Divine Will: Eternity, Specification of Possibilities and Free Agency

1. Divine will as an eternal attribute

والإرادة صفة الله تعالى أزلية قائمة بذاته
Will is an eternal attribute of God, subsisting in His essence.

Affirming will means that the specification of which possible thing exists, how it exists and when it exists relates to divine volition. It is not the result of newly acquired knowledge, external pressure or a need arising within God.

Eternal means without beginning; subsisting in His essence denies that the attribute has an independently existing external subject. The distinction between an eternal attribute and an originated creature governs the argument.

2. Specifying what comes to exist

تقتضي تخصيص المكونات بوجه دون وجه، وفي وقت دون وقت
The attribute relates to specifying created things in one manner rather than another and at one time rather than another.

A possible entity can be considered under alternatives: existence or nonexistence, one size or color or another, earlier origination or later origination. Its being determined in a particular manner is called specification (takhṣīṣ).

The issue is not only whether existence is possible. It is why one definite possibility is actualized rather than the alternatives.

3. Specification of manner and qualities

In one manner rather than another concerns the determination of a particular form, property or state. A possible thing admits various conceivable descriptions; when it exists, certain descriptions are actual.

A tree’s size, the dimensions of an object or its being in a particular location illustrate alternatives of manner. Such examples clarify the concept; they are not comparisons between divine volition and human planning.

Power concerns the possibility of bringing something about; will concerns the specification of which possible manner is realized.

4. Specification of time

At one time rather than another means that an originated thing begins at a definite time even though earlier and later times are conceivable.

If a possible entity comes into being today, its temporal beginning does not entail that God's will also began today. The date of the effect and the beginninglessness of the attribute are different considerations.

Confusing them yields two mistaken inferences: treating the creature as eternal or treating every new event as the origination of a new attribute in the divine essence. Neither follows from the doctrine of eternal will.

5. Knowledge is not identical with will

Knowledge comprehends what is known and the relevant states of things. Yet merely knowing a possible outcome does not, by the notion of knowledge alone, specify its actual occurrence.

Two possible times of an event can both fall within knowledge. Knowledge as such does not explain which time is determined for its creation; this function is ascribed to will.

Thus the universality of knowledge and the specification performed by will are distinct meanings. Simply renaming knowledge as will would leave the argument's question unanswered.

6. Power is not identical with will

Power concerns God's capacity to bring about whatever is possible and willed. The fact that alternative possibilities are within power does not by itself make one of them actual.

If two different outcomes are both possible objects of power, the selection of one is a question of specification. Considered merely as capacity regarding both, power does not explain the preference.

Will concerns which possible object of power is determined to exist. Affirming divine power therefore does not make a distinct account of will redundant.

7. Will and takwīn have different functions

Will concerns the specification of possibilities. In Māturīdī terminology, takwīn is the real divine attribute related to bringing them into existence. Their functions are connected but conceptually different.

Determining a possible thing's time and form is a matter of specification; bringing it into actual existence is considered under takwīn. The known, the possible object of power, the willed and the created are therefore not identical notions.

The created effect begins in time, but its temporal date does not render the eternal divine attributes themselves originated.

8. An eternal attribute and a temporal object

An eternal will relating to a temporal event raises an apparent difficulty: if the will is eternal, why is the willed object not eternal too?

The Māturīdī response distinguishes the beginninglessness of the attribute from the time at which its object occurs. An eternal will specifies that a possible thing exists at its own time; it need not specify an everlasting creature.

The object of will may be not merely “existence” but “existence at this time.” Hence the inference that an eternal will must have an eternal effect assumes precisely what the position disputes.

9. Understanding the relation of will

Relation (taʿalluq) denotes how an attribute is considered with respect to its object. It should not automatically be imagined as a bodily motion or a new state arising in the divine essence.

When a creature begins at a given time, that is a change in the creature's condition. It does not follow that an analogous temporal change occurs within God. Treating the divine attribute like a changing created object is a category error within this framework.

The same caution applies to knowledge: an object being nonexistent and later existent does not, merely by that transition, prove the origination of divine knowledge.

10. The philosophical doctrine of necessary emanation

موجب بالذات لا فاعل بالإرادة والاختيار
A necessary cause by its very essence, not an agent acting through will and choice.

The wording attributes to certain philosophers the view that the first cause's effect proceeds from it by necessity; creation is not analyzed as voluntary specification among alternatives.

The central disagreement is not over whether there is a cause, but over a necessitating cause versus a willing agent. The first emphasizes the necessary consequence; the second attributes the specific occurrence of a possible act to will.

11. What is meant by a willing agent

A willing agent (fāʿil mukhtār) is one whose actions are not explained solely as a compulsory consequence of essence. The particular act is attributed to power and will.

Calling God a willing agent does not imply human deliberation, hesitation, changing information or successive decisions. These are limitations of created agents.

The theological point is to distinguish volition from newly originated willing: an act can be voluntary even while the divine attribute of will is held to be eternal.

12. Choice versus necessary production

If an effect follows a cause necessarily and perpetually in the same fashion, explaining why it begins at a distinct time becomes difficult. If a willing agent specifies among possibilities, the temporal occurrence can be understood in relation to volition.

A crucial distinction is between the certainty that an act will occur and its compulsory production without choice. An act's assured occurrence in accordance with will does not itself abolish volition.

Without this distinction, philosophical necessity and theological voluntary agency become confused under the ambiguous word “necessity.”

13. Reasoning from the order of creation

وأيضا نظام العالم ووجوده على الوجه الأوفق والأصلح دليل على كون صانعه قادرا مختارا
The order of the world and its fitting existence indicate that its maker is powerful and chooses freely.

The argument reasons from the ordered relations among the world's components toward power and choice rather than blind compulsory emanation.

This is a classical theological inference. It does not claim that humans comprehend every particular wisdom or can assign a fully known, single observable purpose to every feature of creation.

14. The meaning of fittingness and wisdom

Al-awfaq wa-l-aṣlaḥ here draws attention to proportion, wisdom and suitability in the world's ordering. The reasoning is not merely that things exist, but that particular ordered relations obtain.

Coordination among elements provides an example of a determinate arrangement among possible alternatives. The question is why such specification is attributed to power and will.

This is not simply the Muʿtazilī doctrine of the obligation to do what is best. Reasoning from wise order and asserting that God is obligated by an external standard are distinct propositions.

15. The objection to an eternal will

One objection takes the form of a dilemma: will must be either eternal or originated. If originated, a new attribute would arise in the divine essence; if eternal, the effect must also have existed eternally.

The dilemma combines two premises: an originated divine attribute would violate transcendence, and an eternal attribute necessarily entails an eternal effect. The first reflects a theological principle; the second is precisely what is contested.

The response must show how eternal will can specify the temporal beginning of an act. The mere eternity of the attribute does not entail eternity of its object.

16. Why an originated divine will is rejected

If divine will were originated and its subject were God's essence, a new attribute or state would be made to subsist in that essence. Within the theology under discussion, the occurrence of originated states in the divine essence conflicts with the eternity and transcendence of divine attributes.

Human willing may begin after a person previously did not will. Transferring that sequence directly to God erases the creator–creature distinction.

The question is therefore not simply when an act occurs, but whether the act must be explained by a newly arising attribute in God.

17. How eternal will specifies a temporal act

Eternal will may have as its object that a thing come into existence at a specified time. The proposition “this thing exists at its particular time” is different from “this thing exists without beginning.”

No change in the attribute is required, because its object was specified as a temporal occurrence. Supposing the object already exists before that time changes what was originally specified.

Thus eternal will plus a temporal willed object is not a contradiction. Contradiction would require assigning eternity and origination to the same thing under the same respect.

18. The Najjāriyyah position

مريد بذاته لا بصفته
He wills by His essence, not by a distinct attribute.

This formulation is attributed to the Najjāriyyah: divine willing is explained without affirming a separately real attribute of will. The language of voluntary action may remain, but its explanation is placed in the essence.

The Māturīdī objection concerns whether treating will as only another designation for essence preserves the distinct real meaning required for specification. The precise claim of the opposing position must be identified rather than treated as a denial of every divine act.

19. Some Muʿtazilī accounts of will

مريد بإرادة حادثة لا في محل
He wills through an originated will subsisting in no subject.

The formulation is attributed to some Muʿtazilīs. It accepts an originated will while seeking to avoid placing an originated attribute in God's essence by denying that the will subsists in a locus.

Two distinct issues arise: whether an attribute can be conceived without a subject, and whether an originated will is compatible with the affirmation of eternal divine will. The two objections should not be conflated.

20. The subject of an attribute

The maxim that an attribute subsists in the subject qualified by it treats a genuine property as belonging to its bearer, not as an independently roaming object.

Saying divine will subsists in the divine essence is not a statement of bodily indwelling or spatial contact. It denies that the attribute belongs to another subject or is an originated quality without any subject.

Three accounts must therefore be distinguished: an eternal attribute subsisting in God, an originated attribute arising in God, and an originated will without a locus. These are different claims.

21. Revelation and rational argument together

Revelatory texts are used to affirm divine will and choosing; rational reasoning then explains why the attribute belongs to its subject and why originated states are not admitted as occurring in the divine essence.

The scriptural argument affirms the attribute, while the theological reasoning addresses its eternity and subsistence in God. These are complementary rather than interchangeable forms of argument.

A party may accept the word “will” while disagreeing about its reality. Verbal agreement therefore does not settle the substantive theological dispute.

22. Comparing three alternative explanations

Philosophers as represented here: an effect follows necessarily from essence, rather than being specified by choice.
Najjāriyyah: God is willing by His essence without a distinct real attribute of will.
Some Muʿtazilīs: will is originated but subsists in no locus.

The disagreements are not identical. The first concerns necessary production, the second the reality of the attribute, and the third origination and locus.

In contrast, the Māturīdī account affirms real, eternal will subsisting in God, related to the specification of the forms and times of created things.

23. Analyzing specification as an argument

Suppose a possible entity can be conceived in two alternative forms, and only one occurs. Four questions are distinct:
1. Are both forms known?
2. Are both within power?
3. Which form is specified?
4. By what relation is it brought into existence?

The respective notions are knowledge, power, will and takwīn. This is an analytical illustration, not an attempt to model divine reality on the processes of a limited human mind.

24. Mapping the objection and response

Objection: If will is eternal, the willed object must be eternal.
Response: The object may be specified precisely as coming into existence at a particular time.

Objection: An originated will would involve originated states in the divine essence.
Response: Affirming eternal will removes the need for such a new attribute.

Objection: Knowledge and power alone should suffice.
Response: Knowledge concerns comprehension and power concerns capacity; specifying one form and time is a distinct meaning.

25. Synthesis of divine will

Divine will is held to be real, eternal and subsisting in the divine essence. It explains how particular created things, forms and times are specified among alternatives.

This entails neither a new temporal state in God, nor the eternity of creatures, nor compulsory production of acts. Will is connected with knowledge, power and takwīn, but not identified conceptually with them.

Three questions organize the debate: Is will a real attribute or merely another description of essence? Is it eternal or originated? And does action proceed through choice or by necessity of essence?