The Seven Compound Modalities and the Negations of Permanence and Necessity

1. From simple to compound modality

The previous lesson covered eight simple modalities, qualifying predication by necessity, permanence, description, time, actuality or possibility. Here two modal aspects combine to form a distinct technical kind of proposition.

«المركبة قضية ركبت حقيقتها من إيجاب وسلب»
A compound proposition is one whose content is composed of affirmation and negation.

The point is not merely to place two ordinary sentences beside each other. An initial modal judgment is qualified by a denial of permanence or necessity under a specified consideration. Understanding which component does which work is central to this section.

2. Which component determines affirmation or negation?

«والاعتبار في تسميتها موجبة أو سالبة للجزء الأول»
A compound proposition is called affirmative or negative according to its first component.

In “Every writer moves the fingers while writing, but not permanently,” the first component affirms a predicate. The whole form is therefore affirmative, even though its latter component denies permanence.

If the initial part denies a predicate—such as the absence of stillness while writing—the whole construction is negative. Thus an ending like “not always” does not automatically classify the compound proposition as negative.

3. Lā dāʾiman: denying permanence

«لا دائماً»
Not permanently: the predication does not endure throughout the subject's existence.

It does not mean the previously asserted predicate never occurs. It may hold continuously under a specified description while failing to hold over the subject's whole lifetime.

For example:
“The writer moves the fingers while writing” — a claim bound to the descriptive condition.
“Not permanently” — the movement is not predicated of that person at every moment of existence.

Thus truth while a condition holds is different from permanence throughout the subject's existence.

4. Lā bi-l-ḍarūrah: denying necessity

«لا بالضرورة»
Not necessarily: the relation is not necessary in virtue of the subject itself.

This is not the same as declaring the first judgment false. A particular person may actually be writing, but writing is not essential to that person's existence; the person can remain human without writing.

Bi-l-fiʿl concerns actuality, whereas lā bi-l-ḍarūrah denies essential necessity. What happens and what must happen are logically distinct.

5. Overview of the seven compound modalities

The seven terms should be learned through their structure, not just memorized as names.

1. Special conditional: general conditional + non-permanence with respect to the subject itself.
2. Special customary: general customary + non-permanence with respect to the subject itself.
3. Existential non-necessary: generally absolute + non-necessity in itself.
4. Existential non-permanent: generally absolute + non-permanence in itself.
5. Temporal special: time-specific simple + non-permanence in itself.
6. Dispersed temporal special: time-indefinite simple + non-permanence in itself.
7. Special possible: denial of necessity on both opposed sides.

The first six add a qualification to a simple mode; the seventh joins the non-necessity of each contradictory side.

6. 1 — Structure of the special conditional

«المشروطة الخاصة: وهي المشروطة العامة مع قيد اللادوام بحسب الذات»
The special conditional is the general conditional qualified by non-permanence with respect to the subject itself.

The general conditional asserts necessity while the subject bears its descriptive title. The special conditional adds that the predicate is not permanent throughout the entire existence of that subject.

“While the person is writing” and “not permanently” are therefore consistent: the first fixes the duration of the descriptive condition, the second denies lifelong persistence.

7. Analyzing an affirmative special conditional

The source illustrates the affirmative construction as follows:
«بالضرورة كل كاتب متحرك الأصابع ما دام كاتبا لا دائما»
Necessarily every writer moves the fingers while writing, but not permanently.

Its parts are:
Subject: writer.
Predicate: one whose fingers move.
First judgment: necessity of movement while the writing description applies.
Second qualification: the movement is not lifelong.

This is called affirmative because the first part affirms movement. The example is part of the book's conceptual teaching model rather than a claim that every possible mode of writing physically requires finger motion at every instant.

8. Analyzing a negative special conditional

«بالضرورة لا شيء من الكاتب بساكن الأصابع ما دام كاتبا لا دائما»
Necessarily, no writer is one whose fingers are still while writing, but not permanently.

The first component is negative: stillness is denied under the writing description. “Not permanently” then denies that the same negative relation holds over the subject's whole existence.

The two negative expressions have different targets:
“No writer ...” — denial of the predicate.
“Not permanently” — denial that this judgment persists throughout the subject's existence.

9. 2 — Definition of the special customary

«العرفية الخاصة: وهي العرفية العامة مع قيد اللادوام بحسب الذات»
The special customary joins the general customary mode to non-permanence with respect to the subject itself.

The general customary mode involves permanence while the descriptive title applies; the general conditional involves necessity under that same title.

Both special constructions add “not permanently,” but they start differently:
Special conditional — necessity while the description holds.
Special customary — continuity while the description holds.

The distinction lies in the force of their first components, not in the final qualification.

10. Two different durations in the special customary

The book retains its writer-and-finger-movement illustration. It expresses continuity while the writing description applies, but does not attribute that very relation to the person throughout the entire period of existence.

Descriptive duration: while writing — continuity under the title.
Essential duration: the person's whole lifetime — no permanence.

Affirmative and negative cases are named according to the first judgment. Either may take the later qualification, which concerns the subject's entire duration.

11. 3 — The existential non-necessary mode

«الوجودية اللاضرورية»
The existential non-necessary modality.

«وهي المطلقة العامة مع قيد اللاضرورة بحسب الذات»
It is the generally absolute proposition qualified by non-necessity in virtue of the subject itself.

The generally absolute mode concerns what holds actually, without thereby asserting essential necessity. The additional qualification explicitly states that the actual predicate is not essential to the subject.

Its structure is actuality + non-necessity, not actuality + non-permanence. The latter names a different compound kind.

12. Affirmative example of existential non-necessity

«كل إنسان كاتب بالفعل لا بالضرورة»
Every human is actually a writer, but not necessarily so.

In this textbook illustration, in actuality qualifies the first component, whereas not necessarily qualifies the second. Even when the first claim is taken as true under an illustrative assumption, writing does not become an essential predicate of humanity.

This is a formal textbook example, not an empirical declaration that every person in the real world currently writes. Its instructional point is that actual occurrence does not imply essential necessity.

13. Negative formulation of existential non-necessity

«لا شيء من الإنسان بكاتب بالفعل لا بالضرورة»
No human is actually a writer, but not necessarily so.

The first component negates being a writer, so the whole proposition is technically negative. “Not necessarily” then says that a person's not writing is not an essential property of humanity; one could become a writer.

The sentence serves as a formal example of the type. It is not an accepted empirical generalization that no humans write. The logical distinction concerns actual denial versus denial of necessity.

14. 4 — The existential non-permanent mode

«الوجودية اللادائمة»
The existential non-permanent modality.

«وهي المطلقة العامة مع قيد اللادوام بحسب الذات»
It is the generally absolute proposition plus non-permanence with respect to the subject itself.

In the existential non-necessary kind, the first part affirms actuality and the second denies necessity. Here actuality remains, but the second clause denies permanence.

These are two distinct modes: one rejects essential necessity, and the other rejects persistence over the subject's existence.

15. Laughter as an existential non-permanent example

«كل إنسان ضاحك بالفعل لا دائما»
Every human is actually laughing, but not permanently.

The point is that, even when laughter is actual, it is not a condition lasting throughout human existence. A person may laugh at one time and not at another.

The negative construction analogously denies laughter under a given circumstance without making that denial permanent over the entire lifetime.

Actuality refers to occurrence, whereas non-permanence denies continuous persistence. One occurrence does not establish a permanent feature.

16. 5 — Special temporal modality: fixed time, no permanence

«الوقتية: وهي الوقتية المطلقة إذا قيدت باللادوام بحسب الذات»
The special temporal proposition is the time-specific simple modality qualified by non-permanence in itself.

The simple time-specific modality asserts a necessary relation at an appointed time. The compound form adds that the relation is not permanent throughout the subject's existence.

Keep two durations separate:
Appointed time: the period in which the qualified relation is necessary.
Subject's full duration: the span over which permanence is denied.

Without this distinction, necessity at a particular time may be incorrectly generalized to necessity at all times.

17. The lunar-eclipse illustration of special temporality

«بالضرورة كل قمر منخسف وقت حيلولة الأرض بينه وبين الشمس لا دائما»
Necessarily the moon is eclipsed when the Earth intervenes between it and the sun, but not permanently.

The time of intervention identifies the appointed condition; necessity is asserted under that condition. “Not permanently” denies that eclipse holds throughout the moon's entire existence.

As an empirical qualification, a real lunar eclipse requires the appropriate celestial alignment, not mere verbal mention of Earth's intervention. The textbook's logical point is the combination specified time + non-permanence.

18. The negative version of special temporality

The book illustrates the negative temporal proposition by mentioning the moon at quadrature and denying eclipse under that specified condition.

«بالضرورة لا شيء من القمر منخسف وقت التربيع لا دائما»
Necessarily the moon is not eclipsed at quadrature, but this denial is not permanent.

The initial component is negative: it denies eclipse at the designated time. The final “not permanently” says that absence of eclipse cannot be generalized across the moon's entire duration.

The distinction is between “not eclipsed at this specified time” and “never eclipsed.”

19. 6 — Dispersed modality: some unspecified time, no permanence

«المنتشرة: وهي المنتشرة المطلقة المقيدة باللادوام بحسب الذات»
The dispersed mode is the time-indefinite simple modality qualified by non-permanence in itself.

The simple dispersed modality makes the qualified judgment necessary at some unspecified time, whereas the special temporal mode designates a particular time. The compound dispersed mode also denies lifelong permanence.

Its two key qualifications are:
Waqtan mā: at some time, not specifically identified.
Lā dāʾiman: not over the whole duration of the subject's existence.

One concerns the determination of time; the other concerns the absence of permanence.

20. Breathing as an example of the dispersed mode

«بالضرورة كل إنسان متنفس في وقت ما لا دائما»
Necessarily every human breathes at some time, but not permanently.

The pedagogical point is the unspecified time: the sentence does not identify a particular instant, only some time at which the qualified judgment applies. The final phrase denies permanence over the entire duration.

The book also illustrates a negative first component concerning breathing at some time. The affirmative or negative label depends on the initial judgment, not on the final non-permanence clause.

21. 7 — Special possibility

«الممكنة الخاصة»
Special possibility.

«وهي التي حكم فيها بارتفاع الضرورة المطلقة عن جانبي الوجود والعدم جميعا»
It is a proposition that denies unrestricted necessity on both sides, existence and nonexistence.

General possibility denies the necessity of the opposite and can therefore include necessary propositions. Special possibility goes further by denying necessity in either direction.

The predicate's presence is not essential and its absence is not essential either. The two opposed outcomes are open in the sense of special possibility.

22. Affirmative and negative illustrations of special possibility

«كل إنسان ضاحك بالإمكان الخاص»
A human may laugh, by special possibility.

«ولا شيء من الإنسان بضاحك بالإمكان الخاص»
And a human may fail to laugh, by special possibility.

Special possibility does not mean that one person is both laughing and not laughing at exactly the same time in the same respect. Laughter is not essential to humanity, nor is the absence of laughter essential.

This distinguishes either outcome being possible from both contradictory outcomes being simultaneously true.

23. General possibility versus special possibility

In general possibility, the opposite of the proposition is not necessary. This broad sense can include propositions that are themselves necessary.

In special possibility, unrestricted necessity is absent on both the affirmative and negative sides. Animality is necessary to a human; laughter is not. They therefore cannot be grouped under special possibility merely because both admit some ordinary-language use of “possible.”

A human can laugh or refrain from laughing. A human's being an animal is not similarly nonessential. The technical word “possible” must be interpreted according to its qualification.

24. “Not always” is not “always not”

This scope difference is essential:
«لا دائماً»
Not always — denial of permanence of the judgment.

«دائماً لا»
Always not — a permanently negative judgment.

“Zayd does not laugh all the time” means laughter does not continue without interruption. “Zayd never laughs” is much stronger: it negates laughter at every time.

Thus compound modalities require identifying the scope of negation. Denial of permanence must not be silently replaced with permanence of denial.

25. “Not necessary” is not “necessarily not”

Necessity has a parallel scope distinction:
«لا بالضرورة»
Not necessarily — denial of the necessity of the predication.

«بالضرورة لا»
Necessarily not — a necessary denial of the predicate.

“Being a writer is not necessary for humans” does not entail “It is necessary that humans not write.” The first is consistent with actual writers; the second would exclude writing altogether.

Existential non-necessity requires denial of necessity, not the necessity of negation. Translation must preserve this difference.

26. A reliable classification procedure

Do not classify a compound mode from its name or last phrase alone. Use four checks.

1. Does the first component affirm or negate the predicate? This determines the positive/negative designation.
2. Is its primary mode necessity, descriptive continuity, actuality or temporal necessity?
3. Is the limiting condition a descriptive title, an appointed time or an unspecified time?
4. Does the second component deny permanence, necessity or necessity on both opposing sides?

For example, “actually, but not necessarily” combines actuality with denied necessity and is therefore existential non-necessary.

27. Consolidation and transition to conditional propositions

Special conditional — necessity under a descriptive condition + non-permanence in itself.
Special customary — descriptive continuity + non-permanence in itself.
Existential non-necessary — actuality + non-necessity.
Existential non-permanent — actuality + non-permanence.
Special temporal — necessity at an appointed time + non-permanence.
Dispersed — necessity at an unspecified time + non-permanence.
Special possibility — non-necessity of both affirmation and negation.

The source separately clarifies the force of lā-dawām and lā-ḍarūrah; these create distinct compound modes.

It then opens Bāb al-Sharṭiyyāt, where connected and disjunctive conditional propositions are treated in detail.