, not to consuming the vessel itself. The interpretation moves from the container to its contents.

Relationship: container and contained.
Why leave the literal sense? The cooking vessel is not itself the food being discussed.
Result: The statement is applied to the relevant food, not to the metal or earthen vessel.

8. Abandoned literal usage: setting foot in a house

Suppose a speaker says, “I shall not set foot in so-and-so’s house.” Literally, this concerns placement of a foot, but the established idiom ordinarily means not entering the house. Someone might cross a threshold without placing a foot in a particular spot; that subtlety need not govern the idiom.

«وحقيقة مهجورة»
And a literal usage that has fallen out of ordinary use.

This is abandoned literal usage: the bare sense is physically conceivable, but ordinary expression uses the phrase for entry. The relevant conventional meaning, rather than a hyper-literal foot movement, guides interpretation.

9. Living literal usage: the original sense remains current

In “I will drink water,” the ordinary meanings of water and drinking are both applicable and in active use. Without a relevant indication, replacing either with an unrelated sense is not sound interpretation.

«وحقيقة مستعملة»
And a literal sense that remains in ordinary use.

This is living literal usage. If a well-established figurative sense also exists, further rules determine the preference. One must consider not only whether a literal act is possible, but whether the literal sense remains active in the language community.

«في القسمين الأولين يصار إلى المجاز بالاتفاق»
The first two categories admit figurative interpretation by agreement.

Impossible and abandoned literal usage give way to an appropriate figurative sense; living usage ordinarily retains the literal sense, with a disagreement where a conventional metaphor also exists.

10. A difference over living literal and established metaphor

The subtle case is one where the literal sense is still actively used, but a conventional figurative sense is also familiar. The disagreement concerns which interpretation takes precedence in such a case.

«ولو كان لها مجاز متعارف فالحقيقة أولى عند أبي حنيفة»
If a conventional figurative sense also exists, Abu Hanifa gives precedence to the literal sense.

The book presents Abu Hanifa as preferring the literal sense, while Abu Yusuf and Muhammad may prefer the general scope of the established figurative usage. This is a methodological difference, not a claim that any sentence automatically includes every possible meaning.

11. What the general scope of metaphor means

The generality of figurative meaning does not mean simultaneously intending the literal and figurative senses of a single expression. It means treating an established figurative expression as covering the relevant cases within its conventional scope.

«والعمل بعموم المجاز أولى عند أبي يوسف ومحمد»
Abu Yusuf and Muhammad give precedence to the general reach of the figurative sense.

In an oath about eating a particular food, for example, the customary scope of an expression may be wider than a narrowly literal reading. The disagreement concerns whether to stay with that narrower literal use or apply a recognized broader figurative use. Each case still depends on wording and convention.

12. Does metaphor replace wording or legal effect?

A second juristic distinction asks in what respect the figurative sense replaces the literal one: with respect to the word itself, or to the legal effect obtained through it.

«المجاز خلف عن الحقيقة في حق اللفظ عند أبي حنيفة»
For Abu Hanifa, the figurative sense replaces the literal sense at the level of the expression.

Abu Hanifa treats metaphor as a substitute at the level of expression, leaving room for an appropriate figurative use even when the literal relation cannot be realized. Abu Yusuf and Muhammad emphasize replacement at the level of legal effect, with different results in particular cases.

«وعندهما خلف عن الحقيقة في حق الحكم»
For the two companions it replaces the literal meaning with respect to the legal ruling.

The available substitute sense of an expression and the resulting legal effect are distinct analytical questions; the following example exposes their difference.

13. The classical example: a person older than the speaker

The textbook supposes an owner saying “This is my son” about an enslaved person older than himself. In this case, literal fatherhood is impossible because the other person is older. The question becomes whether an appropriate figurative legal use of the statement is available.

«هذا ابني»
This is my son.

The text attributes a finding of emancipation under the figurative reading to Abu Hanifa, but does not recognize that shift in this particular case according to the two companions. This is an illustrative ruling from historical legal doctrine on slavery, not a rule to transfer uncritically to modern family relationships.

14. Two methodological routes in the same case

Three questions must be distinguished:
1. Literal fatherhood is impossible here.
2. A figurative use of the expression may be considered.
3. Whether that use produces emancipation is the precise legal disagreement.

Abu Hanifa allows a related substitute at the level of words. The companions impose a different condition when considering substitution at the level of legal effect, producing a different outcome. A responsible account preserves the disagreement itself rather than collapsing it into one rule.

15. Not combining literal and figurative senses at once

A further rule states that one occurrence of one word should not be used to intend both its literal and figurative senses simultaneously under this textual approach. That does not deny multiple possible senses; it requires deciding which sense operates in this particular utterance.

«لا يراد المعنى الحقيقي والمجازي معا من لفظ واحد في حالة واحدة»
The literal and figurative senses are not both intended from one word in the same instance.

If “a lion entered the field” clearly means a brave man, it does not also assert that the animal entered. The literal sense remains available in a different utterance. The availability of two uses is distinct from combining both in a single occurrence.

16. “Lamastum al-nisa”: touch and an allusive meaning

The Qur’anic wording lamastum al-nisa permits consideration of a literal sense of touch and an allusive sense referring to intercourse. In the textbook’s Hanafi methodological reading, the relevant figurative sense is sexual intercourse, rather than combining it with physical touching in the same occurrence.

«أو لامستم النساء»
Or you have touched women.

Juristic schools differ on the ablution implications of touching. The present point is interpretive, not a standalone legal verdict: a scholar may identify two linguistically possible readings yet select one according to a defined method.

17. Why a semantic link is essential to metaphor

Majaz is not permission to assign words arbitrary unrelated meanings. Without a meaningful relation between primary and secondary senses, interpretation would become unreliable.

«لا بد لاستعمال اللفظ في غير ما وضع له من مناسبة»
A connection is required when using a word beyond the meaning for which it was originally assigned.

«كالأسد للرجل الشجاع»
As in using “lion” for a courageous person.

Asad denotes a lion literally and may describe a brave person because both share courage. The link is resemblance. Without a suitable relation and indication, the word cannot simply denote an unrelated thing.

18. One legal link: effective cause and ruling

A secondary sense may arise from resemblance, but in legal speech the link can involve an operative cause and its ruling. An ‘illah is a legally relevant attribute or basis tied to a consequence. Mentioning one may, in a suitable construction, allude to the other.

«الاتصال بين العلة والحكم»
A relationship between the legal cause and its ruling.

The text illustrates a relation involving purchase and ownership: a purchase contract can bring ownership about. In particular legal statements, one may speak in terms of purchase while intending ownership, or the reverse. This is context-sensitive, not an automatic equation in all circumstances.

19. Another legal link: trigger and result

Another form of semantic relatedness is the link between a legal trigger and a resulting rule. A term can, in an appropriate setting, point from the act or basis to its consequence.

«الاتصال بين السبب والحكم»
A link between a legal trigger and the ruling that follows it.

The book discusses the historical categories of ownership of an enslaved person (milk al-raqabah) and entitlement to marital or sexual enjoyment (milk al-mut‘ah). Ending one legal entitlement may affect another, but the two are not identical. The next example turns on that asymmetry.

20. Ownership and purchase as linked concepts

A conditional expression may use acquiring ownership to refer to ownership obtained by purchase. Conversely, mention of purchase may allude to the resulting ownership.

«إن ملكت عبدا فهو حر»
If I acquire ownership of an enslaved person, that person is free.

«إن اشتريت عبدا فهو حر»
If I purchase an enslaved person, that person is free.

Both examples call for analysis of the condition, the resulting legal consequence, and the intended meaning. Purchase and ownership have a real legal relationship, but the two words are not synonyms in all circumstances. Their interchange depends on the particular setting and intention.

21. Manumission and divorce: the relation is not symmetrical

In the manumission and divorce examples, the legal relationship is not symmetrical. The text contrasts a statement of freedom addressed to a wife with an intention of divorce and a statement of divorce addressed to an enslaved person with the intention of manumission.

«حررتك»
I have freed you.

«طلقتك»
I have divorced you.

In the specific historical Hanafi illustration, the former expression with an intention of divorce is considered effective, whereas the latter with an intention of manumission is not. Manumission concerns removal of ownership of an enslaved person; divorce dissolves a marital entitlement. Their legal causes and effects cannot simply be equated.

22. Five indicators for leaving literal meaning

Having studied precedence and relatedness, the practical question is: what tells an interpreter to depart from the literal sense? The textbook names five kinds of indication.

«ما يترك به المعنى الحقيقي خمسة أنواع»
There are five types of indication that justify leaving a literal meaning.

1. Custom (‘urf): established communal usage.
2. The wording itself: what the full expression signals.
3. Context: the setting and flow of conversation.
4. The speaker’s situation or immediate intention: an indicator from the speaker.
5. The subject matter: a literal interpretation incompatible with the legal object being discussed.

23. Custom and the wording itself

Under custom, an oath such as “I will not buy heads” need not encompass every animal or bird head. Established marketplace usage determines the relevant conventional class.

«دلالة العرف»
An indication arising from established custom.

«كل مملوك لي فهو حر»
Every person owned by me is free.

This illustrates an indication within the wording itself. The book treats the mukatab—an enslaved person under a contract of emancipation—distinctly because the combined wording evokes complete ownership. The scope is inferred from the full expression, not an isolated dictionary meaning.

24. Context and speaker-dependent indications

Context of speech requires attending to the setting and manner of a statement. The textbook’s historical discussion of assurances of safety in war contrasts two expressions.

«انزل»
Come down.

«انزل إن كنت رجلا»
Come down if you are a man.

The first, in the stipulated setting, can convey an assurance of protection, but the second is a challenge, not a promise of safety. An identical imperative can have a different legal purport when placed in a different context.

For an indication arising from the speaker’s situation, the book names yamin al-fawr, an oath whose immediate prompting occasion limits its scope.

25. Subject matter and the five-indicator synthesis

Sometimes the nature of the subject makes a literal reading impossible. The book gives a historical legal illustration involving marriage to a free woman expressed using terms such as “sale,” “gift,” “charity,” or “transfer of ownership.” A free person is not an object of sale; the literal property-transfer meanings therefore do not fit the subject.

«دلالة محل الكلام»
An indication arising from the subject matter itself.

This is a school-specific example requiring the appropriate legal conditions; merely uttering those words does not establish a marriage in every setting. The method is to identify the literal meaning, confirm a meaningful relation, and then find an indicator in custom, the wording, context, the speaker, or the subject matter. The next section concerns particles of meaning.

Final qualification: Where the subject itself decisively fixes one figurative sense, a separate intention to choose that sense is unnecessary. This does not remove other legal requirements of the transaction.