وَأَمَّا فِي التَّضَمُّنِ فَلِأَنَّهُ يَجُوزُ أَنْ يَكُونَ الْمَعْنَى جُزْءًا مِنْ شَيْءٍ وَجُزْءَ الْجُزْءِ مِنْ شَيْءٍ آخَرَ
With inclusion, degrees of clarity may arise because a meaning is a component of one thing and a component of another component of a larger thing.
Under a traditional philosophical analysis, “animal” is a relatively direct essential component of the conception “human,” whereas “body” is more remote, reached through a broader component. Moving from the whole sense to its nearby component can thus differ from moving through that component to a further level.
Here “component” is not always a physical fragment. It may be an analytic part of an essential concept. Thus “human,” “animal,” and “body” should not be reduced to the relation between a body and a detached limb.