Prescribed Acts and Prohibitions: Fard, Wajib, Sunnah, Nafl, Haram, Makruh, Azimah and Rukhsah

1. Four categories of prescribed acts

«والمشروعات على أربعة أقسام: الفرض، والواجب، والسنة، والنفل»
Prescribed acts fall into four categories: fard, wajib, sunnah and nafl.

Fard and wajib each involve obligation to perform, but the author distinguishes them by the evidentiary basis. Sunnah concerns an established normative practice to be maintained, while nafl is an additional voluntary act that does not incur punishment when omitted.

An act is not classified merely because it seems useful or widely practised. The relevant evidence and its legal indication determine the category.

2. The lexical and legal definition of fard

«الفرض: هو لغة: التقدير، وشرعاً: ما ثبت بدليل قطعي لا شبهة فيه»
Lexically, fard refers to fixing or determining a measure; technically it is a duty established through conclusive evidence without relevant uncertainty.

Here a conclusive proof is one that establishes the required ruling decisively. Merely finding a text is not enough to assign every detailed ruling the label fard; the authority of the proof and the clarity of its legal indication both matter.

The author uses fard in contrast with wajib, so the two definitions should be considered together.

3. Fard: practical and doctrinal consequences

«حكمه: لزوم العمل به والاعتقاد به، فجحوده كفر»
Its ruling is that performance and acceptance of its binding status are required; denying a definitively established obligation is described as disbelief.

The word juhud means denial of a known, decisive religious ruling, not simple negligence in performance. Neglecting a duty and denying that it is a duty are two different matters.

The textbook is setting out a legal-theoretical classification, not authorizing an automatic judgment against an individual. Questions about an identifiable person require further conditions, evidence and scholarly examination.

4. Wajib and non-conclusive evidence

«الواجب: من الوجوب، وهو السقوط، وشرعاً: ما ثبت بدليل فيه شبهة»
Lexically, wajib is associated with falling into place or becoming binding; technically it is a duty established through evidence with an element of non-conclusiveness.

Here shubhah does not mean a baseless suspicion or an unreliable guess. It indicates that either the proof or its legal indication does not reach the decisiveness associated with fard, despite remaining authoritative for action.

A rule can therefore be practically binding even though its evidentiary grade differs from that of fard.

5. Sources and examples of wajib

«كالآيات المؤولة والصحيح من أخبار الآحاد، كصلاة الوتر والعيدين»
Examples include verses requiring interpretation and sound solitary reports, such as the witr and two Eid prayers.

The book cites witr and Eid prayer as wajib in the Hanafi classification. Other juristic schools assign different statuses to some of these prayers, and that school-specific context should be retained.

An interpretive element in a verse or the evidentiary status of a sound solitary report does not make the resulting obligation optional.

6. The ruling of wajib compared with fard

«هو فرض في حق العمل به، حتى لا يجوز تركه، ونفل في حق الاعتقاد، فلا يلزمنا الاعتقاد به، فجحوده بتأويل ليس بكفر»
Wajib is treated like fard in requiring performance, so its omission is impermissible; but it does not have the same conclusive doctrinal status as fard, and its denial through interpretation is not classified as disbelief.

The phrase “like nafl in respect of belief” is a technical contrast in this passage. It emphatically does not make a wajib optional like a voluntary prayer.

Fard and wajib resemble one another in practical obligation; they differ in the conclusiveness of evidence and related doctrinal consequences.

7. Sunnah: the established practice

«السنة لغة: الطريقة، وشرعاً: ما واظب عليه الرسول ﷺ أو الخلفاء الراشدون من بعده»
Lexically, sunnah means a way or path; here it means a practice persistently maintained by the Prophet ﷺ or by the rightly guided caliphs after him.

Muwazabah is regular, continuing observance. It is central to this particular legal classification and not equivalent merely to hearing of a single incident.

This is the usage in the present chapter. Hadith studies use “Sunnah” more broadly for sayings, actions and tacit approvals, as the earlier lesson explained.

8. The ruling of sunnah and its omission

«حكمها: يطالب المرء بإحيائها، ويستحق الملامة على تركها، إلا أن يتركها أحياناً أو بعذر»
A person is called to maintain the Sunnah and may deserve blame for abandoning it, apart from occasional omission or a valid excuse.

The author differentiates persistent disregard from an occasional justified omission. Such a Sunnah is not treated as simply interchangeable with every voluntary act, nor is its omission automatically identical to abandoning fard.

The proper grade encourages consistent practice without assigning greater legal force than the evidence establishes.

9. Nafl, tatawwu and mandub

«النفل لغة: الزيادة، وشرعاً: ما هو زيادة على الفرائض والواجبات، ويقال له: التطوع والمندوب أيضاً»
Lexically, nafl means an addition; legally it is an act beyond fard and wajib. The author also calls it tatawwu or mandub.

An “addition” is an act beyond the basic binding duties, not an act lacking religious worth. Voluntary worship and virtuous deeds may be meritorious within their relevant conditions.

What distinguishes this category is that approval does not amount to a binding duty.

10. The ruling of nafl and the fourfold comparison

«حكمه: يثاب المرء على فعله، ولا يعاقب بتركه»
One is rewarded for performing a voluntary act and not punished for omitting it.

Compare the four types:
Fard: binding through decisive proof.
Wajib: binding through authoritative but not decisive proof.
Sunnah: an established normative practice to be maintained.
Nafl: additional recommended conduct without punishment for omission.

Their legal force and the strength of their evidence must not be collapsed into one indistinct category.

11. Three categories of prohibited or disfavoured conduct

«ومناهي الشرع ثلاثة أقسام: الحرام، والمكروه كراهة تحريم، والمكروه كراهة تنزيه»
The law's negative directions fall into three groups: haram, makruh tahrimi and makruh tanzihi.

Each involves some degree of discouragement or prohibition, but they differ in the strength of the demand and the standing of the evidence. Calling an act “disliked” cannot by itself tell us whether the act is gravely forbidden or merely preferable to avoid.

Notice how conclusive versus non-conclusive proof and the effects of violation distinguish these categories.

12. Definition of haram

«الحرام: ضد الحلال، وهو ما طلب ترك فعله بدليل قطعي لا شبهة فيه»
Haram is the opposite of lawful; it is conduct that must be avoided on the basis of conclusive evidence without relevant uncertainty.

The textbook mentions illicit sexual intercourse and theft as examples. The definition depends not on the severity of a label alone, but on the decisive proof establishing an obligation to refrain.

Fard concerns a decisively established duty to do something; haram concerns a decisively established duty to refrain.

13. Haram: avoidance, blame and denial

«حكمه: لزوم الاعتقاد بنهيه ووجوب الاجتناب عن العمل به، وجحوده كفر»
Its prohibition must be accepted and the act avoided; denial of a decisively established prohibition is classified as disbelief.

The author adds that avoidance earns commendation and reward, while unjustified commission merits punishment. But committing a prohibited act and rejecting that it is prohibited remain distinct matters.

These abstract categories do not justify instant judgments about particular persons. Any legal application must consider excuses, compulsion, knowledge and other relevant conditions.

14. Definition of makruh tahrimi

«المكروه كراهة تحريم: وهو ما طلب ترك فعله بدليل فيه شبهة»
Makruh tahrimi is conduct that one is required to avoid, with the prohibition established through evidence containing an element of non-conclusiveness.

The Hanafi examples in the text concern predatory animals with fangs, predatory birds with talons, and domestic donkey meat. Their fuller legal debates belong elsewhere; here the point is the grade of the evidence supporting restraint.

This category must not be reduced to a casual personal dislike. Avoidance remains binding within the author's classification.

15. The consequences of makruh tahrimi

«حكمه: لزوم الاجتناب عن العمل به، مع غلبة الظن بحرمته»
Its legal effect is an obligation to avoid the conduct, based on a strong presumption of its prohibition.

The text adds that denial without interpretation is a deviation, while commission without excuse or plausible interpretation brings blame and punishment. The stated qualifications mean disagreement and individual action should not be treated alike in every circumstance.

Like haram, this category calls for avoidance; unlike haram, the author identifies its proof as less than decisive.

16. First form of makruh tanzihi

«المكروه كراهة تنزيه: وهو ما كان الأصل فيه الحرمة، فسقطت لعموم البلوى كسؤر الهرة»
One form of makruh tanzihi concerns something whose original grounds pointed toward prohibition, but the restriction is lifted because of a widespread, difficult-to-avoid circumstance, as illustrated by water left after a cat has drunk.

Umum al-balwa is a general condition affecting many people in a way that makes avoidance unusually burdensome. The example illustrates a justified easing of a general concern.

It is not a blanket license to set aside prohibitions whenever an individual finds them inconvenient; the legal basis of widespread hardship must be established.

17. Second form of makruh tanzihi

«أو ما كان الأصل فيه الإباحة، فعرض ما أخرجه عنها، ولم يغلب على الظن تحريمه كسؤر سباع الطير»
The other form concerns something originally permissible, later affected by a factor that prevents unqualified permissibility without establishing a strong presumption of prohibition; the text illustrates it through water left by predatory birds.

The first form involved a relaxation due to widespread hardship. The second begins with permissibility but acquires a reason for mild disapproval.

Keeping the two patterns separate makes the grounds of classification intelligible rather than memorizing both merely under the same name.

18. Effect of makruh tanzihi and the threefold comparison

«حكمه: يثاب تاركه أدنى ثواب، ولا يعاقب فاعله أصلاً»
Avoiding it brings a lesser degree of reward, while doing it incurs no punishment.

Compare the three negative categories:
Haram: avoidance required by decisive evidence.
Makruh tahrimi: avoidance required by authoritative but non-decisive evidence.
Makruh tanzihi: avoidance preferred but commission not punishable.

Though both kinds of makruh share a name, their practical legal consequences differ markedly.

19. Azimah: the primary prescribed rule

«والمشروعات على نوعين: العزيمة والرخصة»
Prescribed rulings have two modes: azimah and rukhsah.

«العزيمة لغة: القصد المؤكد، وشرعاً: ما لزمنا من الأحكام ابتداءً»
Azimah lexically means firm resolve and legally a ruling established as the initial norm.

The text places fard, wajib and the other primary categories under this broader discussion. Azimah is the normal ruling in the relevant circumstances, not an exceptional reduction due to hardship.

20. Rukhsah: relief under specified conditions

«الرخصة لغة: اليسر والسهولة، وشرعاً: صرف الأمر من عسر إلى يسر، وهي على نوعين»
Rukhsah lexically means ease; technically it moves a matter from hardship toward relief. The author presents two forms.

Concession does not mean that people may change rulings whenever they wish. It is a legally recognized relaxation linked to particular circumstances, such as coercion or necessity.

In the first form the underlying prohibition remains while relief is granted for a coerced outward act. In the second, consuming something otherwise forbidden becomes permitted despite the presence of its ordinary prohibitive cause.

21. First concession: the underlying prohibition remains

«رخصة الفعل مع بقاء الحرمة»
A concession for an act while its underlying prohibition remains.

The textbook illustrates this with severe coercion involving a genuine threat to life or bodily integrity, discussing a limited allowance concerning an outward utterance of unbelief.

«بشرط أن يكون قلبه مطمئناً بالإيمان»
Provided that the heart remains firm in faith.

The issue is genuine duress and inward faith under extreme danger. It cannot be extended to voluntary rejection of faith or ordinary social pressure.

22. Endurance in the first concession

«حكمه: لو صبر حتى قتل لكان مأجوراً؛ لتعظيمه نهي الشارع»
According to the book, someone who remains steadfast under this extreme coercion and is killed is rewarded for honoring the prohibition.

This is a specific juristic illustration of a concession alongside the possibility of retaining the primary ruling. It does not mean that accepting the concession is forbidden or that one is generally required to expose oneself to death; the concession exists precisely because of severe compulsion.

The learner should recognize that an allowed concession and a praised act of endurance can coexist in this narrowly described classical example.

23. Second concession: permission under necessity

«ما استبيح مع قيام السبب»
Something becomes permissible although the ordinary cause of its prohibition still exists.

The book illustrates this with life-threatening coercion to consume carrion or wine, and with makhmasah, an extreme famine or hunger threatening survival.

The ordinary prohibition remains intelligible, but a genuine need to preserve life can allow what would ordinarily be forbidden, to the extent required. Preference, convenience, or appetite is not equivalent to this kind of necessity.

24. Preserving life in the second concession

«حكمه: لو امتنع عن تناوله حتى قتل أو مات يكون آثماً؛ لامتناعه عن المباح»
The book states that if someone in this extreme necessity refuses the now-permitted means of survival until death results, the person is sinful for refusing what became permissible in those conditions.

This differs from the first type of concession. Here the priority is preservation of life, so accepting the lifesaving relaxation is not merely an inferior option.

The discussion concerns genuinely life-threatening circumstances. Any practical application must assess real danger, available lawful alternatives, proportionality and other relevant conditions.

25. Comparing the two concessions and concluding the book

In the first concession, severe coercion grants restricted relief while the underlying prohibition remains; the textbook praises steadfast endurance. In the second, something ordinarily forbidden becomes permissible as necessary to preserve life, and refusing the now-permitted lifesaving means can be blameworthy.

The key is not simply whether a case is “difficult,” but what happens to the underlying rule, what condition justifies the concession, and what consequence the text attaches to that condition.

The textbook closes with “تم الكتاب والحمد لله” (“The book is complete, and praise belongs to God”). Across the course, interpretation of wording, Sunnah, consensus and analogy has led to the final understanding of legal grades and their carefully limited exceptions.