LessonsThe Universality of Divine Knowledge and Power: Classical ObjectionsQuiz

وَعَامَّةُ الْمُعْتَزِلَةِ: أَنَّهُ لَا يَقْدِرُ عَلَى نَفْسِ مَقْدُورِ الْعَبْدِ
The general Muʿtazilī position is reported to deny divine power over the very object of the servant’s power.

This differs from the prior claim. The like of an act may mean another act of that type; the very act points to the individual occurrence itself.

The debate asks whether the same event can stand in relation to two powers. The reply does not treat divine creative power and human voluntary acquisition as two equivalent, independent causal agencies.

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The Muʿtazilī objection concerning the same object

The Universality of Divine Knowledge and Power: Classical Objections

وَعَامَّةُ الْمُعْتَزِلَةِ: أَنَّهُ لَا يَقْدِرُ عَلَى نَفْسِ مَقْدُورِ الْعَبْدِ
The general Muʿtazilī position is reported to deny divine power over the very object of the servant’s power.

This differs from the prior claim. The like of an act may mean another act of that type; the very act points to the individual occurrence itself.

The debate asks whether the same event can stand in relation to two powers. The reply does not treat divine creative power and human voluntary acquisition as two equivalent, independent causal agencies.