Compulsion and Choice: Voluntary Acts, Creation and Acquisition
Read-only question overview. Answers and scoring remain inside authenticated learner attempts.
- What is the principal implication of voluntary acts in the opening statement?
- Which distinction between khalq and kasb is accurate?
- Which observation challenges the strict Jabarī account?
- What principally differentiates deliberate striking from trembling?
- How do capacity and intention relate to accountability?
- What does real attribution of “he wrote” to a person not entail?
- What does “as recompense for what they used to do” support?
- Which confusion underlies the argument from foreknowledge to coercion?
- What does “God knows and wills that the servant acts or abstains by choice” establish?
- Knowing with certainty in advance that an act will occur is not equivalent to what?
- Which conclusion does not follow from the occurrence of a sin?
- How should “necessity through choice does not negate choice” be understood?
- Under what condition can one act be related to two powers?
- When would the relation of two powers entail partnership in creation?
- What is the relevant meaning of an instrument in discussing acquisition?
- Where do Ashʿarī and Māturīdī accounts most directly differ?
- What does ṣarf mean in “directing the servant’s capacity and will toward an act”?
- Which example best captures choice between doing and refraining under obligation?
- Which distinction answers the objection of partnership?
- Why is the agent blameworthy for a reprehensible act?
- Why distinguish creation of a sinful event from commission of sin?
- What does the bitter-medicine example illustrate?
- Which set of considerations best fits praise and blame?
- Which relation encompasses occurrence while approval is restricted to the good?
- Which summary best preserves the theological balance?
- Why does the discussion next turn to istiṭāʿah (capacity)?
- Attributing a voluntary action genuinely to a person necessarily makes that person an independent creator.
- Certainty of a voluntary act through prior knowledge does not by itself make it coerced.
- The occurrence of a sinful act necessarily implies divine religious approval and love.
- Distinguishing acquisition from creation does not amount to positing two independent creators.