Defining Literal Usage: Linguistic Assignment and Speech Convention

1. Literal and figurative usage: the second aim of bayān

الحقيقة والمجاز
Literal and figurative usage.

Earlier discussions of simile examined a perceived likeness between two things. We now ask whether a word is used for the meaning assigned to it or for another meaning. This is the central distinction of literal and figurative usage.

Bayān studies expressive ways of conveying a meaning. Figurative usage is especially relevant because a word can convey another meaning through a significant connection. Defining literal usage first gives us the standard against which that transfer can be recognized. The lesson therefore analyzes the definition of ḥaqīqah and its disputed qualifications.

2. Why literal usage is discussed before the figurative

إلا أنها لما كانت كالأصل للمجاز
Yet literal usage is, as it were, the foundation for figurative usage.

Figurative expression presupposes an established meaning and an identifiable departure from that use. Without determining the original assignment, one might confuse figurative language with a mistake or an unfamiliar but literal sense.

For instance, “asad” used for a lion accords with its usual lexical assignment. Applied to a brave human being, it may have a different rhetorical classification if a suitable indicator is present. Assignment versus actual use is thus the controlling distinction for the next discussions.

3. The technical definition of ḥaqīqah

الكلمة المستعملة فيما وضعت تلك الكلمة له في اصطلاح التخاطب
A word used for the meaning assigned to that word within the convention relevant to the conversation.

The definition has three elements: actual use, an assigned meaning, and the convention of discourse. Omitting any one of them blurs the distinction between literal use, figurative use, error, and an expression that has not been used at all.

Ḥaqīqah does not mean that a word merely sounds familiar. It describes the relation between an actual occurrence and its recognized lexical or technical assignment in a particular communicative setting.

4. Why the definition says “used”

المستعملة
Actually used.

A word being conventionally assigned to a meaning is distinct from someone's employing it in discourse. An entry in the lexicon, without any occurrence in communication, is not yet an instance of literal or figurative use. This is why the definition specifies use.

The word “faras” is assigned to a horse. Knowing that fact is not itself an occurrence of speech. When “hādhā farasun” is said while pointing to a horse, both the occurrence and its relation to the established assignment can be examined.

5. What “for what it was assigned to” requires

فيما وضعت له
For the meaning to which the word was assigned.

This qualification asks whether the speaker intends the assigned referent or a meaning reached through another relation. Literal use corresponds to an established assignment, whereas figurative use departs from it under further conditions.

An Arabic word such as “ʿayn” can have more than one established sense. Using it for one of its conventionally recognized senses is not automatically figurative just because it also has other senses. We must identify the relevant assignment and the meaning intended in this utterance.

6. Why the relevant speech convention matters

في اصطلاح التخاطب
Within the convention governing the conversation.

A term may acquire different accepted meanings in ordinary language, religious discourse, or another specialized usage. To classify an occurrence, one must know the convention shared by speaker and audience rather than automatically reverting to the oldest lexical sense.

Ṣalāh is lexically associated with supplication but is the name of a defined act of worship in Islamic legal usage. In discourse governed by that religious convention, using it for ritual prayer can be literally correct within that convention. Its use in another register must be judged within that register.

7. Lexical, religious and customary literal usage

Lexical literal use is a word applied according to an established assignment among speakers of the language, as “asad” for the animal lion.

Religious literal use follows an established religious-technical sense, such as ṣalāh for ritual prayer. Customary literal use follows a conventional sense within a general or specialized community.

This classification shows why literal usage is not judged against one timeless dictionary entry alone. We must first ask which convention establishes the relevant meaning, then classify the occurrence accordingly.

8. How the case of ṣalāh illustrates different conventions

الصَّلَاةُ
Ritual prayer; lexically the term is also associated with supplication.

In legal discourse, “perform ṣalāh” normally invokes the established religious practice. A use of the same word meaning supplication belongs to a different lexical context, and its exact classification depends on the discourse.

The crucial difference is that a specialized conventional meaning need not be a fresh metaphor every time it occurs. A meaning can become established within a convention; a temporary figurative use works differently, through a relevant relation and contextual indication.

9. Literal usage versus an erroneous designation

خُذْ هَذَا الْفَرَسَ
Take this horse.

If the speaker points to a book and mistakenly treats it as an instance of “faras,” this is an erroneous application of an assigned term. Not every deviation from the expected referent is a meaningful figure of speech.

Figurative usage requires an intelligible relation and suitable context. Arbitrarily calling a book a horse, with no communicative relation to exploit, does not amount to the structured transfer of meaning examined in rhetoric.

10. What separates metaphor from accidental error

رَأَيْتُ أَسَدًا يَرْمِي
I saw a lion shooting: that is, I saw a brave person shooting.

The ordinary sense of “asad” denotes the animal, but the indicator “shooting” directs the listener toward a brave human being. Courage provides a recognizable connection between lion and warrior; the expression can therefore function rhetorically rather than as a random mistake.

This introduces the connection between metaphor and contextual indication. The detailed divisions of figurative language follow later; for now, distinguish the original sense, transferred sense, relation, and indicator.

11. An objection to invoking the speaker’s convention

A word may function in several recognized registers. One might object that appealing to the convention of discourse makes the literal/figurative classification unstable, especially when the hearer is unsure which convention applies.

The answer is to distinguish recognized linguistic practice from a speaker’s arbitrary personal preference. An established convention supplies a meaningful standard; identifying that convention is part of understanding the utterance.

A word's literal status in one setting therefore need not settle its status in another. This is why context becomes important when separating accepted transfers of usage from temporary rhetorical transference.

12. Comparison of literal, figurative and mistaken use

CategoryCriterionExampleLiteralAccords with the governing assignmentAsad for the animal lionFigurativeAnother sense via a relation and indicatorAsad for a brave person in contextMistakeMisapplication without relevant relationMistaking a book for a horseNo actual useNo utterance has occurredA word existing only as a dictionary entry

The point is that departing from an ordinary sense is not a single phenomenon. There may be a change of register, an effective figure, an error, or no instance of language use at all.

13. Why the definition is phrased in terms of a word

الكلمة
The word as an expression employed to convey a meaning.

The formulation uses a word as the unit of discussion, but the decisive questions concern its assigned meaning and its particular use. Counting words or attending only to sound will not establish whether the use is literal.

“Asad” is one word, while “I saw a lion shooting” is a complete sentence. The rhetorical classification concerns the intended sense of the word, although the indicator that resolves its sense can occur elsewhere in the sentence.

14. The technical concept of linguistic assignment

تعيين اللفظ للدلالة على معنى بنفسه
Assigning an expression to signify a meaning in its own right.

Waḍʿ establishes a conventional relation between an expression and a meaning. The expression serves as a sign, its meaning is the signified, and assignment links the two within shared usage. This is not a private impression of resemblance.

The qualification “in its own right” will generate a more technical objection: the import of particles often cannot be fully understood without a complement. Does this mean that particles lack linguistic assignment? The following discussion tests that question.

15. Understanding the phrase “in its own right”

“In its own right” does not mean that uttering a word removes every need for context or resolves every possible ambiguity. The point is that its capacity to signify a meaning is grounded in recognized assignment, not an accidental acoustic resemblance.

An ambiguous or homonymous word may require context to select one of several recognized senses. That does not remove the established connection between the word and each of those senses. Having a conventional significance and identifying the speaker’s specific intention are distinct tasks.

This distinction avoids the misleading conclusion that all contextual assistance destroys direct linguistic signification.

16. Signification in nouns, verbs, and particles

In nouns and verbs it is easier to apprehend a fairly self-contained content. “Kitāb” evokes a book, while “kataba” signifies an act of writing. Some particles, however, signal relations that require further expressions to be specified.

“Min” marks a relation of starting from, and “ilā” marks reaching toward an endpoint. In “from the house to the mosque,” the relata become clear. Uttering “min” alone does not identify the particular terms linked by that relation.

This dependence does not render particles meaningless. It characterizes the relational mode of their signification.

17. The objection about assigning particles

A technical objection arises if assignment demands independent signification, while a particle’s full interpretation depends on other elements. Does that make particles fall outside the definition of assignment?

Consider “fī” and “min.” Their general relational functions are conventional, but identifying what is in what, or what begins from where, requires a broader expression. Some classical approaches therefore treat the assignment of particles differently from that of nouns and verbs.

The countervailing approach treats the general relational signification itself as conventionally assigned, even though each specific relation needs contextual completion. The debate turns on what is meant by independence in signification.

18. A particle’s individual and composite import

A particle can be considered with respect to its general individual function and its fully specified role in a construction. The first identifies the kind of relation it expresses; the second identifies the actual relata in a particular expression.

In “fī l-bayt” (“in the house”), the particle contributes a locative relation. A complete assertion still requires us to know what is in the house. The particle can therefore have conventional significance without constituting an independent proposition.

The key point is that inability to stand alone as a complete statement does not entail absence of an assigned meaning.

19. How context selects the meaning of a shared term

A shared or homonymous expression may have more than one separately recognized sense. An indicator can select which of those senses a speaker intends without necessarily making that use figurative.

“ʿAyn” can denote an eye, a spring, or another established sense. A construction such as “ʿaynu l-māʾ” selects a water spring. The need for such an indicator does not by itself dissolve the lexical assignment.

It is important to distinguish a selector among established senses from an indicator supporting a figurative transfer. The former resolves ambiguity; the latter participates in a different rhetorical operation.

20. The discussion of excluding homonyms

If “in its own right” is interpreted as “never requiring an indicator for understanding,” homonymous words appear problematic. A shared expression may need help to select one sense, even though each recognized sense belongs to its conventional semantic inventory.

The resolution lies in separating two levels: possessing conventionally assigned significance and identifying the specific sense intended in a particular utterance. An indicator may operate at the latter level without replacing the former.

Thus the mere need for context does not make every occurrence figurative, nor does the existence of ambiguity invalidate the idea of linguistic assignment.

21. Why kināyah raises a separate difficulty

In kināyah, an expression can direct the listener to an associated implication while leaving the surface meaning possible. In many forms of figurative use, by contrast, an indicator blocks taking the assigned literal sense as the intended one.

“Ṭawīlu l-nijād” (“long sword strap”) can imply a tall person through an associated feature, without necessarily ruling out a genuinely long strap. Thus possible surface meaning and intended implication can coexist.

This raises a difficulty for the definition of literal usage: how should an expression be classified when the original sense remains possible but a further meaning is sought? The answer must carefully specify the intended use and the relevant conception of kināyah.

22. Indicators in kināyah versus figurative transfer

A blocking indicator prevents the ordinary referent from being the intended one in a particular figurative occurrence. A non-blocking indicator may guide the listener to an implication without excluding the surface sense.

In “I saw a lion shooting,” “shooting” directs us toward a human agent. In “long sword strap” used to suggest tall stature, the reasoning differs: a genuinely long strap remains conceivable.

What matters is not merely whether an indicator exists, but what that indicator does: exclude the primary meaning or permit it alongside a further implication.

23. A contested boundary in the classification of kināyah

The place of kināyah in classifications of literal and figurative usage is more than a verbal dispute. One account highlights the intended implication, while another emphasizes that the expression may still be legitimately used in its ordinary sense.

It would therefore be careless to claim that kināyah is in every respect simply literal or in every respect simply figurative. One must ask what exactly is being classified: the established lexical sense, the speaker’s intended referent, or the communicated implication.

For practical analysis, the essential distinction remains that a kināyah indicator typically operates differently from an indicator that rules out the primary sense in figurative transfer.

24. Assignment and the allegation of circularity

One objection concerns possible circularity: to identify literal use we need to know the original assignment, but how is that assignment known without first classifying linguistic uses?

The stages should be distinguished. Speakers learn established word–meaning associations through language use, instruction, and accepted conventions. Those established associations can then serve as a standard for classifying a new occurrence. The definition does not require every individual to know all assignments without evidence.

Circularity would arise if the assigned sense were inferred solely from a use whose status already presupposes that very assignment. Careful separation of the epistemic question from the definitional standard prevents the simple objection from deciding the issue prematurely.

25. The claim that sounds signify by their own nature

One position suggests a natural relation between sound and meaning, potentially reducing the need to appeal to assignment. The discussion notes sound properties such as strength and softness as cases in which a perceived affinity may seem plausible.

A central objection is that if every word signified its meaning inherently and determinately, it would be difficult to account for different words in different languages denoting the same thing, or one expression having several established senses.

There is a vital distinction between noticing expressive affinities and claiming that convention is unnecessary. The former may be persuasive for particular expressions without supporting the sweeping latter claim.

26. Why language variation matters

Arabic, Persian and Turkish may use different words for the same referent. If every expression possessed one unalterable natural bond with its meaning, this extensive cross-linguistic variation would be difficult to explain.

The appeal to variation between languages supports the role of convention. A speaker might perceive a meaningful sound quality in a particular expression, but that impression does not determine the lexical inventory of every language.

Learning a word’s meaning thus normally requires knowing the established use of its speech community. Any additional claim of intrinsic sound symbolism calls for separate evidence.

27. Phonetic properties, derivation and morphology

The concluding discussion mentions sound qualities including jahr, hams, shiddah, rikhāwah, and tawassuṭ, and the relation of patterns and vowels to verbal meanings. Arabic phonetics and morphology may display suggestive formal and semantic affinities.

Nevertheless, the sound quality of letters alone is not enough to determine the meaning of every word. Derivation and inflection have their own technical principles concerning word structure, form, and semantic relationships.

These examples illustrate possible correspondences rather than establish a universal rule that eliminates conventional lexical assignment.

28. How strength and softness of sounds are relevant

الشِّدَّةُ، الرَّخَاوَةُ، التَّوَسُّطُ
Stops, continuants, and intermediate phonetic qualities.

These are properties of articulation. A strongly articulated expression may feel suitable for a forceful concept, but it does not follow that every expression with strong consonants must denote something forceful.

Likewise, studying voiced and breathy characteristics does not displace the linguistic need to recognize accepted word–meaning assignments. Phonetics and conventional semantics can inform each other without being identical disciplines.

29. A practical method for classifying use

Classifying a new occurrence involves a sequence of distinct judgments:
1. Identify the word and its actual occurrence.
2. Identify the governing lexical, religious, or customary convention.
3. Establish the sense assigned in that convention.
4. Identify the intended sense and any contextual indicator.
5. Determine whether the use follows the assignment, conveys another meaning by a recognized relation, or is simply erroneous.

For ṣalāh in a legal discussion, first consult the religious convention. For “lion” applied to an archer, distinguish its ordinary animal sense from the indicator pointing toward a human being.

30. Literal use, homonymy and allusion compared

TopicCentral questionDistinctive featureLiteralIs the use within its assigned sense?Agreement with conventionHomonymyWhich established sense is intended?Context selects a senseFigurativeIs the word transferred to another sense?Relevant relation and indicatorKināyahIs an implication intended?Original sense can remain possible

All these involve understanding intended meaning, but through different semantic mechanisms. Homonymy selects among assigned senses, figurative usage involves a transfer, and kināyah points to a meaning associated with an expression.

31. Completing the analysis of ḥaqīqah

Ḥaqīqah is a use that agrees with the meaning assigned to a word in the convention governing the conversation. The definition requires an actual occurrence, a recognized assigned sense, and identification of the appropriate linguistic register.

The objections concerning assignment, particles, homonymous words, allusion, and natural sound–meaning relations illuminate the limits of this criterion. The lesson’s conclusion is not to force every use into one category, but to distinguish the assigned sense, the intended sense, and any relevant indicator.

On this foundation, the definition and classification of figurative usage can be developed precisely: what sense has been transferred, what is the relation, and which contextual indicator makes the transfer intelligible?