Suppose someone believes Zayd arrived yesterday, but in fact he did not. The person states, “Zayd arrived yesterday.”
Majority: false, because reality disagrees.
Al-Naẓẓām: true, because the assertion agrees with the speaker’s belief.
Now suppose the person knows Zayd arrived but says, “He did not arrive.” Both views call the statement false, though their criteria differ.
The theories produce visibly different classifications only when belief and reality come apart in the relevant way.
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Truth and Falsehood in Reports: The Majority, al-Naẓẓām and al-Jāḥiẓ
Suppose someone believes Zayd arrived yesterday, but in fact he did not. The person states, “Zayd arrived yesterday.”
Majority: false, because reality disagrees.
Al-Naẓẓām: true, because the assertion agrees with the speaker’s belief.
Now suppose the person knows Zayd arrived but says, “He did not arrive.” Both views call the statement false, though their criteria differ.
The theories produce visibly different classifications only when belief and reality come apart in the relevant way.