The Mujtahid’s Duty: Evidence Hierarchy, Conflicts, and Revised Ijtihad

1. The central obligation of a mujtahid

فصل في بيان الواجب على المجتهد
Chapter on what is required of a mujtahid.

الواجب على المجتهد طلب حكم الحادثة من كتاب الله تعالى ثم من سنة رسول الله ﷺ
The mujtahid must seek the ruling of a new legal case first in Allah’s Book and then in the Sunnah of the Messenger ﷺ.

A ḥādithah is a case requiring a legal ruling. To seek a ruling means to investigate authoritative evidence, not merely select an attractive answer. A qualified jurist begins with the stronger established sources of law before turning to independent reasoning.

The lesson’s starting principle is therefore methodological: personal legal reasoning is not an alternative to investigating the revealed sources; it is employed where those sources do not already settle the matter.

2. Four successive sources of legal evidence

كتاب الله، ثم سنة رسول الله ﷺ، ثم الإجماع، ثم القياس
The Book of Allah, the Sunnah, consensus, and then analogy.

1. Quran: A ruling established directly or through sound textual indication.
2. Sunnah: An authenticated Prophetic statement, act or tacit approval that explains a rule.
3. Ijma: Established agreement of qualified jurists.
4. Qiyas: Extending an established ruling to a new case through its legally effective cause.

The ordering is practical rather than decorative. Once a matter is established by the superior evidence, a later method cannot simply override it. Careful verification of a text's authenticity, meaning, scope and reconciliation with other evidence remains essential.

3. Seeking the ruling in the Quran

Seeking a ruling from the Quran requires more than finding an explicit mention of a case’s name. A rule can be communicated by direct wording, indication, or another recognized form of textual implication.

A general expression may cover numerous cases; a separate text might specify or qualify its scope. This is why the earlier discussions of general versus particular terms, unrestricted versus restricted wording, and modes of textual indication matter in legal derivation.

Principle: A rule supported by sound Quranic indication is not abandoned merely because an independent analogy suggests a different outcome.

4. Investigating the Sunnah after the Quran

ثم من سنة رسول الله ﷺ
Then seek the ruling from the Sunnah of the Messenger ﷺ.

When a Quranic passage does not spell out a legal case in detail, the Sunnah may explain or establish its ruling. It clarifies the performance of worship and many legal transactions.

Two inquiries must remain distinct: Is the report established? and What does it actually prove? Distinctions among mass-transmitted, well-known, and solitary reports help with the first inquiry; scope, wording, and reconciliation with other texts concern the second. A report’s existence alone does not settle every question of application.

5. Consensus before analogy

ثم من الإجماع، ثم من القياس
Then consult consensus, and then analogy.

When a ruling is not directly resolved by the relevant texts, the jurist checks whether the qualified scholars have established consensus. A proven consensus cannot be bypassed by an individual’s newly proposed opinion. Mere popularity, however, should not be mistaken for consensus.

Qiyas follows. It identifies an established original case, its effective legal cause, and the presence of that cause in a new case. It is a disciplined extension of a prior ruling, not arbitrary creation of law.

6. Why opinion cannot bypass an applicable text

فإنه لا سبيل إلى العمل بالرأي مع إمكان العمل بالنص
One may not resort to opinion when an applicable text can be followed.

The qualification when the text can be followed matters. The relevant proof must be established and must actually bear on the case. If competing passages appear difficult to reconcile, the jurist first undertakes proper interpretation and reconciliation rather than declaring opinion a substitute for that work.

Where a rule follows from clear applicable evidence, a jurist cannot simply reject it because a different analogy seems convenient. This is the central distinction between authoritative text and subordinate legal judgment.

7. A reliable report about the qiblah

ولهذا إذا اشتبهت عليه القبلة فأخبره واحد عنها لا يجوز له التحري
If the qiblah is uncertain and a person reliably informs someone of its direction, one should not substitute one’s own estimation for that report.

Here taḥarrī means arriving at a probable direction from the available signs. The legal example assumes a report that qualifies as evidence; a lesser personal estimate should not displace it.

The point is not that every stranger's unexamined claim must be trusted. It is that a valid source of information precedes private conjecture in the relevant circumstances.

8. A report that available water is impure

ولو وجد ماء فأخبره عدل أنه نجس لا يجوز له التوضي به بل يتيمم
If water is available but a trustworthy and upright informant establishes that it is impure, it may not be used for ablution in this example; tayammum is performed instead.

Visible availability of water is not the same as its legal suitability. A mere thought that the water looks usable does not override legally recognized testimony about its impurity.

The illustration depends on a qualifying report and its legal consequence. Other questions—such as the availability of different water—are separate. The issue here is the order of recognized evidence and personal estimation.

9. Distinguishing proof, information and conjecture

SituationMethodClear, applicable textFollow the textLegally recognized reportPrefer it to private guessingNo determinative evidenceApply the qualified rules of estimation or ijtihad

Here “opinion” does not mean impulsive preference: proper ijtihad is a structured, scholarly process. Nevertheless, even expert reasoning is not used to nullify stronger relevant evidence.

Practical distinction: establish whether information counts as evidence first, then ask whether independent estimation remains necessary.

10. Three dimensions of legal doubt

Shubhat al-fiʿl, shubhat al-maḥall, shubhat al-dalīl
Doubt attached to the act, the legal subject or entitlement, and the supporting evidence.

Doubt concerning the act: A belief about permissibility that the relevant doctrine treats as legally significant.
Doubt concerning the subject: Ambiguity about an entitlement or the legal status of the person or thing involved.
Doubt arising from evidence: A textual basis that gives rise to a legally significant appearance of permissibility.

In the historical law of fixed penalties, these distinctions show why every mistaken impression is not the same as a recognized legal doubt. Its source and consequence must be analyzed independently.

11. Doubt arising from the actor’s belief

Shubhat al-fiʿl concerns an uncertainty associated with the actor’s understanding of what was permitted. It does not mean that any later assertion—“I thought it was allowed”—automatically has legal force. The law asks whether that belief arose in a legally recognized setting.

Two outwardly similar acts may differ because one carries a recognized basis of uncertainty while the other does not. Their rulings are not deduced from outward conduct alone.

Crucial distinction: the existence of a subjective belief is a psychological fact; whether law recognizes it as a ground affecting liability is a different inquiry.

12. Doubt relating to the legal subject or entitlement

Shubhat al-maḥall addresses uncertainty attached to the legal status of the subject or the entitlement involved. In some historically discussed cases, law recognizes such an uncertainty even where the actor’s own assumption points the other way.

This is why individual belief and an objectively recognized legal basis of doubt are not interchangeable. The existence of the latter does not always depend on the actor's subsequent statement.

The ownership and kinship illustrations belong to a premodern legal setting. They explain a technical doctrine; they do not prescribe or justify contemporary slavery.

13. Doubt based on a scriptural indication

Shubhat al-dalīl involves uncertainty traceable to a recognizable scriptural or juristic indication. It differs from an unsupported claim that something simply seemed permissible.

The legal uncertainty is associated with an identifiable evidentiary basis, even if fuller analysis ultimately establishes a different ruling.

For any category, three distinct questions are useful: What gives rise to the uncertainty? What legally supports treating it as such? And what consequence does it have in the particular rule being discussed?

14. Historical example: father and son

وطئ جارية ابنه لا يحد، وإن قال: علمت أنها حرام
In the premodern example involving a father and a slave woman owned by his son, the cited Hanafi doctrine does not impose the fixed penalty even if the father says he knew the act was unlawful.

The explanation is shubhat al-milk, a legally recognized appearance of entitlement. The cited “You and your property belong to your father” is not treated here as an ordinary transfer of all the son’s property; it is invoked as the particular basis of legal doubt in the historical discussion.

Methodological point: the actor’s admission of knowledge does not by itself remove a legal doubt thought to attach to the subject. This is an historical jurisprudential illustration, not present-day conduct guidance.

15. Why the reverse historical example differs

ولو وطئ الابن جارية أبيه يعتبر ظنه في الحل والحرمة
In the reverse historical case, involving the son and a slave woman owned by his father, the son’s belief about permissibility receives consideration in the cited Hanafi discussion.

The legally recognized appearance of entitlement relied upon in the father’s case is not established in the same way for the son. Hence the actor’s legally relevant belief is assessed differently, along with the case’s other conditions.

Contrast: the first example relies on doubt attributed to a legal subject; the second gives weight to the actor’s own belief because the same basis does not exist. Outwardly parallel acts need not have parallel legal consequences.

16. When two Quranic indications appear to conflict

ثم إذا تعارض الدليلان عند المجتهد، فإن كان التعارض بين الآيتين يميل إلى السنة
If two indications appear to conflict and they are Quranic verses, the jurist consults the Sunnah.

Here conflict is an apparent inability to apply both indications to the same case in the same way. It is not a claim of actual contradiction in revelation. The jurist first examines scope, specification, context and possible reconciliation.

Where difficulty remains, the Sunnah can explain the intended practical application of the verses. Consulting it is a way to elucidate Quranic meaning, not to disregard the Quran.

17. The example of recitation during prayer

فَاقْرَءُوا مَا تَيَسَّرَ مِنْهُ
Recite what is easy of it.

وَإِذَا قُرِئَ الْقُرْآنُ فَاسْتَمِعُوا لَهُ وَأَنْصِتُوا
When the Quran is recited, listen to it attentively and remain silent.

The first statement commands recitation; the second commands attentive listening and silence. In the question of a follower reciting behind an imam, both must be understood together rather than suppressing one in favor of a convenient isolated citation.

Prophetic guidance about imam and follower is consulted to reconcile their practical implications. Juristic schools differ over the resulting rule; the lesson identifies the Hanafi methodological approach rather than claiming universal agreement.

18. When two Sunnah reports appear to differ

وإن كان بين السنتين يميل إلى آثار الصحابة أو القياس الصحيح
If two Sunnah reports appear to conflict, the jurist considers reports of the Companions or sound analogy.

Before seeking a preference, the authenticity, wording, context and possible reconciliation of both reports are examined. Where chronology and the conditions of abrogation are established, that is a distinct route. A weak conjectural analogy is not being licensed to override a sound report.

The practice and statements of the Companions may illuminate the Prophetic intent, while valid analogy can supply a relevant juristic indication. Their role here is to resolve the difficult application of evidence, not to erase established Sunnah.

19. The role of Companion reports

Āthār al-ṣaḥābah are transmitted statements, judgments and practices of the Companions. When two Prophetic reports seem to point in different directions, Companion practice may show how the generation closest to the Prophet understood their use.

One report may appear general while another supplies a limitation. A well-established Companion practice can assist in deciding which application is appropriate.

This does not elevate a Companion report above the Quran. Its relevant function is as supporting evidence for interpreting and weighing the competing Sunnah reports.

20. How sound analogy can assist interpretation

Sound qiyas is analogy supported by a valid original case, governing rule, effective cause and parallel new case. Here it assists interpretation or preference among plausible readings of Sunnah reports. It does not authorize a jurist to discard both reports and invent a contrary rule.

Where reports admit more than one possible application, a well-supported legal principle may strengthen one interpretation. The principle itself must be relevant and legally sound.

Distinction: deriving a new rule by analogy in the absence of governing evidence and employing analogy as an interpretive aid are not the same operation.

21. Choosing between competing analogies

ثم إذا تعارض القياسان عند المجتهد يتحرى ويعمل بأحدهما، لأنه ليس دون القياس دليل شرعي يصار إليه
If two analogies conflict for the mujtahid, the jurist investigates and acts on one, since there is no further lower-ranking source in this sequence to consult.

Taḥarrī is not arbitrary guessing. The jurist examines the basis and effective cause of each analogy and its fit with the new case, then acts on the stronger assessment.

Qualified scholarship remains a condition. This does not mean treating rival analogies as interchangeable or choosing at personal whim; it means forming a justified preference after analysis.

22. Two vessels when a substitute for water exists

إذا كان مع المسافر إناءان طاهر ونجس لا يتحرى بينهما بل يتيمم
If a traveler has two vessels, one with pure water and one with impure water, the cited Hanafi ruling does not choose by estimation in this particular circumstance; tayammum is performed.

The stated reason is that water has a legally recognized substitute for purification. With no reliable identification of the usable vessel, the presence of that substitute changes the ruling.

This is a specific classical case involving uncertain water. Other details of identification, quantity or necessity require their own legal assessment.

23. Two garments when no comparable substitute exists

ولو كان معه ثوبان طاهر ونجس يتحرى بينهما، لأن للماء بدلا وهو التراب، وليس للثوب بدل يصار إليه
If two garments are available, one pure and the other impure, the person estimates which is suitable. Water has the substitute of earth for tayammum, whereas the garment has no comparable substitute in this particular scenario.

The outward structure resembles the two vessels, but the legally significant reason differs. Therefore, not all cases involving two uncertain alternatives receive the same solution.

The individual should assess available signs to form a responsible conclusion. Arbitrary selection without inquiry is not proper taḥarrī.

24. Why performance strengthens an adopted judgment

ثم ثبت هذا أن العمل بالرأي إنما يكون عند انعدام دليل سواه شرعًا ثم إذا تحرى وتأكد تحريه بالعمل لا ينتقض ذلك بمجرد التحري
Resort to considered opinion occurs where no other applicable legal proof remains. When the assessment has been followed through an act, it is not undone merely by another estimate.

Before action, taḥarrī produces a probable judgment. After a devotional act has been carried out on that basis, the completed act acquires a legal status. A later conjecture does not automatically nullify it.

This does not settle separate cases where definitive proof reveals an actual defect. The present rule concerns the effect of a subsequent estimate alone.

25. Later reassessment: garments versus qiblah

فيما إذا تحرى بين الثوبين وصلى الظهر بأحدهما، ثم وقع تحريه عند العصر على الثوب الآخر
For example, a person chooses one of two uncertain garments for the noon prayer, but a fresh estimate favors the other at the afternoon prayer.

In this specific ruling the earlier judgment concerning the garment has been reinforced by performance, so merely favoring the other garment later does not overturn it; the text therefore does not permit switching to it for the next prayer on the basis of estimation alone.

The qiblah differs: where the estimated direction changes after one prayer, a later prayer may face the newly selected direction. Direction is a case in which a prospective change of application is possible; the garment illustration is treated differently.

Conclusion: evidence hierarchy, type of legal doubt, existence of a substitute, and whether judgment has been acted upon jointly determine the ruling.