Defining Majāz and Kināyah: Excluding Clues and the Transition to Simile

1. Majāz and kināyah within ʿilm al-bayān

After correspondence, inclusion and implication, rhetoric examines expressions in which the assigned sense of a word and the sense intended by the speaker may differ. We must explain how the mind passes from one meaning to a connected one and when that transition is warranted.

Both majāz (figurative usage) and kināyah (allusive expression) may carry the listener from a familiar meaning to a related intended sense. Indirectness alone does not distinguish them. The central question is whether the literal assigned meaning remains possible as an intended meaning.

This is why the earlier distinctions in indication matter for figurative language, allusion and, in the next section, simile. They provide the analytical foundation for these rhetorical categories.

2. Intended sense versus assigned meaning

ثم اللفظ المراد به لازم ما وضع له
Then comes the word through which a concomitant of its assigned meaning is intended.

The mawḍūʿ lah is the sense to which a word is conventionally assigned. In use, a speaker may intend that original sense or another meaning connected to it. To justify the latter interpretation, we must identify a meaningful relation linking it to the assigned sense.

For example, “ṭawīl al-nijād” literally refers to having a long sword-strap. In a traditional rhetorical setting it can suggest that the person is tall. The literal strap and the inferred stature are different meanings. Keeping them distinct allows a precise rhetorical analysis.

3. How broadly “concomitant” is used

سواء كان اللازم داخلا كما في التضمن أو خارجا كما في الالتزام
Whether the connected meaning lies within the assigned sense, as in inclusion, or outside it, as in implication.

Here lāzim is used broadly: it is not restricted to an externally related concomitant. An internal component, considered under taḍammun, may also be involved in the general account, while iltizām concerns an external connected sense.

A composite expression can lead attention to one of its included components. Conversely, “long sword-strap” can lead from its literal content to the external, associated quality of tall stature. In either case we must first specify the relation between the primary and intended meanings.

4. A related meaning alone is not sufficient

The fact that one meaning leads to another is not by itself enough to classify an expression as majāz or kināyah. We must also ask whether the original assigned meaning is still available as intended or whether a contextual indicator excludes it.

Suppose “lion” is used of a brave person and the context rules out an actual animal. The literal sense is then excluded. By contrast, “this man has a long sword-strap” could describe an actual long strap while also suggesting a tall person.

Both expressions can lead to a related meaning, but the status of the literal sense is different. This difference determines the rhetorical classification.

5. The decisive condition for majāz

إن قامت قرينة على عدم إرادته
If a contextual clue indicates that its assigned sense is not intended.

The pronoun refers to mā wuḍiʿa lah—the word's original assigned meaning. In majāz, a clue is present that excludes intending this literal meaning on the occasion of use. This is the qarīnah māniʿah, an excluding contextual indicator.

In “raʾaytu asadan yakhṭubu al-nās” (“I saw a lion addressing people”), the reference to public speaking, given a context about a brave orator, directs the listener toward a human being. The word still has “lion” as its lexical sense, but the actual animal is not the intended referent.

6. What the excluding clue actually does

An excluding clue does not erase a word's lexical assignment. Rather, it prevents intending that literal sense in the specific utterance. The distinction between language convention and an individual use therefore remains intact.

Verbal clue: “The lion delivered an eloquent public speech” can refer to a human orator; the speaking context indicates the shift.
Situational clue: Pointing to a courageous soldier and saying, “He is a lion,” while the man is visibly present.

In each case a clue may arise from the utterance itself or from the surrounding situation. The analysis must identify the lexical sense, the intended sense, and the operative clue separately.

7. Why only the transferred sense is intended in majāz

لأن معنى المجاز هو اللازم فقط
For the meaning intended in majāz is the connected meaning alone.

“Only the concomitant” means that the transferred intended sense is what the speaker communicates in this figurative use. The original literal sense is not intended there because the excluding clue prevents it.

If “Zayd is a lion” is used to praise his courage, it does not assert that Zayd is literally a wild animal. It attributes courage to him through the figurative image. None of this abolishes the established dictionary meaning of the word “lion.”

8. The fundamental characterization of kināyah

فمجاز وإلا فكناية
Then it is majāz; otherwise it is kināyah.

This concise alternative presupposes the earlier condition: the expression intends a connected meaning. If there is no clue excluding the possibility of intending the original literal sense, it is classified as kināyah. The utterance still leads beyond its literal content, but that content remains available as an intended meaning.

“The man has a long sword-strap” may literally be true while also suggesting that he is tall. Kināyah permits both meanings to be intended; it does not require the speaker to intend both in every instance.

9. Permissibility is not obligatory simultaneous intent

The possibility of intending a literal sense must not be confused with the requirement actually to intend both senses. In kināyah the original literal content remains an allowable interpretation. The speaker need not actively intend both senses with equal emphasis in every case.

For example, “His guest-room door is always open” may imply hospitality while also being factually true in its literal description. Yet the speaker's principal purpose may be only to convey generosity.

Thus the crucial distinction is literal intent excluded in majāz versus literal intent permitted in kināyah, not that the latter is necessarily the sum of two simultaneous assertions.

10. A kināyah may still have contextual clues

It is incorrect to say that kināyah has no contextual indicators at all. Custom, circumstances or another clue may lead the audience toward the connected intended sense. The defining point is that such a clue does not exclude the possibility of intending the literal sense.

Consider, “The fire in his home is never cold,” said when describing someone's hospitality. The conversational setting suggests generous hosting. In an appropriate situation, however, the literal notion of frequent cooking could also remain possible.

A clue that rules out the literal sense differs from one that merely helps identify an associated intended sense. Confusing their functions obscures the distinction.

11. Side-by-side comparison of majāz and kināyah

Both styles can guide us toward a related meaning. Describing one as “direct” and the other as “indirect” misses the main issue. The contextual clue and the possibility of literal intention must be analyzed together.

AspectMajāzKināyah
Intended meaningTransferred, connected senseAllusively indicated sense
Original assigned senseNot intended in this useMay also be intended
ClueExcludes literal intentionCan guide inference without excluding literal intention
Diagnostic questionWhy is the literal reading excluded?How do both readings remain possible?

The decisive row concerns the status of the assigned literal sense, not merely the existence of some inference.

12. The necessary link in kināyah

The lāzim is the connected sense ultimately targeted, while the malzūm is the sense from which the mental transition begins. In kināyah the conventional expression first presents the initial meaning and then leads to another through a recognized association.

In “ṭawīl al-nijād,” a long sword-strap provides the starting image. It can suggest a tall person's stature within traditional usage. This is a customary rhetorical association, not an infallible scientific rule about every sword-strap.

Removing the first sense entirely would change the character of kināyah, whose rhetorical effect depends on moving from that sense toward its concomitant.

13. An implication need not work in reverse

إذ لا دلالة للازم من حيث إنه لازم على الملزوم
For a concomitant, merely as a concomitant, need not indicate its antecedent.

That an antecedent sense suggests a concomitant does not guarantee that the concomitant uniquely identifies that very antecedent. Several different circumstances can yield the same associated quality, so the direction of the inferential movement matters.

For example, a long strap may suggest tallness, but a tall person does not necessarily have a long sword-strap. The presence of an inferred quality is not proof that every particular sign associated with it is physically present. This prevents confusion about the direction of indication.

14. Why majāz precedes kināyah

وقدم المجاز عليها
And majāz is presented before kināyah.

The first rationale is that in majāz only the related transferred meaning is intended and literal intention is excluded. In kināyah the connected meaning is intended while intending the antecedent literal sense also remains possible. In that respect majāz can appear conceptually more restricted.

This is not just a list-making decision: the first case has an excluded literal sense, while the second preserves the possibility of literal intention. Studying them in that sequence makes their difference especially clear.

15. Understanding “as though part of its meaning”

لأن معناه كجزء معناها
Because its meaning is, as it were, part of her [kināyah's] meaning.

The comparison particle ka- (“as though”) matters. The meaning of kināyah is not a literal compound whose two mandatory components are the concomitant and the original assigned sense. Thus majāz cannot strictly be described as an actual constituent of kināyah's meaning.

The comparison instead contrasts a use restricted to the transferred sense with a use that also permits literal intention. Part and whole are an analogy here, not an assertion of literal composition.

16. Kināyah is not literally a sum of two meanings

بل هو اللازم مع جواز إرادة الملزوم
Rather, it is the concomitant, with the possibility of intending the antecedent as well.

This corrects a possible misunderstanding: the concomitant is the allusively intended meaning, while literal intention remains permitted. That permission is not a second compulsory piece of a composite meaning actually intended every time.

In “ṭawīl al-nijād” the allusive point is tallness. The long sword-strap may also be literally intended, but kināyah does not vanish if the speaker primarily wishes to communicate only tallness, provided the literal reading has not been ruled out.

17. Possibility versus necessity in a table

Jawāz means that something is allowable or possible; wujūb means that it is required. This distinction is crucial to the definition of kināyah.

ClaimStatus
Kināyah targets the concomitantIts primary allusive point
The antecedent can also be intendedPermissible, not compulsory
Both must always actually be intendedFalse requirement
An excluding clue prevents literal intention in majāzDecisive indicator

The meaning actually targeted and the possibility of also intending another meaning need separate treatment. Their confusion produces an incorrect definition.

18. The analogy of part preceding whole

A part may be conceived as prior to the whole that comprises it. The rationale for presenting majāz before kināyah draws an analogy from this part–whole relation.

The limit of that reasoning matters. Kināyah is not literally concomitant + antecedent as a composite containing majāz as a proper constituent. The point is that both involve the associated intended sense, but kināyah has the additional permission of literal intention.

Thus “part before whole” supplies an explanation for the order of exposition, not a rigid new definition of kināyah.

19. Why the treatment now turns to simile

ثم منه أي من المجاز ما يبنى على التشبيه
Then among figurative expressions are those built upon simile.

Some transfers from a lexical sense to a related intended sense rely on a resemblance between two things. To understand these transfers, one must first understand what the resemblance consists in and how a comparison operates.

“Zayd is brave like a lion” explicitly states a comparison. “Zayd is a lion,” when figuratively said of his courage, can become the basis of istiʿārah (metaphor). The two forms should not be collapsed: one states the similarity openly, while the other transfers an expression figuratively.

20. The comparison underlying istiʿārah

وهو الاستعارة التي كان أصلها التشبيه
That is istiʿārah, whose foundation is simile.

In istiʿārah a word associated with one thing may be applied to another on the basis of a shared point of resemblance. The underlying comparison is retained conceptually, even when explicit comparative elements are omitted or recast.

Simile: “Zayd is brave like a lion” — the common quality of bravery is expressed as a comparison.
Metaphorical transfer: “I saw a lion on the battlefield” — the context identifies a brave soldier and excludes the actual animal.

Thus simile explains how metaphorical resemblance works, but not every simile is itself an istiʿārah.

21. Why simile deserves independent treatment

Although simile prepares us for certain metaphorical transfers, it has its own components and rules. The point of resemblance, the items compared, and the degree to which comparative elements are stated or left implicit require dedicated analysis.

فتعين التعرض له
Therefore, simile, too, must be examined.

Treating simile as no more than a passing note within metaphor would overlook its own rhetorical functions. After establishing its relation to majāz, it therefore receives its own systematic treatment.

22. Three major topics in ʿilm al-bayān

فانحصر المقصود من علم البيان في الثلاثة
Thus the principal subjects of ʿilm al-bayān are these three.

1. Tashbīh (simile): Establishing resemblance between two things, including the component roles and comparative forms.
2. Majāz (figurative usage): Intending a connected nonliteral meaning where a clue excludes literal intention.
3. Kināyah (allusion): Reaching a connected intended sense while the original literal intention remains possible.

These divisions organize the central concerns of bayān. Earlier analysis of indication continues to help explain their operation, even as each receives more detailed treatment.

23. Worked examples: how classification proceeds

Before assigning a label, identify four things: assigned sense, intended sense, the relation between them, and the contextual clue. Otherwise classification becomes a superficial recognition exercise.

Example 1: “A lion is addressing the assembly” — if a brave orator is intended and an animal reading is excluded by the context, the use is majāz.
Example 2: “His hem is clean” — if this alludes to moral purity while an actually clean garment remains possible, the use is kināyah.
Example 3: “Zayd is like a lion” — the resemblance is explicitly expressed; in its basic form it is a simile.

Analysis depends on the context and intended relation, not merely on the appearance of one familiar word.

24. Correcting recurring misconceptions

Mistake 1: Every indirect meaning is majāz. Correction: Kināyah is also possible when no clue excludes the literal sense.

Mistake 2: Kināyah can have no clue at all. Correction: A clue may guide us toward the associated sense without ruling out the literal one.

Mistake 3: Kināyah must be the actual sum of two jointly intended meanings. Correction: The concomitant is intended, and intention of the antecedent is permitted rather than required.

Mistake 4: Simile and istiʿārah are identical. Correction: Some metaphors grow out of simile, but the two have distinguishable forms and rules.

25. Concluding principles and the next boundary

Core rule: If a word conveys a connected sense and a clue excludes intention of the original assigned sense, the use is majāz. If the allusive concomitant is intended but the original literal sense remains possible, the use is kināyah.

Important refinement: Allowing literal intention in kināyah does not require two actually intended senses in every occurrence. Accordingly, majāz and kināyah are not literally constituent and whole in their definitions.

The three principal subjects of bayān are simile, figurative expression, and allusion. Some types of istiʿārah depend on a prior comparison, so the next lesson begins the separate, detailed treatment of simile and its component structure.